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		<category><![CDATA[United States Supreme Court Case Law Update 2010-2011]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[I. INTRODUCTION
This outline summarizes United States Supreme Court decisions published between
September 29, 2009 and March 31, 2010, and those cases pending review. For up-to-date
summaries of all decided cases and cases pending review, see the
Review-Preview-Overview
Division, Office of the Federal Public Defender, S.D. Fla., and available at
United States Supreme Court, updated weekly by Paul M. Rashkind, Chief [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">I. INTRODUCTION</span></div>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">This outline summarizes United States Supreme Court decisions published between</p>
<p>September 29, 2009 and March 31, 2010, and those cases pending review. For up-to-date</p>
<p>summaries of all decided cases and cases pending review, see the</p>
<p>Review-Preview-Overview</p>
<p>Division, Office of the Federal Public Defender, S.D. Fla., and available at</p>
<div><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Italic;">United States Supreme Court</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">, updated weekly by Paul M. Rashkind, Chief of the Appellate</span><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;">http://www.rashkind.com</span></span></em></div>
<p></span><em><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;">direct any email questions about this outline or the websites listed above to</p>
<p>II. SPECIFIC OFFENSES</p>
<p>A. Cases Granted Review</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">, or the U.S. Supreme Court Blog at </span><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;">http://ussc.blogspot.com/. </span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Please</span><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: TimesNewRoman;">laura_wasco@fd.org</span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">.</span></p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Skilling v. United States</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009); Honest Services Fraud; 18 U.S.C. § 1346.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 393 (cert. granted Oct. 13, 2009); decision below at 554</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issues: (1) Whether the federal “honest services” fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, requires</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">the government to prove that the defendant&#8217;s conduct was intended to achieve</p>
<p>“private gain” rather than to advance the employer&#8217;s interests, and, if not, whether</p>
<p>§ 1346 is unconstitutionally vague. (2) When a presumption of jury prejudice</p>
<p>arises because of the widespread community impact of the defendant&#8217;s alleged</p>
<p>conduct and massive, inflammatory pretrial publicity, whether the government</p>
<p>may rebut the presumption of prejudice, and, if so, whether the government must</p>
<p>prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror was actually prejudiced.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">below at 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2007); Material Assistance to Terrorist Organization; 18</p>
<p>U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 48 (cert. granted Sep. 30, 2009); decision</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the knowing provision of “any</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">*** service, *** training, [or] expert advice or assistance,” 18 U.S.C. §</p>
<p>2339A(b)(1), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally</p>
<p>vague.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Carr v. United States</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">578 (7th Cir. 2009); Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”); 18 U.S.C.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 47 (cert. granted Sept. 30, 2009); decision below at 551 F.3d</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">§</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;"></p>
<div><strong><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">2250(a).</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), which imposes criminal penalties on certain sex</span></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">offenders who travel in interstate commerce and knowingly fail to register or</p>
<p>update a registration as required by SORNA, 42 U.S.C. § 16901, et seq., applies</p>
<p>to petitioner, whose interstate travel occurred after his conviction for a sex offense</p>
<p>Page 4 of 8</p>
<p>that triggers a registration requirement, but before SORNA’s enactment. (2)</p>
<p>Whether the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes prosecution under § 2250(a) of a</p>
<p>person whose underlying offense and interstate travel predated SORNA’s</p>
<p>enactment, but whose failure to register occurred well after SORNA’s</p>
<p>requirements became applicable to him.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Robertson v. United States, ex Rel. Watson</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">decision below at 940 A.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Criminal Contempt; D.C. Code 1981,</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 1011 (cert. granted Dec. 14, 2009);</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">§</span></p>
<div><strong><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">16-1005(f).</span></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;"></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether, consistent with this Court&#8217;s cases and the Due Process Clause of the</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an action for criminal</p>
<p>contempt in a congressionally created court may be brought in the name and</p>
<p>pursuant to the power of a private person, rather than in the name and pursuant to</p>
<p>the power of the United States.</p>
<p>III. SECOND AMENDMENT</p>
<p>A. Case Granted Review</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">McDonald v. City of Chicago</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">2008 WL 5111112 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Second Amendment.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 48 (cert. granted Sep. 30, 2009); decision below at</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment&#8217;s Privileges or Immunities or</p>
