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Posted by admin on September 6th, 2011

ILLEGAL CARRYING OF WEAPONS NATIONAL PARKS

No. __-_______

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEAN MASCIANDARO, Petitioner,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Antigone Peyton Matthew Levy Cloudigy Law PLLC 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600 Alexandria, VA 22314

(866) 531-6660 Antigone.Peyton@cloudigylaw.com Matthew.Levy@cloudigylaw.com

MICHAEL S. NACHMANOFF Federal Public Defender

Rachel S. Martin Assistant Federal Public Defender Counsel of Record Office of the Federal Public Defender 1650 King Street, Suite 500 Alexandria, VA 22314 (703) 600-0800 Rachel_Martin@fd.org

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Does the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protect a right to possess and carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home?

II. If there is a Second Amendment right to possess and carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home, is it constitutional to prohibit law-abiding citizens’ possession and carrying of loaded weapons in motor vehicles while on National Park Service land?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QuestionsPresented………………………………………………. i PartiestotheProceedings. ………………………………………….ii TableofContents……………………………………………….. iii Index to Appendix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v TableofAuthorities……………………………………………… vi Opinions Below. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jurisdiction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ConstitutionalandRegulatoryProvisionsInvolved. ……………………….. 2 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Statement of the Case.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A. Mr. Masciandaro Was Arrested for Having a Loaded Weapon in His

Car While on NPS Land. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

B. The Magistrate Judge Upheld the NPS Loaded Weapons Ban and ConvictedMr.Masciandaro. ……………………………… 5

C. The District Court Analyzed the NPS Loaded Weapons Ban Under ThreeConstitutionalTestsandUpheldtheConviction…………….. 7

D. The Court of Appeals Avoided the Constitutional Question and Applied an Intermediate Scrutiny Hybrid Analysis to Uphold the Conviction.. . . . . 8

ReasonsforGrantingthePetition. ……………………………………. 9

I. This Case Is the Right Vehicle to Clarify the Scope of the Second Amendment . ………………………………………………………10

iii

A. This Case Cleanly Presents the Question of Whether a Second Amendment Right to Self-Defense Exists Outside the Home.. . . . . . . . . . 10

B. The Decision Below Was Incorrect Because It Failed to Recognize a Constitutional Right Outside the Home and Applied a Balancing Test toUpholdaTotalWeaponsBaninaCar. ……………………. 12

C. This Case Is Analogous to Heller and Squarely Presents the Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

II. Courts Will Not Recognize a Second Amendment Right to Self-Defense Outside One’s Home Until This Court Explicitly Tells Them That Right Exists . ………………………………………………………17

A. Lower Courts Are Concluding That the Second Amendment Right to Have a Firearm for Self-Defense Does Not Extend Outside the Home orAreAvoidingTakingaPositionontheQuestion……………… 17

B. This Court’s Guidance Is Needed Now, Before the Lower Courts Foreclose Any Constitutional Protection of the Self-Defense Right Outside the Home. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

III. Federal and State Appellate Courts Are Applying Invalid Tests to Uphold All Weapons Regulations That Impact Activities Outside the Home, Contrary to Heller’sDirection………………………………………….. 21

A. Masciandaro and Other Federal Decisions Employ Balancing Tests LiketheTestProposedbytheHellerDissent………………….. 22

B. State Appellate Courts Have Applied a Rational Basis Test to Uphold WeaponsRegulations. …………………………………. 25

C. Some Courts Have Used the “Presumptively Lawful” Measures Identified in Heller to Avoid Any Meaningful Analysis of a Weapon RegulationUnderAnyStandardofReview. ………………….. 26

D. Other Courts Have Attempted to Apply a Historical Analysis to Determine Whether Certain Weapons Regulations Pass Constitutional Muster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 iv

INDEX TO APPENDIX

UnitedStatesv.Masciandaro,638F.3d458(4thCir.2011). ………………… 1a

UnitedStatesv.Masciandaro,648F.Supp.2d779(E.D.Va.2009)…………… 18a

United States v. Masciandaro, memorandum opinion, Viol. Nos. 1745586 &1745587(Feb.3,2009)(E.D.Va.2009). ………………………. 35a

Cases

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Annex Books v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2009).. . . . . . . . 22-23 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, No. 09-1476, slip op. (U.S. June 20, 2011). . . 28

Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Commonwealth v. McCollum, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 239 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).. . . 27 Commonwealthv.Powell,459Mass.572(Mass.2011). ……………. 18,25 Crespov.Crespo,201N.J.207(N.J.2010)………………………… 25 DiGiacinto v. The Rector and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 281 Va. 127

(Va. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).. . . . . passim

Eppsv.State,55So.3d710(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011)………………… 27

Garber v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 4th 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), perm. app.denied,No.S183580(Cal.Aug.11,2010)……………………… 19

Hamblenv.UnitedStates,591F.3d471(6thCir.2009)……………….. 27 InreUnitedStates,578F.3d1195(10thCir.2009). …………………. 27 Littlev.UnitedStates,989A.2d1096(D.C.2010)………………… 18,25 Mackv.UnitedStates,6A.3d1224(D.C.2010)…………………….. 18 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). . . . . . . 17, 20 Nordyke v. King, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1632063 (9th Cir. May 2, 2011). . . . . 23 Pearsonv.Callahan,129S.Ct.808(2009)……………………… 12,13

People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill. App. 3d 136, 944 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), perm.app.granted,No.112116(Ill.May25,2011)………………….. 18

People v. Dawson, 403 Ill. App. 3d 499 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL766601(May2,2011)…………………………………. 18,25

People v. Delacy, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1481 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), perm. app.

denied,No.S170073(Cal.Mar.18,2009)…………………. 19-20,25,27 People v. Perkins, 62 A.D.3d 1160, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009),

perm.app.denied,13N.Y.3d748(N.Y.2009)…………………… 18,25 People v. Williams, 405 Ill. App. 3d 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), perm. app.

docketed,No.111594(Ill.May9,2011). …………………………. 18 People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App. 4th 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), perm. app.

denied,No.S169983(Cal.Mar.18,2009)…………………………. 19

Richards v. County of Yolo, 2011 WL 1885641 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). . . . . . 23

Spencerv.State,286Ga.483(Ga.2010)………………………….. 27

State v. Knight, 44 Kan. App. 2d 666 (2009), perm. app. docketed, No. 100167 (Kan.Nov.8,2010). …………………………………….. 18,27

Statev.Morris,2009WL3807159(OhioCt.App.Nov.13,2009). ………. 27

State v. Schultz, No. 10-CM-138 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Clark County Oct. 12, 2010).. . . 17

State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash. 2d 276 (Wash. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

UnitedStatesv.Anderson,559F.3d348(5thCir.2009)……………….. 27

UnitedStatesv.Barton,633F.3d168(3dCir.2011). ………………… 28

United States v. Booker, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1631947 (1st Cir. May 2, 2011)…………………………………………………… 22

UnitedStatesv.Chester,628F.3d673(4thCir.2010)…………… 21,22,24 vii

UnitedStatesv.Dorosan,350F.App’x874(5thCir.2009). ………… 19,27 UnitedStatesv.Fincher,538F.3d868(8thCir.2008)………………… 27 UnitedStatesv.Khami,362F.App’x501(6thCir.2010). …………….. 27 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.

Ct. 958 (2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . passim United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Va. 2009). . . . 1, 5, 7, 11 UnitedStatesv.McCane,573F.3d1037(10thCir.2009)………………. 27 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2306248 (5th Cir.

June 13, 2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 UnitedStatesv.Pruess,2011WL893793(4thCir.Mar.14,2011)……….. 28

United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

UnitedStatesv.ReneE.,583F.3d8(1stCir.2009). …………………. 28 UnitedStatesv.Richard,350F.App’x252(10thCir.2009). …………… 27 UnitedStatesv.Ross,323F.App’x117(3dCir.2009). ………………. 27 UnitedStatesv.Seay,620F.3d919(8thCir.2010)…………………… 27

United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Skoien I”), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011) . ………………………………………………… 22-23,24

United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Skoien II”), cert.denied,131S.Ct.1674(2011)………………………… 18,23,28

UnitedStatesv.Vongxay,594F.3d1111(9thCir.2010). ……………… 28 UnitedStatesv.White,593F.3d1199(11thCir.2010)………………… 27

viii

United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

UnitedStatesv.Yancey,621F.3d681(7thCir.2010). ……………….. 28 Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479 (Md. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 79

U.S.L.W.3594(Apr.5,2011). …………………………… 18,19,25 Woodenv.UnitedStates,6A.3d833(D.C.2010)……………………. 18

Federal Constitutional Provision, Statutes, Regulations, and Rules U.S.Const.,amend.II……………………………………. passim 1 U.S.C. § 109.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 16 U.S.C. § 1a-7b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 18 U.S.C. § 3401.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 18 U.S.C. § 3402.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 28 U.S.C. § 1254.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 28 U.S.C. § 1291.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 36C.F.R.§2.4(2007). ………………………………….. passim Fed. R. Crim. P. 58. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

State Statutes Ala.Code§13A-11-73………………………………………. 16 AlaskaStat.§11.61.190etseq.. ……………………………….. 16 Ark.CodeAnn.§5-73-120. ………………………………….. 16 Ariz.Rev.Stat.§13-3102. …………………………………… 16

Cal.PenalCode§12031(asofJanuary1,2012,revisedto§25850)………. 16 Colo.Rev.Stat.§18-12-105. …………………………………. 16 Conn.Gen.Stat.§29-35……………………………………… 16 Del.CodeAnn.tit.11,§1442. ………………………………… 16 D.C.Code§7-2507.02(2001)…………………………………. 14 D.C.Code§22-4504.02……………………………………… 15 Fla. Stat. § 790.25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-126. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-51. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 IdahoCodeAnn.§18-3302(9)…………………………………. 16 720Ill.Comp.Stat.5/24-1……………………………………. 15 Ind.Code§35-47-2-1……………………………………….. 16 Iowa Code § 724.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Kan.Stat.Ann.§21-4201. …………………………………… 16 Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann.§527.020. ………………………………… 16 La.Rev.Stat.Ann.§14:95……………………………………. 16 La.Rev.Stat.Ann.§32:292.1…………………………………. 16 La.Rev.Stat.Ann.§40:1379.3………………………………… 16 Me.Rev.Stat.tit.12,§11212. ………………………………… 16 Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 4-203. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Mass.Gen.Lawsch.269,§10…………………………………. 16 Mich.Comp.Laws§750.227………………………………….. 16 Minn.Stat.§624.714……………………………………….. 16 Miss.CodeAnn.§97-37-1……………………………………. 16 Mo.Rev.Stat.§571.030. ……………………………………. 16 Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-316. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Neb.Rev.Stat.§28-1202…………………………………….. 16 Nev.Rev.Stat.§202.350…………………………………….. 16 N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann.§159:4. …………………………………. 16 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 N.M.Stat.Ann.§30-7-2. ……………………………………. 16 N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 N.C.Gen.Stat.§14-269……………………………………… 16 N.D.Cent.Code§62.1-02-10. ………………………………… 16 OhioRev.CodeAnn.§2923.16………………………………… 16 Okla.Stat.tit.21,§1289.7……………………………………. 16 Or.Rev.Stat.§166.250……………………………………… 16 18Pa.Cons.Stat.§6106. ……………………………………. 16 R.I.Gen.Laws§11-47-8…………………………………….. 16

S.C.CodeAnn.§16-23-20……………………………………. 16 S.D.CodifiedLaws§22-14-9. ………………………………… 16 Tenn.CodeAnn.§39-17-1307. ……………………………….. 16 Tenn.CodeAnn.§39-17-1308. ……………………………….. 16 Tex.PenalCodeAnn.§46.02. ………………………………… 16 UtahCodeAnn.§76-10-505………………………………….. 16 Va.CodeAnn.§18.2-308. …………………………………… 16 Wash.Rev.Code§9.41.050. …………………………………. 16 W. Va. Code § 20-2-5.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 W. Va. Code § 20-2-6a.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Wis. Stat. § 167.31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Wyo.Stat.Ann.§6-8-104. …………………………………… 16

Other Authorities JackKerouac,OntheRoad(1957)………………………………. 11

About Us, National Park Service, http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last visitedJune20,2011)………………………………………… 5

John Steinbeck, Travels with Charley: In Search of America (1962). . . . . . . . . . 11 Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About

MethodandOutcomes,56UCLAL.Rev.1425(2009)………………… 21 MarkTwain,RoughingIt(1872). ………………………………. 11

Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

xii

No. __-_______

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEAN MASCIANDARO, Petitioner,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Sean Masciandaro, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Pet. App., infra, 1a-17a) is reported at 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). The opinion of the district court (Pet. App., infra, 18a-34a) is reported at 648 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Va. 2009). The opinion of the magistrate judge (Pet. App., infra, 35a-42a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (magistrate judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan) had jurisdiction over the charge of possession of a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle located on National Park Service land (Violation No. 1745587) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a). Jurisdiction over Mr. Masciandaro’s appeal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (district court judge T. S. Ellis, III) derived from 18 U.S.C. § 3402 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2)(B). The court of appeals had jurisdiction over Mr. Masciandaro’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That court issued its opinion and judgment on March 24, 2011. Mr. Masciandaro did not seek rehearing.

