The issue of the retroactivity of the “Fair Sentencing Act of 2010″ (FSA), which reduced penalties for crack cocaine offenses, has been the source of quite a bit of recent litigation. On February 9, 2011, the Fifth Circuit ruled, in United States v. Doggins, 633 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2011), that the FSA is NOT retroactive for defendants who were sentenced BEFORE the FSA was signed into law on August 3, 2010. The Fifth Circuit, and indeed nearly every other federal circuit, has ruled that the “Savings Statute” of Title 1 U.S.C. §109 requires the application of the old law in place at the time of the commission of the crime, in the absence of congressional intent either express or implied as to the retroactivity of a new law. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, the FSA is not retroactive as to any defendant who was sentenced before August 3, 2010. What about defendants who committed their offense before August 3, 2010, but have not been convicted and/or sentenced until AFTER August 3, 2010?
In a surprising decision, on May 31, 2011, the First Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to apply the FSA retroactively to a defendant who committed his offense before August 3, 2010, but was sentenced after that date. In United States v. Douglas, F.3d , 2011 WL 2120163 (C.A.1 (Me.)), the First Circuit looked to congressional intent and determined that Congress would not have ordered the Sentencing Commission to promulgate emergency guideline amendments to implement the FSA if it had not wanted the act to apply to defendants whose cases were still pending conviction or sentence after August 3, 2010. The First Circuit stated that “the imposition of a minimum sentence that Congress has condemned as too harsh makes this an unusual case. It seems unrealistic to suppose that Congress strongly desired to put 18:1 guidelines in effect by November 1 even for crimes committed before the FSA but balked at giving the same defendants the benefit of the newly enacted 18:1 mandatory minimums. The purity of the mandatory minimum regime has always been tempered by charging decisions, assistance departures and other interventions: here, at least, it is likely that Congress would wish to apply the new minimums to new sentences.”
The First Circuit’s Douglas decision creates a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011). The Seventh Circuit found that the FSA did not apply retroactively to defendants who committed their offense before August 3, 2010, but were sentenced later. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue of the whether it will allow retroactive application of the FSA to defendants who committed their crime before August 3, 2010, but were or still are awaiting sentence. We do not know whether the Fifth Circuit will follow the First or Seventh Circuit’s lead on this issue. Given the circuit split, it is likely that the Government will take a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on the Douglas decision.
With all the uncertainty at the circuit level, it is little wonder that the district courts are all over the place with trying to decide whether the FSA applies retroactively to pending cases with defendants who committed offenses before the FSA was enacted but had or have not yet been sentenced. Judge Ponsor’s ruling, in United States v. Watts, F.Supp.2d , 2011 WL 1282542 (D.Mass.) from the District of Massachusetts, is truly outstanding and should serve as a model for any defense motion requesting application of the FSA to a currently pending crack case. Given the huge success with the Douglas decision in the First Circuit and the resulting circuit split, defense counsel should definitely consider filing a motion for application of the FSA to any crack cases where the defendant committed the offense prior to August 3, 2010, but has not yet been convicted and/or sentenced.
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1Evans, Circuit Judge, United States v. Anthony Fisher, 635F.3d336 (7th Cir. 2011).