<p>Due Process Clauses.</p>
<p>IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT</p>
<p>A. Case Granted Review</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">City of Ontario v. Quon</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2009); Fourth Amendment and Expectation of Privacy.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (cert. granted Dec. 14, 2009); decision below at 529</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issues: (1) Whether a SWAT team member has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">messages transmitted on his SWAT pager, where the police department has an official</p>
<p>no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking lieutenant announced an informal policy of</p>
<p>allowing some personal use of the pagers. (2) Whether the Ninth Circuit contravened this</p>
<p>Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents and created a circuit conflict by analyzing whether</p>
<p>the police department could have used “less intrusive methods” of reviewing text</p>
<p>messages transmitted by a SWAT team member on his SWAT pager. (3) Whether</p>
<p>individuals who send text messages to a SWAT team member’s SWAT pager have a</p>
<p>Page 5 of 8</p>
<p>reasonable expectation that their messages will be free from review by the recipient’s</p>
<p>government employer.</p>
<p>V. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS</p>
<p>A. Decided Cases</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Maryland v. Shatzer</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Counsel.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 559 U.S. ___ (2010); Questioning Following Invocation of Right to</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Can an extended passage of time (here two and a half years) between a person’s</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">invocation of the right to counsel and officer’s subsequent attempts to question that</p>
<p>person nullify the proscription against further police-initiated questioning.</p>
<p>Held: Yes, the rule enunciated in</p>
<p>person’s invocation of right to counsel only applies to a period of 14 days after such</p>
<p>invocation.</p>
<div><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Italic;">Edwards v. Arizona </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">which precludes interrogation following a</span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Florida v. Powell</span></em></strong></em></div>
<p></span><em><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">of Counsel.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 559 U.S. __ (2010); Sufficiency of </span></p>
<div><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Miranda’s </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">Advice of Right to Presence</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether prior to questioning a person, the interrogating officer must expressly advise</span></em></div>
<p></span><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">him/her of the rights to consult with counsel prior to questioning and at any time during</p>
<p>questioning.</p>
<p>Held: No, so long as the</p>
<p>custodial interrogation, the warnings need not expressly state that a person has the right to</p>
<p>consult with an attorney prior to answering questions and has a related right to consult</p>
<p>with counsel in the middle of interrogation. Here, the warning of a “right to talk to a</p>
<p>lawyer before answering any questions” along with the right to use this right at any time,</p>
<p>sufficed.</p>
<div><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Italic;">Miranda </span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">warning reasonably conveys rights which attach during a</span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Padilla v. Kentucky</span></em></strong></em></div>
<p></span><em><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;"><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 559 U.S. __ (2010); Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel.</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether failure to correctly inform client of guilty plea’s immigration consequences</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.</p>
<p>Held: As a matter of federal law, counsel must inform a client when his or her plea carries a risk</p>
<p>of deportation.</p>
<p>B. Cases Granted Review</p>
<p>Page 6 of 8</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Michigan v. Bryant</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Mich. 132 (2009); Confrontation Clause and</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. __ (cert. granted March 1, 2010); decision below at 483</span></p>
<div><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Crawford</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">.</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and</span></em></div>
<p></span><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">circumstances of the shooting are nontestimonial because they were “made under</p>
<p>circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to</p>
<p>enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” including not only aid to a</p>
<p>wounded victim, but also the prompt identification and apprehension of an apparently</p>
<p>violent and dangerous individual.</p>
<p>VI. SENTENCING</p>
<p>A. Decided Case</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Johnson v. United States</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Predicates.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 559 U. S. __ (2010); Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issues: (1) Whether a simple battery conviction involving merely de minimis physical contact</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">categorically meets ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. (2) Whether a state’s highest</p>
<p>court holding that predicate state conviction does not have as an element the use or</p>
<p>threatened use of physical force against another is binding on federal court applying</p>
<p>ACCA.</p>
<p>Held: Because the Florida offense of battery by offensive touching does not require the use of</p>
<p>physical force, it does not qualify as an ACCA predicate under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).</p>