This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II.

The National Park Service regulation at issue provides that

Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation is prohibited, except that carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a vessel is allowed when such vessel is not being propelled by machinery and is used as a shooting platform in accordance with Federal and State law.

36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2007).

INTRODUCTION

Three years ago, this Court announced that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms in self-defense and defense of the home. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). Since that time, numerous federal and state appellate courts from around the country have refused to recognize any Second Amendment self-defense right outside the home. Some courts have assumed (without deciding) that the right could extend beyond the home. Others have explicitly refused to recognize any constitutional self-defense right that exists outside of a traditional primary residence. These courts have read Heller as identifying a constitutional self-defense right only in one’s home or have refused to expand the right until this Court explicitly does so. Lower courts have, to date, upheld every challenged firearm regulation outside the home (with one known exception) using one of four alternative tests.

Mr. Masciandaro is a law-abiding citizen who was found sleeping in his car with a loaded handgun in a bag in the trunk. He was sleeping in a parking lot on Daingerfield Island, which is National Park Service (“NPS”) land. Because of the loaded handgun in his car, he was convicted of violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2007), which prohibits possession and carrying of loaded weapons in motor vehicles located on NPS land.

Mr. Masciandaro asks this Court to recognize his right to possess and carry a loaded firearm in his car in case of confrontation. He also asks this Court to consider the constitutionality of the NPS loaded weapons ban.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Mr. Masciandaro Was Arrested for Having a Loaded Weapon in His Car While on NPS Land.

Mr. Masciandaro owns a small reptile education business, Raging Reptiles. See C.A.J.A. 17-18.1 He travels to trade shows, schools, and other events held in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic areas to teach children and adults about exotic snakes, monitor lizards, bearded dragons, and other reptiles. During the spring and summer months in 2008, Raging Reptiles’ customers scheduled many reptile education shows and show-and-tells. In those hectic months, Mr. Masciandaro spent three to five days each week on the road, sleeping in his car with expensive equipment, cash from shows, and other valuable personal and business items. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 461, 467 (4th Cir. 2011). He carried a handgun in his vehicle for protection while he was on the road, id. at 461, until a United States Park Police officer confiscated it.

On the morning of June 5, 2008, Mr. Masciandaro was sleeping in his car in a gravel parking lot on Daingerfield Island, off the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Alexandria, Virginia. Id. at 460. Daingerfield Island is an outcropping of land extending into the Potomac River. Id. It has a restaurant, marina, biking trail, parking lots, and other public facilities. Id. This area is part of an 84-million-acre network of land and over 4.5 million acres of oceans, lakes, and reservoirs that are governed by NPS regulations and include sites

1 “C.A.J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed in the court of appeals. 4

ranging from historic landmarks, untouched wilderness, and underwater coral reefs to commercial areas, RV campgrounds, and rest stops.2

While on patrol, a Park Police officer noticed that Mr. Masciandaro’s car was parked incorrectly in a “Front End Parking Only” area. Id. After approaching the car and finding Mr. Masciandaro asleep in the reclined driver’s seat, the officer woke him up and asked for his driver’s license. Id. Complying, Mr. Masciandaro pulled a messenger bag from the trunk after releasing a latch and pulling down the top of the back seat to expose the car trunk space. United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (E.D. Va. 2009). With the seat leaned back, the officer noticed a knife under the driver’s seat and asked Mr. Masciandaro if he had any other weapons in the car. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 460. Mr. Masciandaro said he had a loaded handgun in his bag. Id. The officer searched the car, confiscated the Kahr P9 9mm semi-automatic handgun, and arrested Mr. Masciandaro. Id.

B. The Magistrate Judge Upheld the NPS Loaded Weapons Ban and Convicted Mr. Masciandaro.

Mr. Masciandaro was charged with unlawful possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle on NPS land, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), and with failure to comply with a parking sign. Pet. App. 35a.

After this Court issued its decision in Heller, Mr. Masciandaro filed two pre-trial motions to dismiss the loaded weapon charge. Id. One motion asserted that the NPS regulation is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied in

2 See About Us, National Park Service, http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2011); see also C.A.J.A. 17 n.5.

this case.3 Id. at 36a-37a. At a hearing, Mr. Masciandaro and the officer testified, the magistrate judge heard argument on the motions and took them under advisement, and the government provided additional trial evidence. Id. at 35a. The government did not present any evidence regarding public safety on NPS land generally or on Daingerfield Island, or data showing the number of visitors to that area.

On February 3, 2009, the magistrate judge found Mr. Masciandaro guilty of violating the NPS loaded weapons ban and failing to follow the traffic sign. Pet. App. 42a. In a memorandum opinion, the magistrate judge concluded that the NPS loaded weapons ban is not unconstitutional. Id. at 37a-38a. In the judge’s view, Heller struck down a “complete prohibition” on the use of handguns for protection by ordinary citizens, while the NPS loaded weapons ban allowed Mr. Masciandaro “to have both ammunition and a handgun in his car; he simply was required to keep the handgun unloaded while on Daingerfield Island.” Id. at 38a. Though the judge concluded that § 2.4(b) is “narrowly tailored,” id., she did not identify

3 The second motion sought to dismiss because § 2.4(b) had been superseded at the time of trial by 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h), which allowed possession of a loaded weapon in a vehicle so long as such possession is “in accordance with the laws of the state” in which the NPS land is located. Pet. App. 39a. Section 2.4(h) itself was subsequently enjoined by the District Court for the District of Columbia. See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). Congress later enacted 16 U.S.C. § 1a-7b as part of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, which directed that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior shall not promulgate or enforce any regulation” that prohibits possession of a functional firearm on NPS land if such possession complies with the laws of the state in which the land is located. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 461-62. The magistrate judge, district court, and Fourth Circuit all held that under 1 U.S.C. § 109 (the federal savings statute), the version of § 2.4(b) in effect at the time of Mr. Masciandaro’s arrest governed. Id. at 462, 465. Mr. Masciandaro does not seek review of that holding. Section 2.4(b) has never been formally repealed and the government could enforce it against other individuals, just as it maintains its enforcement efforts against Mr. Masciandaro.

a compelling government interest or describe how the law withstood a strict scrutiny analysis. The judge later imposed a fine for violation of the NPS loaded weapons ban. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 461.

C. The District Court Analyzed the NPS Loaded Weapons Ban Under Three Constitutional Tests and Upheld the Conviction.

Mr. Masciandaro appealed the weapons conviction to the district court, which requested supplemental briefs addressing the “sensitive places” aspect of Heller. On August 26, 2009, the district court affirmed. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 795. The court concluded that the NPS loaded weapons ban is valid under the intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, and “undue burden” tests. Id. at 789. Mr. Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge to the NPS loaded weapons ban failed because the regulation is limited to motor vehicles and does not ban loaded weapons in the home. Id. at 790.

The district court also determined that Heller’s list of “‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ points persuasively” to rejection of the as-applied challenge. Id. In its view, the “sensitive places” examples announced in Heller “plainly suggest that motor vehicles on National Park land fall within any sensible definition of a ‘sensitive place.’” Id. And the court rejected the facial challenge, noting that since the Second Amendment does not grant Mr. Masciandaro an absolute right to carry a loaded weapon in his vehicle, “it necessarily follows that § 2.4(b) has at least some constitutional applications.” Id. at 792.

D. The Court of Appeals Avoided the Constitutional Question and Applied an Intermediate Scrutiny Hybrid Analysis to Uphold the Conviction.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction without deciding whether Mr. Masciandaro has a Second Amendment right to carry or possess a loaded handgun in his car for self-defense. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 460. The court stated that it would await direction from this Court “on the question of Heller’s applicability outside the home environment.” Id. at 475. Judge Niemeyer wrote separately on this issue. He stated that a right outside the home is “plausible” given the Court’s discussion of the self-defense right in Heller and felt that the court should recognize Mr. Masciandaro’s constitutional claim. Id. at 467-68. But he concluded that the NPS loaded weapons ban is constitutional. Id. at 474.

When analyzing the constitutional challenge, the Fourth Circuit stated that the core of the Second Amendment right is in the home. Id. at 470. So while strict scrutiny would be appropriate to evaluate regulations affecting gun possession in the home, the intermediate scrutiny standard was applied here based on the “longstanding out-of-the-home/in-the-home distinction.” Id. Moreover, the NPS loaded weapons ban “reasonably served [the government’s] substantial interest in public safety in the national park area where Masciandaro was arrested.” Id. at 460. Finally, the court noted that “[t]he arguments of counsel about the meaning of the ‘sensitive places’ language raise difficult questions about the scope of the Second Amendment and the scrutiny to be given to government regulations in sensitive places.” Id. at 472. But it declined to decide whether Daingerfield Island is a sensitive place like the schools or government buildings identified in Heller. Id. at 473.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in this case highlights the difficulty that law-abiding gun owners and courts face in trying to understand the scope and depth of the individual right to keep and bear arms announced in Heller. Because the Fourth Circuit refused to analyze the scope of that right, gun owners have no greater constitutional self-defense right outside the home than they did before Heller. Yet Heller’s description of the right was not so limited: the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 554 U.S. at 592.

Mr. Masciandaro’s case is the right vehicle to address this problem. The issue of whether the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense extends outside the home is squarely presented, even though a divided Fourth Circuit panel avoided deciding the question until this Court gives it guidance. The Fourth Circuit also applied a balancing test to uphold the challenged NPS loaded weapons ban, determining that the law’s burden on Mr. Masciandaro’s self-defense options was outweighed by speculative gains in safety that flow from a ban of loaded weapons in motor vehicles. Finally, this case is a natural extension of the situation presented in Heller. Mr. Masciandaro is a law-abiding, responsible citizen who was barred from having a functional (loaded) handgun available while traveling and sleeping in his car. The only substantial difference between this case and the unconstitutional statute at issue in Heller is that here the prohibited conduct occurred outside the home.

This issue is not limited to the decision below. Despite the text of the Second Amendment, federal and state appellate courts either expressly hold that the right to keep and

bear arms ends at the doorway to the home or avoid deciding the constitutional question. If this Court does not halt this trend, the Second Amendment will be reduced to a constitutional bar on laws that prohibit handgun possession for self-defense in the home.

This case highlights another problem with the growing Second Amendment jurisprudence: many lower courts are applying scrutiny tests that this Court explicitly discarded in Heller. In particular, a number of federal appellate courts are applying a balancing form of intermediate scrutiny, i.e., they are balancing burdens on the right to keep and bear arms against purported gains in safety. Additionally, a number of state courts are applying a “reasonable regulation” standard, which is little more than the rational basis test that the Court rejected in Heller.

Because of the importance of clarifying and protecting the right to keep and bear arms

outside the home, this Court should grant Mr. Masciandaro’s petition.

I. This Case Is the Right Vehicle to Clarify the Scope of the Second Amendment.

A. This Case Cleanly Presents the Question of Whether a Second Amendment Right to Self-Defense Exists Outside the Home.

Mr. Masciandaro’s case offers this Court an ideal opportunity to clarify the scope of the Second Amendment right to self-defense. There are no factual disputes or standing issues. And the practical effect of the restrictions in this case and Heller are similar: law-abiding citizens cannot have an operable handgun available in case of confrontation.

First, the facts relevant to this Second Amendment challenge are undisputed. Mr. Masciandaro is a law-abiding, responsible citizen who carried a loaded handgun in his car for self-defense. The regulation Mr. Masciandaro violated, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), bans all loaded weapons in motor vehicles on all land controlled by the NPS, 85 million acres of public and private land under NPS care. This includes the George Washington Memorial Parkway and Daingerfield Island, which has a public parking lot next to the Parkway. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 781. When Mr. Masciandaro was first questioned by the Park Police officer, his handgun was in a gun case, in a messenger bag, and in the car’s rear compartment. Id. at 782.

Second, explicit recognition of the self-defense right outside the home is appropriate in this case. Like Mr. Heller, Mr. Masciandaro is a law-abiding and responsible citizen. He lawfully possessed his handgun, which is not a dangerous or unusual weapon, and traveled with it for self-defense. The challenged regulation is nearly as extreme as the challenged statutes in Heller: there is no way for a law-abiding citizen to have a handgun available for self-defense (i.e., loaded and functional) without violating § 2.4(b).

If there is a Second Amendment right outside the home, it surely applies to law-abiding citizens carrying handguns for self-defense while traveling on public highways. The road trip is a quintessential American experience. See, e.g., Mark Twain, Roughing It (1872); John Steinbeck, Travels with Charley: In Search of America (1962); Jack Kerouac, On the Road (1957). The need to protect “self, family, and property” is acute on the road, as well as at home.

B. The Decision Below Was Incorrect Because It Failed to Recognize a Constitutional Right Outside the Home and Applied a Balancing Test to Uphold a Total Weapons Ban in a Car.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision ignores this Court’s explicit guidance regarding the fundamental nature of the right to keep and bear arms. First, the court declined to decide whether the Second Amendment right extends beyond the home:

Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (Wilkinson, J., writing for the court as to Part III.B). The court concluded that any right that might exist outside the home is outside the “core right,” and hence a “lesser showing” is necessary to demonstrate the validity of a regulation that affects such conduct. Id. at 471.

Judge Wilkinson relied on the Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), to justify avoidance of the question of whether the constitutional right to keep and bear a firearm for self-defense exists outside of the home. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475. But this is a misreading of Pearson, which simply changed the procedure for evaluating qualified immunity. Prior to Pearson, judges were required to determine if a constitutional right was violated before determining if that right was clearly established at the time of the accused official’s conduct. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16. The Court held that judges are no longer bound to that sequence and could consider the “clearly established” prong first, if appropriate. Id. at 818. It changed the procedure because “there will be cases in which a court

will rather quickly and easily decide that there was no violation of clearly established law before turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.” Id. at 820. This change also allowed courts to avoid a situation where a defendant lost on the first prong (i.e., was found to have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right) but won the second, putting the defendant in the uncomfortable position of winning, but potentially being unable to appeal the determination that a constitutional violation occurred. Id.

These concerns are not present here. Instead, the decision below denies Mr. Masciandaro (and all other citizens subject to the law of the Fourth Circuit) a determination of the scope of his Second Amendment right. The court simultaneously informed him that if he had such a right outside the home, it would not be worth as much as the gains in public safety the court assures him are realized, notwithstanding the absence of evidence on this point in the record. Mr. Masciandaro is entitled to know what his rights are, even if the NPS loaded weapons ban is a valid limitation on them.

In this case, the Fourth Circuit also improperly applied a balancing test to analyze § 2.4(b) and determined that “[t]he Secretary could have reasonably concluded that, when concealed within a motor vehicle, a loaded weapon becomes even more dangerous,” to justify the ban. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473 (emphasis added). This language parallels Justice Breyer’s view in Heller of the District of Columbia’s handgun ban: “a legislature could reasonably conclude that the law will advance goals of great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing injury, and reducing crime.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 682

(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Moreover, unlike Heller, any gains in safety attributable to § 2.4(b) are purely speculative, as there is no evidence of them in the record. Mr. Masciandaro, like millions of law-abiding gun owners, should be told the scope of his right to keep and bear arms in case of confrontation. Under the decision below, he is

left with no more information about his constitutional right than he had before his arrest.

C. This Case Is Analogous to Heller and Squarely Presents the Questions.

The NPS loaded weapons ban is quite similar to D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 (2001), which was struck down as an invalid limitation on Mr. Heller’s Second Amendment right. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. Section 7-2507.02 required “that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.” Id. at 628. Heller expressly held that a complete prohibition of the use of handguns for self-defense in the home is invalid. Id. at 635. The NPS loaded weapons ban also prohibits the use of handguns (or any other firearm) for self-defense, albeit in a motor vehicle.

The decision below incorrectly implies that § 2.4(b) allows someone to load a firearm if the need for self-defense arises. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 474. The text of the NPS loaded weapons ban is unambiguous, and contains no self-defense exception:

36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). Once a person in a motor vehicle on NPS land loads a firearm and renders it operable, that person violates § 2.4(b). The only exception, which is not relevant here, is that “[a]uthorized Federal, State and local law enforcement officers may carry firearms in the performance of their official duties.” 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(e). So an off-duty police officer driving on the Rock Creek Parkway in Washington, DC (which is controlled by the NPS) would violate § 2.4(b) when carrying a loaded weapon in her car.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that allowing the carrying of unloaded firearms while prohibiting loading them “leaves largely intact the right to ‘possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’” Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 474. This cannot be reconciled with the Court’s opinion in Heller. The Court held that a requirement that guns have trigger locks (which, according to the District’s counsel, could be removed in “3 seconds”) and be unloaded made “it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. Like the challenged statutes in Heller, the NPS loaded weapons ban contains no self-defense exception, but does contain a specific enumerated exception for law enforcement.

Moreover, the NPS loaded weapons ban is generally inconsistent with state law. In fact, only Illinois, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have such stringent rules regarding carrying loaded weapons in motor vehicles. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1; Wis. Stat. § 167.31; D.C. Code § 22-4504.02. Other states allow the carrying of loaded weapons in motor vehicles under at least some conditions. Twenty-three states require a license or

4 concealedweaponspermit, threestatesrequirealicenseorconcealedweaponspermitunless

the weapon is secured,5 thirteen states allow open carry in motor vehicles while requiring a concealed weapons permit for carrying a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle,6 and nine states have no restrictions on law-abiding citizens’ carrying a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle.7

4 Ala. Code § 13A-11-73; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120; Cal. Penal Code § 12031 (as of January 1, 2012, revised to § 25850); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-35; Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 134-26, 134-51; Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1; Iowa Code § 724.4; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, § 11212; Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 4-203; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227; Minn. Stat. § 624.714; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:4; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:39-5, 2C:39-2; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.03, 265.20; N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-02-10; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.16; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.7; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6106; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-8; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1307-08; Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.050; W. Va. Code §§ 20-2-5, 20-2-6a.

5 Fla. Stat. § 790.25; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-20; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308. The Virginia law was amended in 2010, after Mr. Masciandaro’s arrest. At the time of his arrest, Virginia required that a weapon not be concealed “about his person, hidden from common observation” without first obtaining a permit. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308 (2008). Since his handgun was in a gun case inside a messenger bag in the trunk of his car, Mr. Masciandaro’s gun was not about his person.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1442; Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302(9); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4201 (as of July 1, 2011, see 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 136, § 187); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:95, 32:292.1, 40:1379.3; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-316; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1202; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.350; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269; Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.250; S.D. Codified Laws § 22-14-9; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104.

7 Alaska Stat. § 11.61.190 et seq.; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-105; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-126; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-1; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.02 (weapon cannot be in plain view); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505. Vermont does not regulate carrying of firearms.

Because the NPS loaded weapons ban completely prohibits the acts of carrying or possessing a firearm for self-defense while on NPS land, including on heavily traveled parkways used for commuting, it is an invalid limitation on law-abiding citizens’ Second Amendment right.

II. Courts Will Not Recognize a Second Amendment Right to Self-Defense Outside One’s Home Until This Court Explicitly Tells Them That Right Exists.

A. Lower Courts Are Concluding That the Second Amendment Right to Have a Firearm for Self-Defense Does Not Extend Outside the Home or Are Avoiding Taking a Position on the Question.

Heller established an individual right to self-defense in the home that is protected by the Second Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago applied this right against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment and recognized its fundamental nature. 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). The decision below highlights an almost unanimous response from the courts: to limit the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms to the strict holdings of those cases. In fact, Mr. Masciandaro has been unable to identify a single state or federal appellate court that has recognized a Second Amendment right outside the home.8 And many courts have considered the question.

Heller and McDonald left open important questions regarding the scope of the self-defense right beyond the home and the appropriate method for evaluating government regulations affecting it. The lower courts have struggled mightily with these issues. See, e.g.,

8 A single trial court judge in Wisconsin held that Wisconsin’s concealed carry law violates the Second Amendment. State v. Schultz, No. 10-CM-138 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Clark County Oct. 12, 2010). That decision does not appear to have been appealed.

Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 467 (“But a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of that right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether and how the right can be burdened by governmental regulation.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Skoien II”) (Heller creates an individual right that includes keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense but “[w]hat other entitlements the Second Amendment creates, and what regulations legislatures may establish, were left open.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).

The highest state courts that have considered the issue unanimously decided that the Second Amendment right is limited to the home. Maryland, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Kansas have all limited Heller to its holding.9 For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Maryland’s firearm permitting statute, concluding that the right is unavailable outside the home. Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 496 (Md. 2011) (stating that “[i]f the Supreme Court, in this [Heller] dicta, meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly”), petition for cert. filed, 79

9 See Wooden v. United States, 6 A.3d 833, 841 (D.C. 2010) (“Neither self-defense as such, nor even self-defense in the home of another (with a weapon carried there), is entitled to such protection, as we have read Heller.”); Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1236 (D.C. 2010) (no right under Heller to carry outside the home); Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1101 (D.C. 2010) (same); People v. Dawson, 403 Ill. App. 3d 499, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (same), cert. denied, 2011 WL 766601 (May 2, 2011); People v. Williams, 405 Ill. App. 3d 958, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (same), perm. app. docketed, No. 111594 (Ill. May 9, 2011); People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill. App. 3d 136, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (same), perm. app. granted, No. 112116 (Ill. May 25, 2011); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 589 (Mass. 2011) (same); People v. Perkins, 62 A.D.3d 1160, 1161, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (same), perm. app. denied, 13 N.Y.3d 748 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Knight, 44 Kan. App. 2d 666, 685 (2009) (same), perm. app. docketed, No. 100167 (Kan. Nov. 8, 2010).

U.S.L.W. 3594 (Apr. 5, 2011). That court noted that Illinois, the District of Columbia, and California also limited the right in similar cases. Id. at 496-99. Given this trend, state courts that confront Second Amendment issues in the future will likely limit its protection to the home.10

Other state and federal courts have held that even if the right might exist outside the home, it is substantially weaker than the right enjoyed in the home. The Fourth Circuit declined to decide whether Mr. Masciandaro had a right outside the home and applied a lower standard of scrutiny to uphold the NPS loaded weapons ban. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 474-76, 471. In another case involving federal property, the Fifth Circuit merely assumed (without deciding) that the right extends outside the home and upheld a law regulating gun possession on Postal Service property because it is a “sensitive place,” without further analysis. United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). California appellate courts have also concluded that if the Second Amendment right extends outside the home, it is entitled to less protection.11 For example, in People v. Flores, the defendant challenged several California statutes, including the state ban on

10 The Williams court also noted that the statute contains an exception for permit holders, and the defendant had never applied for a permit. 417 Md. at 488. The regulation at issue in this case is even more extreme, as here there are no exceptions to the ban except for law enforcement personnel “in the performance of their official duties.” See 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(e).

See People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App. 4th 303, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing law from Heller because no effect on gun possession in home), perm. app. denied, No. S169983 (Cal. Mar. 18, 2009); Garber v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 4th 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished portion) (stating that Heller only prohibited total ban on handguns for self-defense in home), perm. app. denied, No. S183580 (Cal. Aug. 11, 2010).

carrying a loaded weapon in a public place. 169 Cal. App. 4th 568, 576-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), perm. app. denied, No. S170073 (Cal. Mar. 18, 2009). The court upheld the ban and limited the core Second Amendment right to the home, rather than to self-defense.

These courts ignore the import of the term “bear arms.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“Putting all of these textual elements [of the Second Amendment] together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”). But see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3119-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Thankfully, the Second Amendment right identified in Heller and its newly minted Fourteenth Amendment analogue are limited, at least for now, to the home.”). They will also continue to limit the Second Amendment right to the home until this Court affirmatively extends its scope.

B. This Court’s Guidance Is Needed Now, Before the Lower Courts Foreclose Any Constitutional Protection of the Self-Defense Right Outside the Home.