<p>B. Cases Granted Review</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">United States v. O’Brien</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">F.3d 921 (1st Cir. 2009); Mandatory Minimums.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 49 (cert. granted Sept. 30, 2009); decision below at 542</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides for a series of escalating</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">mandatory minimum sentences depending on the manner in which the basic crime (viz.</p>
<p>using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to an underlying offense, or possessing</p>
<p>that firearm in furtherance of that offense) is carried out. The question is whether the</p>
<p>sentence enhancement to a 30-year minimum when the firearm is a machine gun is an</p>
<p>element of the offense that must be charged and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable</p>
<p>doubt, or instead a sentencing factor that may be found by a judge by the preponderance</p>
<p>of the evidence.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Barber v. Thomas</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">800 (9th Cir. 2008); Good Time Credit.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 737 (cert. granted Nov. 30, 2009); decision below at 533 F.3d</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Page 7 of 8</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issues: (1) Does “term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act,</p>
<p>enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time</p>
<p>credits on the basis of the sentence imposed. (2) If “term of imprisonment” in the federal</p>
<p>good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference</p>
<p>appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be</p>
<p>awarded based on the sentence imposed.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Abbott v. United States</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">States</p>
<p>Cir. 2009) and 329 Fed. Appx. 569 (5th Cir. 2009), respectively; Consecutive Mandatory</p>
<p>Minimums with § 924(c).</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 1284 (cert. granted Jan. 25, 2010) and </span></p>
<div><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Gould v. United</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 1283 (cert. granted Jan. 25, 2010); decisions below at 574 F.3d 203 (3rd</span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: The cases have been consolidated to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)’s</span></em></div>
<p></span><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">prefatory phrase “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise</p>
<p>provided by this section or by any other provision of law” encompasses the underlying</p>
<p>drug trafficking offense or crime of violence, and if not, whether it includes another</p>
<p>offense for possessing the firearm in the same transaction.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">United States v. Dolan</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">F.3d 10 (10th Cir. 2009); Timeliness of Order of Restitution.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (cert. granted Jan. 8, 2010); decision below at 571</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether a district court may enter a restitution order beyond the time limit prescribed in</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Dillon v. United States</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">572 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. Jun 10, 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 797 (cert. granted December 7, 2009); decision below at</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issues: (1) Whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are binding when a district court imposes</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">a new sentence pursuant to a revised guideline range under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. (2)</p>
<p>Whether during a § 3582(c)(2) sentencing, a district court is required to impose sentence</p>
<p>based on an admittedly incorrectly calculated guideline range.</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">below at 570 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2009); Federal Misdemeanor as an Aggravated Felony.</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 1012 (cert. granted December 14, 2009); decision</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether a person convicted under state law for simple drug possession (a federal</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">misdemeanor) has been “convicted” of an “aggravated felony” on the theory that he could</p>
<p>have been prosecuted for recidivist simple possession (a federal felony), even though</p>
<p>there was no charge or finding of a prior conviction in his prosecution for possession.</p>
<p>VII. APPEALS</p>
<p>A. Case Granted Review</p>
<p>Page 8 of 8</p>
<div><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">United States v. Marcus</span></em></strong></div>
<p></span><strong><em><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,BoldItalic;">538 F.3d 97 (2 Cir. 2008); Ex Post Facto Prohibitions</p>
<p><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">, 130 S.Ct. 393 (cert. granted October 13, 2009); decision below at</span><span style="font-size: xx-small; font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;"><span style="font-size: xx-small; font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">nd </span></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman,Bold;">and Standard of Review.</span></p>
<div><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Issue: Whether the Second Circuit departed from the Court’s interpretation of Rule 52(b) of the</span></div>
<p></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRoman;">Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by adopting as the appropriate standard for</p>
<p>plain-error review of an alleged ex post facto violation whether there is any possibility</p>
<p>that the defendant could have been convicted based exclusively on conduct that took</p>
<p>place before the enactment of the statutes in question.</p>
<p></span></em></strong></em></strong></em></strong></em></strong></em></em></strong></em></strong></em></strong></em></strong></em></em></strong></em></strong></em></em></em></strong></em></em></strong></em></strong></em></strong></strong></em></strong></strong></em></strong></em></strong></em></strong></em></p>
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