This Court has the opportunity in this case to give the lower courts the critical guidance they have explicitly and implicitly requested relating to the Second Amendment right. In the absence of that guidance, the lower courts are likely to continue to chip away at the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. If this Court does not step in now, the thoughts of one commentator may prove prophetic:

By the time the Supreme Court gets around to hearing substantive Second Amendment challenges, the only real question for the Court will be, I suspect, whether to give Heller a respectful burial by rejecting the individual-rights interpretation it adopted, or to pretend that the Second Amendment protects an individual right while giving essentially no content to it except as a constitutional barrier to complete

prohibitions on handgun possession in the home for self-defense purposes.

Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1441-42 (2009).

This constitutional right should not be allowed to wither. But without intervention, lower courts will continue to limit the Second Amendment right to self-defense in the home. Only this Court can step in and protect the full scope of the individual Second Amendment right to self-defense that it announced, for the first time, three years ago.

III. Federal and State Appellate Courts Are Applying Invalid Tests to Uphold All Weapons Regulations That Impact Activities Outside the Home, Contrary to Heller’s Direction.

“Heller has left in its wake a morass of conflicting lower court opinions regarding the proper analysis to apply to challenged firearms regulations.” United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 688-89 (4th Cir. 2010) (Davis, J., concurring). Judge Davis’s observation in Chester is no exaggeration. Mr. Masciandaro has identified at least four different approaches used by lower courts in analyzing regulations under the Second Amendment: (1) balancing the burden against the benefit to public safety; (2) presuming a regulation is valid if it is short of a total ban on possession of handguns in the home for self-defense (the so-called “reasonable regulation” standard); (3) citing the “Heller dicta” as dispositive of different laws with little or no analysis; and (4) historically analyzing a regulation in light of Heller to determine if the limitation is valid.

The first two approaches are in tension with Heller. “Interest-balancing” was expressly rejected, and the reasonable regulation standard is little more than rational basis, which was also rejected. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27, 634-35. The third approach, citing the Heller dicta with little analysis, may be consistent with the approach taken in Heller, at least for certain laws that are identical or highly analogous to the “presumptively lawful measures” the Court identified. The last approach is similar to the historical analysis described in Heller.

This Court’s guidance is urgently needed to clarify the appropriate standard to measure burdens on those protected activities. Currently, the analysis depends on the court considering the issue.

A. Masciandaro and Other Federal Decisions Employ Balancing Tests Like the Test Proposed by the Heller Dissent.

As noted in Part I.B, supra page 13, the Fourth Circuit applied a balancing test and upheld 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) as constitutional. Similarly, the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have applied a balancing form of “intermediate scrutiny” in at least some circumstances.12 That is, they balanced the increase in public safety against the burden

12 See United States v. Booker, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1631947, at *9-12 (1st Cir. May 2, 2011) (balancing burden on right to keep and bear arms against benefit of keeping guns out of hands of domestic violence misdemeanants); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97-101 (3d Cir. 2010) (balancing burden on right to keep and bear arms against benefit of enabling tracing of weapons via serial numbers), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 682-83 (“The question then becomes whether the government can justify, under the appropriate level of scrutiny, the burden imposed on Chester’s Second Amendment rights by § 922(g)(9).”); United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2009) (“In other words, ‘the public benefits of the restrictions must be established by evidence, and not just asserted[;] . . . lawyers’ talk is insufficient.’” (quoting Annex Books

on individual rights. For example, the en banc court in Skoien II emphasized the unsympathetic nature of the defendant to help justify prohibiting the possession of guns by domestic violence misdemeanants. 614 F.3d at 645. In all of these decisions, the court determined the usefulness of the regulation in improving public safety and determined that the improvement was substantial, i.e., worth having.

These approaches ignore this Court’s observation that “[w]e know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added). The Court warned against allowing judges to “decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” Id.

A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. We would not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march

v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2009)) (alterations in original)) (“Skoien I”), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Skoien II”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692-94 (7th Cir.) (balancing burden against benefits of keeping weapons out of hands of violent felons), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010); Nordyke v. King, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1632063, at *5-6 (9th Cir. May 2, 2011) (“[W]e hold that only regulations which substantially burden the right to keep and bear arms trigger heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment.”); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802-05 (10th Cir. 2010) (balancing burden on right to keep and bear arms against benefit of keeping weapons out of hands of people subject to protective orders), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011); see also Richards v. County of Yolo, 2011 WL 1885641, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (interpreting Nordyke to mean that “if the regulation does not place a substantial burden to an individual’s fundamental [Second Amendment] right, then rational basis review applies”).

through Skokie. The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no different.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35 (internal citation omitted). The lower federal courts have also taken the “core protection” of self-defense in the

home described in Heller to support application of the balancing test that Heller rejects. Courts applying intermediate scrutiny generally justify this approach by finding that whatever situation is currently being evaluated is outside the core of the Second Amendment right identified in Heller. See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471 (“While we find the application of strict scrutiny important to protect the core right of the self-defense of a law-abiding citizen in his home . . . we conclude that a lesser showing is necessary with respect to laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside of the home.” (internal quotation omitted, emphasis added)); Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 812 (“The Second Amendment challenge in this case is several steps removed from the core constitutional right identified in Heller.” (emphasis added)); Chester, 628 F.3d at 682-83 (“[W]e believe [Chester’s] claim is not within the core right identified in Heller . . . .” (emphasis added)).

By labeling whatever right is at issue “outside the core,” courts have justified use of the balancing test to uphold the regulations they have considered. Only this Court can stop this weakening of the historical right to keep and bear arms.

B. State Appellate Courts Have Applied a Rational Basis Test to Uphold Weapons Regulations.

Despite this Court’s explicit rejection of a rational basis analysis of regulations that impact the Second Amendment in Heller, a number of state courts of appeal are applying what has been called the “reasonable regulation” standard. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (2007). Under the reasonable regulation analysis of gun control regulations, courts consider the question of whether the challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating the right to bear arms. “So long as a gun control measure is ‘not a total ban on the right to bear arms,’ the courts will consider it a mere regulation of the right” and uphold those regulations. Id. at 717 (footnotes omitted). The courts of appeals in the District of Columbia, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey have all applied this standard to uphold various weapons regulations.13

This approach, too, is invalid under Heller. “Obviously, the [rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. The sheer number and variety of cases that analyze Second Amendment right issues and uphold every law they

13 See, e.g., Little, 989 A.2d at 1101 (Heller limited to ban on gun possession in home); Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 576-77 (same); Dawson, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 510 (same); Williams, 417 Md. at 496 (same); Powell, 459 Mass. at 588-89 (same); Perkins, 62 A.D.3d at 1161 (same); Crespo v. Crespo, 201 N.J. 207, 210 (N.J. 2010) (upholding law allowing seizure of defendant’s firearms after finding of domestic violence because “the right to possess firearms clearly may be subject to reasonable limitations”).

consider demonstrate that lower courts have—and will continue to—apply deferential standards that have already been rejected by the Court.

C. Some Courts Have Used the “Presumptively Lawful” Measures Identified in Heller to Avoid Any Meaningful Analysis of a Weapon Regulation Under Any Standard of Review.

Other courts have attempted to determine the scope of the right by relying on and analogizing to what has come to be known in the lower courts and the academic community as the “Heller dicta”:

[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U.S. at 179, 59 S. Ct. 816. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 (footnote omitted). Since Heller, a number of courts have embraced the caution that these presumptively

lawful regulatory measures are examples: “our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 627 n.26. Specifically, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, and state appellate courts in California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Virginia, have, in some circumstances, simply identified a “safe harbor” within the Heller dicta to

uphold a particular firearm regulation without any true analysis of the law.14 Although this approach may appropriately dispense of challenges to bans on gun possession by felons, it does not make sense in a case involving a prohibition such as the one at issue here. Cf. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1050 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (wondering “whether Second Amendment law would have been better served if the regulations Heller addressed in dicta had been left to later cases”).

D. Other Courts Have Attempted to Apply a Historical Analysis to Determine Whether Certain Weapons Regulations Pass Constitutional Muster.

A final group of courts have performed a hybrid historical analysis to determine if a limitation is one that the Founders would have understood to be part of the right to keep and

14 See United States v. Ross, 323 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2009) (“dangerous and unusual weapons”); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009) (gun possession by felons); Dorosan, 350 F. App’x at 875 (“sensitive places”); Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (weapons “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens”); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2010) (gun possession by felons); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (gun possession by drug abusers); United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008) (weapons “in common use by law-abiding citizens”); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (gun possession by felons); United States v. Richard, 350 F. App’x 252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009) (gun possession by drug abusers); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants); People v. Delacy, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1481, 1492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (gun possession by violent misdemeanants); Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 574-76 (gun possession by violent misdemeanants and concealed weapons); Epps v. State, 55 So. 3d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (gun possession by felons); Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 484 (Ga. 2010) (same); Knight, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 685-86 (concealed weapons); Commonwealth v. McCollum, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 258 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (licensing requirements); State v. Morris, 2009 WL 3807159, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2009) (gun possession by felons); DiGiacinto v. The Rector and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 281 Va. 127, 134-37 (Va. 2011) (“sensitive places”).

bear arms.15 This analysis is consistent with Heller’s historical approach and the Court’s statement that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them . . . .” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. In a similar context, this Court undertook a historical analysis to determine whether the history and purpose of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, which also enshrined a preexisting right, supports imposition of liability against a government employer. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, No. 09-1476, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 20, 2011) (“Some effort must be made to identify the historic and fundamental principles that led to the enumeration of the right to petition in the First Amendment, among other rights fundamental to liberty.”); see also slip op. at 2 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The reference to ‘the right of the people’ indicates that the Petition Clause was intended to codify a pre-existing individual right, which means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 579, 592 (2008).”).

15 See United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 11-16 (1st Cir. 2009) (gun possession by juveniles); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172-75 (3d Cir. 2011) (gun possession by felons); United States v. Pruess, 2011 WL 893793, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 14, 2011) (per curiam) (vacating and instructing district court to conduct analysis of ban on gun possession by felons); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2306248, No. 11-10086, slip op. at 3-8 (5th Cir. June 13, 2011) (gun possession by illegal aliens); Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 642-44 (gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 682-87 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (gun possession by drug abusers); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114-18 (9th Cir. 2010) (gun possession by felons); State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash. 2d 276, 294-96 (Wash. 2010) (gun possession by juveniles).

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION

UnitedStatesv.Masciandaro,638F.3d458(4thCir.2011). ………………… 1a

UnitedStatesv.Masciandaro,648F.Supp.2d779(E.D.Va.2009)…………… 18a

United States v. Masciandaro, memorandum opinion, Viol. Nos. 1745586 &1745587(Feb.3,2009)(E.D.Va.2009). ………………………. 35a

638 F.3d 458

(Cite as: 638 F.3d 458)

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Sean MASCIANDARO, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09–4839. Argued: Dec. 8, 2010. Decided: March 24, 2011.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, T.S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge, 648 F.Supp.2d 779, of carrying or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a national park area, and he appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Niemeyer, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) general federal savings statute preserved gov- ernment’s authority to prosecute defendant’s pre- repeal conduct covered by prior regulation, and

(2) application of regulation to defendant did not violate his Second Amendment rights.

Affirmed.

Niemeyer, Circuit Judge, wrote separately as to Part III.B.

Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, wrote the opinion for the court as to Part III.B, in which Duffy, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation, joined.

West Headnotes

[1] Weapons 406 108

406 Weapons 406I In General

406k102 Constitutional, Statutory, and Regu- latory Provisions

406k108 k. Retroactive operation. Most Cited Cases

Although prior regulation prohibiting carrying or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a national park was superseded post-arrest by a more lenient regulation that provided for state law to govern the legality of defendant’s actions, general federal savings statute preserved govern- ment’s authority to prosecute defendant’s pre-repeal conduct covered by prior regulation. 1 U.S.C.A. § 109; 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b).

[2] Criminal Law 110 15

110 Criminal Law 110I Nature and Elements of Crime

110k12 Statutory Provisions 110k15 k. Repeal. Most Cited Cases

Unless a repealing statute explicitly provides otherwise, the repeal of a criminal statute neither abates the underlying offense nor affects its attend- ant penalties with respect to acts committed prior to repeal.

[3] Weapons 406 107(2)

406 Weapons 406I In General

406k102 Constitutional, Statutory, and Regu- latory Provisions

406k107 Construction 406k107(2) k. Right to bear arms in

general. Most Cited Cases Second Amendment provides a fundamental

right to possess firearms for self-defense within the home. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 2.

[4] Weapons 406 107(2)

406 Weapons 406I In General

406k102 Constitutional, Statutory, and Regu- latory Provisions

406k107 Construction 406k107(2) k. Right to bear arms in

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general. Most Cited Cases Intermediate scrutiny applied when reviewing a

Second Amendment challenge to regulation prohib- iting carrying or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a national park, and therefore regulation would be valid if government could demonstrate that it was reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 2; 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b).

[5] Weapons 406 106(3)

406 Weapons 406I In General

406k102 Constitutional, Statutory, and Regu- latory Provisions

406k106 Validity 406k106(3) k. Violation of right to

bear arms. Most Cited Cases Application of regulation prohibiting carrying

or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a national park to defendant did not violate his Second Amendment rights; the narrow regulat- ory prohibition was reasonably adapted to substan- tial governmental interest in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and make use of the national parks. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 2; 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b).

[6] Constitutional Law 92 667

92 Constitutional Law 92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions

92VI(A) Persons Entitled to Raise Constitu- tional Questions; Standing

92VI(A)1 In General 92k667 k. Third-party standing in gen-

eral. Most Cited Cases A person to whom a statute was constitution-

ally applied will not be heard to challenge that stat- ute on the ground that it may conceivably be ap- plied unconstitutionally to others, in other situ- ations not before the court.

*459 ARGUED: Antigone Gabriella Peyton, Fin- negan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner,

LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jeffrey Zee- man, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexan- dria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Rachel S. Martin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virgin- ia; Matthew Levy, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Ap- pellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and P A TRICK MICHAEL DUFFY , Senior United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion for the court, in which Judge WILKINSON and Senior Judge DUFFY joined ex- cept as to Part III.B. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion for the court as to Part III.B, in which Seni- or Judge DUFFY joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a separate opinion as to Part III.B.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the court except as to Part III.B:

Sean Masciandaro was convicted of carrying or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a national park area, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). He challenges his conviction on two grounds: (1) *460 that he was improperly charged under § 2.4(b), because after he was arres- ted but before he was tried, that regulation was su- perseded by a more lenient regulation that provided for state law to govern the legality of his actions; or alternatively (2) that section 2.4(b) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him and facially.

Because we conclude that the holding in United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), as well as the general federal savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, denies defendants an automatic entitlement to the benefit of post-ar-

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rest changes in the law, we find that Masciandaro was properly tried under the law as it existed on the date of his arrest.

On Masciandaro’s constitutional challenge, we conclude that Masciandaro’s Second Amendment claim to a right to carry or possess a loaded hand- gun for self-defense is assessed under the interme- diate scrutiny standard, and, even if his claim im- plicates the Second Amendment, a question we do not resolve here, it is defeated by applying that standard. We conclude that the government has amply shown that the regulation reasonably served its substantial interest in public safety in the nation- al park area where Masciandaro was arrested. Thus, we hold that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) is constitutional as applied to Masciandaro’s conduct.

Although Masciandaro has also mounted a sep- arate facial challenge to § 2.4(b), we conclude that this challenge is foreclosed by our determination that the regulation is constitutional on an as-applied basis.

Accordingly, we affirm.

I On June 5, 2008, at about 10:00 a.m., United

States Park Police Sergeant Ken Fornshill, who was conducting a routine patrol of Daingerfield Island, near Alexandria, Virginia, observed a Toyota hatchback parked illegally. The vehicle was parked parallel to the side of the parking lot, in violation of the sign indicating “Front End Parking Only.” As Sgt. Fornshill approached the vehicle, he saw Mas- ciandaro and his girlfriend sleeping inside and awoke them by tapping on the window. He asked Masciandaro for his driver’s license, which Mas- ciandaro produced from a messenger bag located in the vehicle’s rear compartment. While Masciandaro was retrieving his license, Sgt. Fornshill noticed a large “machete-type” knife protruding from under- neath the front seat, prompting him to ask Mas- ciandaro whether there were any other weapons in the vehicle. When Masciandaro replied that he had a loaded handgun in the same bag, Sgt. Fornshill

placed Masciandaro under arrest. Following a search, Fornshill uncovered a loaded 9mm Kahr semiautomatic pistol, and at the police station, Masciandaro produced an expired Virginia con- cealed weapon carry permit.

Daingerfield Island, where Masciandaro was arrested, is not an island but an outcropping of land extending into the Potomac River near Alexandria. The area, which is managed by the National Park Service, is used for recreational purposes and in- cludes a restaurant, marina, biking trail, wooded areas, and other public facilities.

Masciandaro was charged with “carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle” within national park areas, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), and failing to comply with a traffic control device (the parking sign), in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.12. These regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior under 16 U.S.C. § 3, which authorizes the Secretary to “make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary *461 or proper for the use and management of the parks, monuments, and reservations under the juris- diction of the National Park Service.” Violations of these regulations are punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. Id.

At trial, Masciandaro explained that he carried the handgun for self-defense, as he frequently slept in his car while traveling on business, and that while traveling, he often kept cash, a laptop com- puter, and other valuables on hand. The place where Masciandaro was arrested on June 5, 2008, was 20 miles from his residence in Woodbridge, Virginia.

On April 30, 2008, slightly more than a month before Masciandaro was arrested, the Secretary of the Interior proposed a revision to 36 C.F.R. § 2.4, which was designed to harmonize the regulation of firearms in national parks with that by the States. See General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife

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Service, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,388 (Apr. 30, 2008). The proposal advocated adding a new provision to § 2.4 which would allow individuals to possess loaded, operable firearms within national parks whenever it was legal to do so under the laws of the state in which the park was located, so long as the individu- al was not otherwise prohibited from doing so by federal law. Id. On December 10, 2008—six months after Masciandaro’s arrest but less than two months before his trial—the Secretary published a final version of the regulation, to take effect Janu- ary 9, 2009, which provided:

Notwithstanding any other provision in this Chapter, a person may possess, carry, and trans- port concealed, loaded, and operable firearms within a national park area in accordance with the laws of the state in which the national park area, or that portion thereof, is located, except as other- wise prohibited by applicable Federal law.

73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,971–72 (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h)).

When 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h) took effect, Mas- ciandaro had not yet been tried, and he promptly filed a motion with the magistrate judge to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that § 2.4(h) had effectively superseded § 2.4(b). He also argued that, in any event, § 2.4(b) violated the Second Amendment, as applied to him and facially. The magistrate judge denied the motion to dismiss, and, on February 3, 2009, found Masciandaro guilty on both counts. The judge imposed a $150 fine on the handgun violation and a $50 fine on the parking vi- olation. Masciandaro appealed only the conviction on the handgun charge to the district court.

On March 19, 2009, while Masciandaro’s ap- peal to the district court was pending, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a prelim- inary injunction, blocking enforcement of newly promulgated § 2.4(h), because the Department of the Interior had failed to conduct the required envir- onmental impact analysis. See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F.Supp.2d 1

(D.D.C.2009). Responding to this ruling, Congress promptly added language to an unrelated piece of legislation, which in essence reinstated § 2.4(h) by statute. See Credit Card Accountability Responsib- ility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“Credit CARD Act”), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a–7b(b). Section 512 of the Credit CARD Act provides:

The Secretary of the Interior shall not promulgate or enforce any regulation that prohibits an indi- vidual from possessing a firearm including an as- sembled or functional firearm in any unit of the National Park System or the National Wildlife Refuge System if—

*462 (1) the individual is not otherwise prohib- ited by law from possessing the firearm; and

(2) the possession of the firearm is in compli- ance with the law of the State in which the unit of the National Park System or the National Wildlife Refuge System is located.

16 U.S.C. § 1a–7b(b).

On appeal, the district court rejected Mas- ciandaro’s argument for application of § 2.4(h) in lieu of § 2.4(b) and affirmed the magistrate judge’s ruling. United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F.Supp.2d 779 (E.D.Va.2009). Relying mainly on United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), the court held that it was proper to try Masciandaro under the law as it exis- ted at the time of his arrest. Id. at 784–85. Address- ing the constitutionality of § 2.4(b), the court did not decide what level of scrutiny to apply but held that even applying strict scrutiny, the provision was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling govern- mental interest in public safety and thus was consti- tutional on an as-applied basis. Id. at 788–91. The court rejected Masciandaro’s facial challenge be- cause he had not “demonstrat[ed] from actual fact ” that a substantial number of instances exist in which § 2.4(b) could not be applied constitution- ally. Id. at 792–94.

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From the judgment of the district court, dated August 26, 2009, Masciandaro filed this appeal.

[1] Masciandaro contends first that he should not have been prosecuted under 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) because that provision was effectively superseded first by 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h), a more permissive regu- lation making state law applicable, and then by § 512 of the Credit CARD Act, which effectively co- dified § 2.4(h). Section 2.4(h) was thus in effect when Masciandaro was tried before the magistrate judge and § 512 of the Credit CARD Act is in ef- fect now. He maintains that a court must “apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 277, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974)).

Masciandaro does not dispute the fact that on June 5, 2008, he carried or possessed a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle within a national park. Nor does he dispute the fact that at the time he was arrested, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) was in effect and pro- hibited such conduct. The question that arises is whether legal developments postdating his arrest undermined the government’s ability to prosecute him under § 2.4(b).

The district court applied the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), to reject Mas- ciandaro’s argument. In Hark, the defendants viol- ated beef pricing regulations promulgated during World War II pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. But after the defendants com- mitted their acts and before they were arrested, the regulations were revoked. The Supreme Court non- etheless rejected the defendants’ argument that they were entitled to the benefit of the change in the law, holding that “revocation of [a] regulation d[oes] not prevent indictment and conviction for violation of its provisions at a time when it remained in force.” 320 U.S. at 536, 64 S.Ct. 359. As it explained:

The reason for the common law rule that the re- peal of a statute ends the power to prosecute for prior violations is absent in the case of a prosecu- tion for violation of a regulation issued pursuant to an *463 existing statute which expresses a continuing policy, to enforce which the regula- tion was authorized. Revocation of the regulation does not repeal the statute; and though the regula- tion calls the statutory penalties into play, the statute, not the regulation, creates the offense and imposes punishment for its violation.

Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss–Wright Ex- port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936)) (footnote omitted). The Court held that because the Emergency Price Control Act had re- mained in effect, the fact that the beef pricing regu- lations promulgated under the Act had been re- voked did not preclude the prosecution for an of- fense that occurred while the regulations were in force.

As in Hark, the regulation at issue here was promulgated pursuant to an enabling statute that permitted the Secretary of the Interior to issue rules in furtherance of a specific objective. In Hark, the Emergency Price Control Act authorized the Price Administrator to establish “by regulation … maxim- um prices” of a variety of goods so as to prevent profiteering, see Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 1(a), 2(a), 56 Stat. 23, 23–24 (1942), whereas the enabling statute here, 16 U.S.C. § 3, provided the Secretary of the Interior with the power to issue regulations “necessary … for the use and management of the parks … under the jurisdic- tion of the National Parks Service.” Both statutes made it a crime to violate the regulations, and both set forth specific penalties for violations. Compare Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 4(a), 56 Stat. 23, 28 (“It shall be unlawful … for any person to sell or deliver any commodity … in violation of any regulation or order under section 2”), and id. § 205(a)-(b), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (authorizing fines of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for up to two years for willful violations), with 16 U.S.C. § 3 (“[A]ny viol-

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ation of any of the rules and regulations authorized by this [Act] shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both …”).

Masciandaro claims that Hark is distinguish- able because 16 U.S.C. § 3 does not “contain sub- stantive provisions directly restricting or prohibit- ing certain conduct,” as did the Emergency Price Control Act. This argument, however, is unpersuas- ive because it treats what are actually differences in degree as differences in kind. Both laws attach spe- cific criminal penalties to actions that violate regu- lations issued by an Executive Branch official. They differ, however, in the specificity with which they describe the offending conduct—the Emer- gency Price Control Act made it unlawful to sell or deliver commodities in violation of a regulation’s terms, as specified by the Price Administrator, while 16 U.S.C. § 3 makes it unlawful to violate a regulation adopted for the use and management of national parks, as specified by the Secretary of the Interior. Thus, both create an offense and both de- pend on implementing regulations to “call[ ] the statutory [offense] into play.” Hark, 320 U.S. at 536, 64 S.Ct. 359. We thus conclude, as did the dis- trict court, that Masciandaro’s effort to distinguish Hark falls short and that Hark is controlling.

Masciandaro suggests that Hark is also distin- guishable insofar as it depended on the continuing vitality of the underlying enabling statute. See Hark, 320 U.S. at 536, 64 S.Ct. 359 (“Revocation of [a] regulation does not repeal the statute; and though the regulation calls the statutory penalties into play, the statute, not the regulation, creates the offense and imposes punishment for its violation”). He claims that in this case, with the enactment of the Credit CARD Act, “Congress expressly *464 withdrew the authority to enforce the superseded [National Parks Service] regulation against Mr. Masciandaro and other citizens who are similarly situated.” He explains, the Credit CARD Act “states that the Secretary of the [Interior] (through the Park Police and local United States Attorneys’

offices) shall not ‘enforce any regulation that pro- hibits an individual from possessing a firearm in- cluding an assembled or functional firearm in any unit of the National Parks System’ if that individual is acting in conformance with state laws regulating that weapon.” Thus, he argues, while Hark applies when a regulation, but not the authorizing statute, has been revoked, it does not apply when both the regulation and the authorizing statute have been eliminated, as, he asserts, occurred here.

While it is true that the Credit CARD Act pro- hibited the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing a regulation such as § 2.4(b) in certain circum- stances, that Act did not modify or revoke 16 U.S.C. § 3, which authorized, and continues to au- thorize, the Secretary of the Interior generally to is- sue national park regulations that are enforceable by a fine or imprisonment or both. If we accept the argument that the Credit CARD Act somehow re- pealed a portion of 16 U.S.C. § 3 by implication by limiting the Secretary of the Interior’s authority, the original form of the authorizing statute would non- etheless be saved under the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, which provides:

The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper ac- tion or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.

This provision reversed the common-law rule, under which the repeal of a criminal law “preclude[d] punishment for acts antedating the re- peal.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 1483; see also Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281, 283, 3 L.Ed. 101 (1809) (holding that when a criminal statute expires or is repealed, “no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for viol- ations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that pur- pose by statute”).

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[2] Accordingly, “unless [a] repealing statute explicitly provides otherwise, the repeal of a crim- inal statute neither abates the underlying offense nor affects its attendant penalties with respect to acts committed prior to repeal.” United States v. Bradley, 455 F.2d 1181, 1190 (1st Cir.1972), aff’d 410 U.S. 605, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973). This principle extends to criminal laws as well as to regulations which implement them. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 554–55, 74 S.Ct. 745, 98 L.Ed. 933 (1954) (interpreting the savings statute to “prevent the expiration of a … statute from cutting off appropriate measures to en- force the expired statute in relation to violations of it, or of regulations issued under it, occurring be- fore its expiration” (emphasis added)). Thus, even if it were the case that both the criminal regulation and its enabling act were found to have been re- pealed, the savings statute would nonetheless pre- serve the government’s authority to prosecute pre- repeal conduct covered by the regulation. Id.

While Masciandaro does argue that Congress eliminated the Secretary’s power to restrict firearm possession under 16 U.S.C. § 3 by enacting § 512 of the Credit CARD Act, he has not pointed to any language in § 512 “explicitly provid [ing],” *465 as required by Bradley, that the savings statute does not apply. Indeed, the new law makes no mention of 1 U.S.C. § 109 or existing prosecutions. Because there is no explicit language in § 512 of the Credit CARD Act avoiding application of the savings stat- ute, the savings statute’s default rule applies. See Bradley, 455 F.2d at 1190. And under that rule, the government retains the ability to prosecute previous violations of 16 U.S.C. § 3 or of any “regulations issued under” that provision, such as 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). Allen, 347 U.S. at 554, 74 S.Ct. 745.

In sum, we conclude that Masciandaro was properly prosecuted under 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), the law applicable at the time of his arrest.

III We now turn to Masciandaro’s constitutional

challenge to 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). Masciandaro con-

tends that the Second Amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court in its “watershed” decision in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), guaranteed to him the right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation and thus protected him from pro- secution under § 2.4(b) for exercising that right in a national park area. He explains that

[H]e travels extensively because of his small business and is frequently forced to sleep in his car while he is on the road. He has a Second Amendment right to keep a loaded handgun in the back of his car for the purpose of self-defense and defense of the valuable business property, cash, and personal property he carries with him in the car.

Masciandaro points out that his handgun is the “quintessential self-defense weapon” and that he is exactly the type of “law-abiding citizen” who is the primary intended beneficiary of the Second Amend- ment’s protections.

The government maintains that the holding of Heller is inapplicable here. It argues:

In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Dis- trict of Columbia law that “totally ban[ned] hand- gun possession in the home” and prohibit[ed] rendering any lawful firearm in the house oper- able for the purpose of immediate self-defense vi- olated the Second Amendment. Because the Su- preme Court’s decision is limited to the posses- sion of firearms in the home, it does not invalid- ate the regulation at issue, which narrowly in- volves only the possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle on National Park Service land.

Both parties are correct, albeit incomplete, in their descriptions of the holding in Heller, yet both disagree on the scope of the constitutional right ar- ticulated there. Thus, in resolving Masciandaro’s constitutional challenge, we will begin with a dis- cussion of Heller’s holding and then proceed to ad- dress, seriatim, the scope of the Second Amend-

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ment right to keep and bear arms; the scrutiny that is applied in determining whether a regulation of firearms in national parks is justified; the question of whether a national park is a “sensitive place” where prohibiting firearms is a presumptively law- ful regulatory measure; and the application of our conclusions to Masciandaro’s circumstances.

A The Second Amendment states, “A well regu-

lated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.

Resolving the longstanding issue whether the Second Amendment guarantees an *466 individual right to keep and bear arms or a collective right to do so in connection with militia service, the Su- preme Court in Heller held, based on “the historical background of the Second Amendment,” that the Amendment guarantees the “pre-existing” “individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (emphasis omitted). Because the right predated the Constitution, the Court looked to the historical re- cord when articulating its nature, noting that the right was secured to individuals according to “ ‘libertarian political principles,’ not as members of a fighting force,” to “protect[ ] against both public and private violence.” Id. at 2798–99. It also ob- served that throughout the country’s history, Amer- icans have valued the right not only to be able to prevent the elimination of militia, but “even more important[ly], for self-defense and hunting.” Id. at 2801.

Considering the constitutionality of a District of Columbia statute that prohibited private citizens from possessing handguns and required other legal firearms, such as long guns, to be stored in a fash- ion that rendered them inoperable, the Court held that the statute violated the Second Amendment, stating:

The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an

entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful pur- pose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enu- merated constitutional rights, banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family, would fail constitutional muster.

***

We must also address the District’s requirement (as applied to respondent’s handgun) that firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times. This makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self- defense and is hence unconstitutional.

Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817–18 (internal quota- tion marks, footnote, and citation omitted).

But in reaching its holding, the Court did not define the outer limits of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. It did point out, however, that the right was “not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not.” Id. at 2799; see also id. at 2816 (noting that the right was not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose”). Illustrating this point, the Court related that a majority of the 19th-century courts that considered prohibitions on carrying con- cealed weapons held them to be lawful under the Second Amendment. Id. at 2816. It summarized:

Although we do not undertake an exhaustive his- torical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws im- posing conditions and qualifications on the com-

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mercial sale of arms.

Id. at 2816–17. The Court explained in a foot- note that it was identifying these “presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples.” Id. at 2817 n. 26.

Not only did the Heller Court not define the outer limits of Second Amendment rights, it also did not address the level of *467 scrutiny that should be applied to laws that burden those rights. It found it unnecessary to do so because the District of Columbia law under consideration would violate the Second Amendment “[u]nder any of the stand- ards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.” Id. at 2817.

Two years after deciding Heller, the Supreme Court revisited the Second Amendment in McDon- ald v. City of Chicago, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), holding that the Second Amendment was applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex- plaining Heller further, the McDonald Court stated that “self-defense is the central component” of the individual right to keep and bear arms and that this right is “fundamental.” Id. at 3036, 3038 n. 17 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted). McDonald also reaffirmed that Second Amendment rights are far from absolute, reiterating that Heller had “assur[ed]” that many basic handgun regulations were presumptively lawful. In a similar vein, the McDonald Court noted that the doctrine of “incorporation does not imperil every law regulat- ing firearms.” Id. at 3047.

[3] The upshot of these landmark decisions is that there now exists a clearly-defined fundamental right to possess firearms for self-defense within the home. But a considerable degree of uncertainty re- mains as to the scope of that right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether and how the right can be burdened by governmental regula- tion.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing separately on

this Part III.B:

B Invoking Heller’s direct holding, Masciandaro

argues that because he regularly slept in his car, as much as three to five days a week while traveling on business, his arrest for carrying or possessing a handgun ran afoul of Heller’s core protection of the right “to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2821. Alternatively, he con- tends that if his car is found not to be his home, his arrest nonetheless violated a more general right to carry or possess a handgun outside of the home for self-defense.

I would reject Masciandaro’s argument that his car, even when he slept in it frequently, was his “home” so as to fall within the core protection ar- ticulated in Heller. In the circumstances where Masciandaro had a residence in Woodbridge, Vir- ginia, which was only 20 miles from where he was found sleeping by Sgt. Fornshill, and the place where he was found sleeping was a public parking place, we need not explore further the factors es- sential to making a place a person’s home for Heller ’s core protection. I would conclude, in the circum- stances of this case, that Masciandaro’s car was not his home.

Masciandaro also argues that he possessed a constitutional right to possess a loaded handgun for self-defense outside the home. I would agree that there is a plausible reading of Heller that the Second Amendment provides such a right, at least in some form.

The Heller Court began by noting that the right predated the Constitution and always was an im- portant part of individual freedom—one of “the fundamental rights of Englishmen.” Heller , 128 S.Ct. at 2798. It found that the right included the right to “protect[ ] [oneself] against both public and private violence,” id. at 2799 (emphasis added), thus extending the right in some form to wherever a person could become exposed to public or private violence. See also id. at 2797 (finding that the Second Amendment’s operative clause *468

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“guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation”). Because “self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be,” it follows that the right extends to public areas beyond the home. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self–Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Re- search Agenda, 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1443, 1515–18 (2009) [hereinafter “ Implementing the Right for Self–Defense ”]. Moreover, the right to keep and bear arms was found to have been understood to ex- ist not only for self-defense, but also for member- ship in a militia and for hunting, id. at 2801, neither of which is a home-bound activity. Indeed, one as- pect of the right, as historically understood, was “to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.” Id. at 2801 (emphasis added).

Consistent with the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms outside the home, the Heller Court’s description of its actual holding also implies that a broader right exists. The Court stated that its holding applies to the home, where the need “for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817 (emphasis added), suggesting that some form of the right ap- plies where that need is not “most acute.” Further, when the Court acknowledged that the Second Amendment right was not unlimited, it listed as ex- amples of regulations that were presumptively law- ful, those “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Id. If the Second Amendment right were confined to self-defense in the home, the Court would not have needed to express a reservation for “sensitive places” outside of the home.

What the Heller Court describes as the general preexisting right to keep and bear arms for particip- ation in militias, for self-defense, and for hunting is thus not strictly limited to the home environment but extends in some form to wherever those activit- ies or needs occur, just as other Amendments apply

Pet. App. 10a

generally to protect other individual freedoms. But I would not conclude that the right is all- encompassing such that it extends to all places or to all persons, as the Supreme Court has explicitly re- cognized. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816–17. The complex question of where it may apply outside the home, and what persons may invoke it, is, however, not one that we need to fully answer, because it ap- pears sufficiently clear that, in this case, Mas- ciandaro’s claim to self-defense—asserted by him as a law-abiding citizen sleeping in his automobile in a public parking area—does implicate the Second Amendment, albeit subject to lawful limita- tions. And any analysis of it, therefore, requires re- view of the government’s interest in regulating fire- arms through 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) under the appropri- ate level of scrutiny, which we now address.FN*

FN* In his opinion for the court, my good colleague concludes that we need not de- cide whether Masciandaro’s Second Amendment rights were implicated outside the home. But, I respectfully note, this is not the type of case where constitutional avoidance is appropriate. First, we are con- fronted directly with the contention that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) violated Masciandaro’s Second Amendment right to possess a fire- arm for self-defense purposes, and, having found that § 2.4(b) applies, we cannot duck the issue. See Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 550 (3d Cir.2007) (observing that the court was “squarely presented with [a] constitutional question” and thus “obliged to enter the fray,” despite the “prudential concerns” expressed by Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936)). Applying intermediate scrutiny to reject Masciandaro’s claim does not avoid the constitutional question—it presumes the existence of the constitutional right and conducts a constitutional analysis to defeat it. As I have written, I would acknowledge that Masciandaro’s claim, in the particular

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circumstances of this case, implicates the Second Amendment, leading us to reject the claim under the intermediate scrutiny standard.

Second, I believe that application of the broader Second Amendment right dis- cussed in Heller to factual settings arising outside the home involves pre- cisely the kind of “difficult issue[ ]” the Supreme Court prefers to “mature through full consideration by the courts of appeals.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 965, 51 L.Ed.2d 204 (1977); see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984). Thus, while determining when and where the Second Amendment ap- plies is every bit as complex as Judge Wilkinson suggests, I feel it both neces- sary and important to address the cir- cumstances presented here.

*469 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the court:

C [4] Masciandaro argues that § 2.4(b) should be

analyzed under strict scrutiny, because at the time of his arrest, he was a law-abiding citizen who was simply seeking to exercise his “fundamental” right to self-defense.

Without responding to Masciandaro’s argument directly, the government asserts that § 2.4(b) satis- fies the strict scrutiny standard, as it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government in- terest in public safety. In making this argument, however, we do not understand the government to be taking a specific position on the level of scrutiny to apply.

In Heller, the Supreme Court expressly avoided deciding what level of scrutiny should be applied when reviewing a law burdening the right to keep and bear arms, see Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817, 2821, because it concluded that the District of Columbia’s

handgun ban under consideration before it “would fail constitutional muster” “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny [traditionally] applied to enu- merated constitutional rights,” id. at 2817–18 (emphasis added). The Court did, however, rule out a rational basis review, because that level of review “would be redundant with the separate constitution- al prohibitions on irrational laws.” Id. at 2817 n. 27. Moreover, by listing several “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” id. at 2816–17 & n. 26, the Court provided a hint as to the types of govern- mental interests that might be sufficient to with- stand Second Amendment challenges, as well as the contexts in which those interests could be success- fully invoked.

We have held that intermediate scrutiny should be applied when reviewing a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of firearms by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir.2010). In Chester, officers searching Chester’s home in West Virginia uncovered a 12–gauge shotgun and a 9mm handgun, both of which Chester was prohib- ited from possessing under § 922(g)(9) because he had a prior misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence. In response to Chester’s challenge, we concluded that the scope of the Second Amendment extended to Chester’s activity in possessing fire- arms in the home for self-defense and that the bur- den on possession of the firearms imposed by § 922(g)(9) was subject to intermediate scrutiny. We explained:

Although Chester asserts his right to possess a firearm in his home for the purpose of self- defense, we believe his claim is not within the core right identified in Heller—the right of a law- abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense—by virtue*470 of Chester’s criminal history as a domestic violence misdemeanant. Accordingly, we conclude that in- termediate scrutiny is more appropriate than strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situated per-

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sons.

Id. at 682–83; see also United States v. Marz- zarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir.2010) (applying in- termediate scrutiny under the Second Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits the posses- sion of firearms with obliterated serial numbers).

In the case before us, Masciandaro was a law- abiding citizen at the time of his arrest, without any criminal record, whereas in Chester, the defendant was a domestic violence misdemeanant. On the oth- er hand, Chester was in his home, where the core Heller right applies, whereas Masciandaro was in a public park. These different contexts might call for different judicial approaches. See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir.2010). Indeed, as has been the experience under the First Amend- ment, we might expect that courts will employ dif- ferent types of scrutiny in assessing burdens on Second Amendment rights, depending on the char- acter of the Second Amendment question presented. Under such an approach, we would take into ac- count the nature of a person’s Second Amendment interest, the extent to which those interests are burdened by government regulation, and the strength of the government’s justifications for the regulation. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir.2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.2010) (en banc), pet. for cert. filed, No. 10–7005 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010). As we stated in Chester:

The Second Amendment is no more susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of review than any other constitutional right. Gun-control regulations impose varying degrees of burden on Second Amendment rights, and individual assertions of the right will come in many forms. A severe bur- den on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense should require strong justific- ation. But less severe burdens on the right, laws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and laws that do not implicate the central self-defense con- cern of the Second Amendment, may be more easily justified.

Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (quoting Skoien, 587 F.3d at 813–14).

As we observe that any law regulating the con- tent of speech is subject to strict scrutiny, see, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000), we assume that any law that would burden the “fundamental,” core right of self- defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move out- side the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816 (noting that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues”). Since historical meaning en- joys a privileged interpretative role in the Second Amendment context, see id. at 2816; Skoien, 587 F.3d at 809, this longstanding out- of-the-home/in-the-home distinction bears directly on the level of scrutiny applicable. Indeed, one of the principal cases relied upon in Heller upheld a state concealed carry ban after applying review of a decidedly less-than-strict nature. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846) (“But a law which is merely intended to promote personal security, and to put down lawless aggression and violence, and to this end prohibits the wearing of certain weapons in such a manner as *471 is calculated to exert an un- happy influence upon the moral feelings of the wearer, by making him less regardful of the person- al security of others, does not come in collision with the Constitution”).

Were we to require strict scrutiny in circum- stances such as those presented here, we would likely foreclose an extraordinary number of regulat- ory measures, thus handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to “prevent[ ] armed mayhem” in public places, see Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642, and depriving them of “a variety of tools for combating that problem,” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2822. While we find the applic-

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ation of strict scrutiny important to protect the core right of the self-defense of a law-abiding citizen in his home (“where the need for defense of self, fam- ily, and property is most acute,” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817), we conclude that a lesser showing is neces- sary with respect to laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside of the home. Accord- ingly, we hold that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) will survive Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge if it satisfies in- termediate scrutiny— i.e., if the government can demonstrate that § 2.4(b) is reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683; cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to content- neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech); Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech in light of its “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values”).

D Perhaps to avoid being required to carry any

burden to justify its firearms regulations in national parks, which are properties owned and managed by the government, the government contends that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) is a law regulating firearms in “sensitive places,” as identified in Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816–17, and therefore is presumptively constitu- tional, see id. at 2817 n. 26. Arguing that Dainger- field Island is a sensitive place, the government states that

a large number of people, including children, congregate in National Parks for recreational, educational and expressive activities. Park land is not akin to a gun owner’s home and is far more analogous to other public spaces, such as schools, municipal parks, governmental buildings, and ap- purtenant parking lots, where courts have found firearms restrictions to be presumptively reason- able. Furthermore, as the district court noted, the locations within the National Parks where motor vehicles travel are even more sensitive, given that

they are extensively regulated thoroughfares fre- quented by large numbers of strangers, including children.

It argues that in these circumstances, the law is presumptively “narrowly tailored to advance the compelling government interest” in public safety.

Masciandaro contends that the parking lot at Daingerfield Island was not a “sensitive place” like a school or governmental building, as referenced to in Heller. He argues:

The George Washington Memorial Parkway, where [he] was charged with violation of the su- perseded [National Park Service] weapons regu- lation, is a public road and a major traffic thor- oughfare in the Washington metropolitan area and is not a sensitive place….

***

There is a patchwork of regulations that allow people to use and possess weapons on NPS land, including parkways and *472 remote forests and parks across the United States. Those regulations reflect the [Department of Interior's] determina- tion that NPS land is not sensitive, as a general matter. Indeed, the very same NPS regulation [36 C.F.R. § 2.4] that prohibits possession of loaded weapons in motor vehicles indicates that it is lawful to hunt with weapons, use them for target practice, have them in residential dwellings, use them for research activities, and carry them for protection in “pack trains” or on trail rides, all on NPS land.

(Citing 73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,971 (Dec. 10, 2008)). Masciandaro points out that the National Park Service itself “has explicitly distinguished between the sorts of ‘sensitive places’ mentioned in Heller (schools and government buildings) on one hand and national parks on the other” when it ex- plained that “nothing in [36 C.F.R. § 2.4] shall be construed to authorize concealed carry of firearms in any Federal facility or Federal court facility as

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defined in 18 U.S.C. § 930.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,971 (emphasis added).

These arguments raise the question whether the “sensitive places” doctrine limits the scope of the Second Amendment or, instead, alters the analysis for its application to such places.

The Supreme Court in Heller did state twice that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms was “not unlimited.” See 128 S.Ct. at 2799, 2816. For example, it stated:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited…. Although we do not take an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on … laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensit- ive places such as schools and government build- ings.

Id. at 2816–17 (emphasis added). Because of the relation between the first statement and the ex- amples, one might conclude that a law prohibiting firearms in a sensitive place would fall beyond the scope of the Second Amendment and therefore would be subject to no further analysis. But the Court added a footnote to its language, calling these regulatory measures “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 2817 n. 26 (emphasis added). The Court’s use of the word “presumptively” suggests that the articulation of sensitive places may not be a limitation on the scope of the Second Amendment, but rather on the analysis to be conducted with respect to the burden on that right.

The arguments of counsel about the meaning of the “sensitive places” language raise difficult ques- tions about the scope of the Second Amendment and the scrutiny to be given to government regula- tions in sensitive places. In Chester, we explained the ambiguity inherent in these questions:

Having acknowledged that the scope of the Second Amendment is subject to historical limit-

ations, the Court cautioned that Heller should not be read “to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi- tions” such as … “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” [ Heller, 128 S.Ct.] at 2816–17. Heller described its exemplary list of “longstanding prohibitions” as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” id. at 2817 n. 26, without alluding to any historical evidence that the right to keep and bear arms did not extend to … the conduct prohibited by any of the listed gun regulations. It is unclear to us whether Heller was suggesting that “longstanding prohibitions” such as these were historically understood to be valid limitations*473 on the right to bear arms or did not violate the Second Amendment for some oth- er reason.

Chester, 628 F.3d at 679. In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit labored over the same ambiguity:

We recognize the phrase “presumptively lawful” could have different meanings under newly enun- ciated Second Amendment doctrine. On the one hand, this language could be read to suggest the identified restrictions are presumptively lawful because they regulate conduct outside the scope of the Second Amendment. On the other hand, it may suggest the restrictions are presumptively lawful because they pass muster under any stand- ard of scrutiny.

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.

We need not, however, resolve the ambiguity in the “sensitive places” language in this case, be- cause even if Daingerfield Island is not a sensitive place, as Masciandaro argues, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) still passes constitutional muster under the interme- diate scrutiny standard.

E [5] In reaching this result, we conclude first

that the government has a substantial interest in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and make use of the national parks, including Dainger- field Island. Although the government’s interest

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(Cite as: 638 F.3d 458)

need not be “compelling” under intermediate scru- tiny, cases have sometimes described the govern- ment’s interest in public safety in that fashion. See Schenck v. Pro–Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) (referring to the “significant governmental interest in public safety”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (commenting on the “Federal Government’s com- pelling interests in public safety”). The govern- ment, after all, is invested with “plenary power” to protect the public from danger on federal lands un- der the Property Clause. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (giving Congress the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Ter- ritory or other Property belonging to the United States”); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 201, 107 S.Ct. 2318, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525, 17 S.Ct. 864, 42 L.Ed. 260 (1897); see also United States v. Dorosan, 350 Fed.Appx. 874, 875 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (noting that U.S. Postal Service is authorized under the Property Clause to exclude firearms from its property); Volokh, Imple- menting the Right for Self–Defense, 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1529–33. As the district court noted, Daingerfield Island is a national park area where large numbers of people, including children, con- gregate for recreation. See Masciandaro, 648 F.Supp.2d at 790. Such circumstances justify reas- onable measures to secure public safety.

We also conclude that § 2.4(b)’s narrow prohib- ition is reasonably adapted to that substantial gov- ernmental interest. Under § 2.4(b), national parks patrons are prohibited from possessing loaded fire- arms, and only then within their motor vehicles. 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (“Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel, or other mode of transportation is prohibited”). We have no occasion in this case to address a regulation of unloaded fire- arms. Loaded firearms are surely more dangerous than unloaded firearms, as they could fire accident- ally or be fired before a potential victim has the op- portunity to flee. The Secretary could have reason-

ably concluded that, when concealed within a motor vehicle, a loaded weapon becomes even more dan- gerous. In this respect, § 2.4(b) is analogous to the litany of state concealed carry prohibitions specific- ally*474 identified as valid in Heller. See 128 S.Ct. at 2816–17.

By permitting park patrons to carry unloaded firearms within their vehicles, § 2.4(b) leaves largely intact the right to “possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797. While it is true that the need to load a firearm impinges on the need for armed self-de- fense, see Volokh, Implementing the Right for Self–Defense, 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1518–19, in- termediate scrutiny does not require that a regula- tion be the least intrusive means of achieving the relevant government objective, or that there be no burden whatsoever on the individual right in ques- tion. See United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 847 (4th Cir.1995). Moreover, because the United States Park Police patrol Daingerfield Island, the Secretary could conclude that the need for armed self-defense is less acute there than in the context of one’s home.

Accordingly, we hold that, on Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge under the Second Amendment, § 2.4(b) satisfies the intermediate scrutiny standard.

IV In view of our determination that 36 C.F.R. §

2.4(b) is constitutional under the Second Amend- ment as applied to Masciandaro, a priori we reject his facial overbreath challenge to § 2.4(b).

[6] Without entertaining the novel notion that an overbreath challenge could be recognized “outside the limited context of the First Amend- ment,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, we conclude that a person, such as Masciandaro, to whom a statute was constitutionally applied, “will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitution- ally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610,

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93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). This conclu- sion “reflect[s] the conviction that under our consti- tutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Na- tion’s laws.” Id. at 610–11, 93 S.Ct. 2908; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) (“It is neither our obligation nor within our traditional institution- al role to resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that might devel- op…. For this reason, ‘[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudica- tion’ ” (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As–Applied and Facial Challenges and Third–Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1328 (2000))); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (“[a] person to whom a statute properly applies [cannot] obtain relief based on arguments that a differently situated person might present”). Accordingly, we reject his facial challenge.

***

Because we conclude that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) was properly applied to Masciandaro’s conduct and that § 2.4(b) is constitutional as applied to the cir- cumstances in this case, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, with whom DUFFY, Senior District Judge, joins, writing for the court as to Part III.B:

We are pleased to join Judge Niemeyer’s fine opinion with the exception of Part III.B. In our view it is unnecessary to explore in this case the question of whether and to what extent the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller applies out- side the home.

*475 This case underscores the dilemma faced by lower courts in the post- Heller world: how far to push Heller beyond its undisputed core holding. On the question of Heller’s applicability outside the home environment, we think it prudent to await dir- ection from the Court itself. See Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (2011) (“If the

Supreme Court, in [ McDonald's ] dicta, meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly.”); see also Sims v. United States, 963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.2008).

There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a num- ber of other questions. It is not clear in what places public authorities may ban firearms altogether without shouldering the burdens of litigation. The notion that “self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be,” Eugene Volokh, Imple- menting the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self–Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Re- search Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1515 (2009), appears to us to portend all sorts of litiga- tion over schools, airports, parks, public thorough- fares, and various additional government facilities. And even that may not address the place of any right in a private facility where a public officer ef- fects an arrest. The whole matter strikes us as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree.

There is no such necessity here. We have no reason to expound on where the Heller right may or may not apply outside the home because, as Judge Niemeyer ably explains, intermediate scrutiny of any burden on the alleged right would plainly lead the court to uphold the National Park Service regu- lation.

The trend toward constitutional avoidance seems, finally, to be taking hold. Ashwander, at long last, is back. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The seminal case seems to be Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), which cut back on Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), and relieved the circuit courts of the need and burden of deciding constitutional questions in cases that could be resolved on nar-

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rower grounds. Just as the qualified immunity in- quiry in that case could assume arguendo the viola- tion of a constitutional right, so too can the applica- tion of intermediate scrutiny in this case assume ar- guendo the existence of a right. Courts take this ap- proach routinely in harmless error determinations as well.

Sometimes saying a little less, rather than a little more, is a nice way to discharge our primary responsibility to the parties before us of deciding their case. At other times, of course, the need for clarity and guidance in future cases is paramount, but in this instance we believe the most respectful course is to await that guidance from the nation’s highest court.

There simply is no need in this litigation to break ground that our superiors have not tread. To the degree that we push the right beyond what the Supreme Court in Heller declared to be its origin, we circumscribe the scope of popular governance, move the action into court, and encourage litigation in contexts we cannot foresee. This is serious busi- ness. We do not wish to be even minutely respons- ible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem be- cause in the peace of our judicial chambers we mis- calculated as to Second Amendment rights. It is not far-fetched to think the *476 Heller Court wished to leave open the possibility that such a danger would rise exponentially as one moved the right from the home to the public square.

If ever there was an occasion for restraint, this would seem to be it. There is much to be said for a course of simple caution.

C.A.4 (Va.),2011. U.S. v. Masciandaro 638 F.3d 458

END OF DOCUMENT

Pet. App. 17a

Page 17

harm a victim.’’ Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586. It is the government’s burden to prove that defendant qualifies under the ACCA and the record does simply not support a decision that defendant’s convictions con- stitute violent felonies.15 See Roseboro, 551 F.3d at 242–43.

Because this court does not find the consultation of additional materials to be persuasive at all, this court concludes that defendant’s convictions for failure to stop for a blue light do not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.

As a final note, this court is particularly concerned about the discrepancy in sen- tencing for defendants who are guilty of the same exact offense. In certain coun- ties in South Carolina, the word ‘‘willfully’’ is inserted as a matter of course in an indictment.16 By contrast, other counties only charge the language of the statute in an indictment. This court has no way of distinguishing, without looking to the facts behind the conviction, whether it actually involved intentional conduct, let alone vio- lent and aggressive conduct.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this court concludes it is bound by Supreme Court precedent to apply the categorical approach to the statute in question. Moreover, the court does not believe that the South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light statute, as written, qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. However, in the unlikely event the modified categori- cal approach is the correct approach to apply, this court finds that the government

15. Another court in this district recently held the government failed to meet its burden to prove the defendant’s convictions qualified as ‘‘violent felonies.’’ See United States v. Wright, Cr. No. 9:07–cr–418 (D.S.C. July 29, 2009) (Blatt, Jr., J.). In so holding, the court observed that with only the indictment to consider, it was unlikely that the government

has failed to meet its burden because the indictment alone is not sufficient to estab- lish that defendant’s prior convictions for FTSBL constitute violent felonies under the ACCA.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES of America v. Sean MASCIANDARO. No. 1:09cr238.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

Aug. 26, 2009.

Background: Following conviction by United States Magistrate Judge for pos- session of loaded weapon in motor vehicle in National Park, defendant sought rever- sal.

Holdings: The District Court, T.S. Ellis, III, J., held that:

(1) exception to regulation prohibiting the possession of loaded weapons in motor vehicles on National Park land did not apply to defendant;

(2) defendant’s conviction did not violate his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms;

could ever meet its burden of a preponder- ance of the evidence. Id.

16. This court has learned in researching this issue that the word ‘‘intentionally’’ is included in Richland County but not in adjoining Lex- ington County. This is also true in Charles- ton County where ‘‘intentionally’’ is included, but not in adjoining Dorchester County.

U.S. v. MASCIANDARO

Cite as 648 F.Supp.2d 779 (E.D.Va. 2009)

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648 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

(3) federal regulation criminalizing the possession of a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle on National Park land was not facially unconstitutional as vio- lating the Second Amendment; and

(4) there was no abuse of discretion in not granting post-sentencing request for expungement.

Affirmed.

1. United States Magistrates O26, 27 An appellate review conducted by a district court after a bench trial before a magistrate judge is not a trial de novo; rather, the district court utilizes the same standards of review applied by a court of appeals in assessing a district court convic-

compelling and regulation was narrowly tailored and substantially related to fur- thering public safety in National Parks since it was limited to individuals who carried loaded firearm in motor vehicle on National Park land. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 2; 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b).

tion.

Constitutional Law O1054 Intermediate scrutiny requires that

2. Weapons O3 Exception to regulation prohibiting

the challenged statute or regulation be substantially related to an important gov- ernmental objective to survive a constitu- tional challenge.

the possession of loaded weapons in motor vehicles on National Park land, for posses- sion in accordance with laws of state in which park was located, which was enacted after defendant’s arrest but before his tri- al, did not apply to defendant, since en- abling statute did not change between de- fendant’s offense conduct and time of his trial. 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h); National Park Service Organic Act, § 3, 16 U.S.C.A. § 3.

7. Administrative Law and Procedure O390.1

3. Constitutional Law O4582 Criminal Law O13(1)

undue burden analysis where it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the indi- vidual seeking to engage in constitutionally protected conduct.

Where a defendant is convicted of a general charge that is framed in the words of the statute, a constitutional challenge to that conviction must focus on the statute’s elements, as conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due pro- cess. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.

8. Constitutional Law O656 A party ordinarily can only succeed in

4. Weapons O3 Defendant’s conviction for possession

a facial challenge by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.

of loaded weapon in motor vehicle on Na- tional Park land did not violate his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms; governmental interest in public safety in National Parks was both important and

9. Weapons O3 Federal regulation criminalizing the

Pet. App. 19a

5. Administrative Law and Procedure O390.1

Constitutional Law O1053 Strict scrutiny requires that a statute

or regulation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest in or- der to survive a constitutional challenge.

6. Administrative Law and Procedure O390.1

Constitutional Law O1050 A statute or regulation survives an

possession of a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle on National Park land was not facially unconstitutional as violating the Second Amendment; law had at least some

constitutional applications and nothing in- dicated that a substantial number of in- stances existed in which regulation could not be applied constitutionally. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 2; 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b).

Appellant, Sean Masciandaro, seeks re- versal of his conviction by a United States Magistrate Judge of possession of a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle in a National Park, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2007) and 16 U.S.C. § 3. Specifically, Mas- ciandaro argues

(i) that the Magistrate Judge erred by applying the regulation in force at the time of the offense conduct, rath- er than the later-amended regulation in force at the time of trial and sen- tencing;

(ii) that the Magistrate Judge erred in rejecting Masciandaro’s as-applied and facial Second Amendment chal- lenges to the regulation, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dis- trict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ––––, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008); and

(iii) that the Magistrate Judge erred in rejecting Masciandaro’s post-sen- tencing request for expungement of his conviction.

For the reasons that follow, these argu- ments fail and the judgment of conviction must be affirmed.

On the morning of June 5, 2008, United States Park Police (‘‘USPP’’) Sergeant Kenneth Fornshill was on patrol duty in the area surrounding Daingerfield Island, a National Park Service (‘‘NPS’’) property located appurtenant to and east of the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Northern Virginia.1 At approximately 10:00 a.m., Sergeant Fornshill, who was in a marked patrol car, entered the Dainger- field Island gravel parking lot and ob-

tional Airport and due north of Old Town Alexandria, Virginia.

10. Statutes O64(1) Where a law has at least some consti-

tutional applications, a facial challenge to that law ordinarily succeeds only where the challenging party demonstrates that any unconstitutional applications of the law are not severable as a matter of statutory construction; this severability inquiry is largely a question of legislative intent, but the presumption is in favor of severability.

11. Criminal Law O1226(3.1) Courts have inherent equitable power

to order the expungement of criminal rec- ords, but such power is of exceedingly narrow scope.

12. Criminal Law O1226(3.1) A court’s equitable expungement pow-

er is to be reserved only for extreme and compelling circumstances, such as when necessary to remedy the denial of an indi- vidual’s constitutional rights, or when the government concedes the defendant’s inno- cence.

13. Criminal Law O1226(3.1) Even if magistrate judge had discre-

tion to grant defendant’s post-sentencing request for expungement of conviction, there was no abuse of discretion in not granting the request, where conviction was constitutionally valid and upheld.

Rosie Haney, United States Attorney’s Office, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

Rachel Sarah Martin, Office of the Fed- eral Public Defender, Alexandria, VA, for Defendant.

1. Daingerfield Island, which is not an island, is located due south of Ronald Reagan Na-

U.S. v. MASCIANDARO

Cite as 648 F.Supp.2d 779 (E.D.Va. 2009)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

T.S. ELLIS, III, District Judge.

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served an illegally parked Toyota hatch- back.2 After parking next to the vehicle and exiting his patrol car, Sergeant Forns- hill approached the Toyota and noticed two individuals asleep inside, namely (i) a man, later identified to be Masciandaro, who was asleep in the driver’s seat; and (ii) a woman, later identified to be Mascianda- ro’s girlfriend, asleep in the front passen- ger seat. Sergeant Fornshill then awak- ened Masciandaro and the passenger by tapping on the driver’s side window and asked Masciandaro, the owner of the vehi- cle, to produce his driver’s license. Mas- ciandaro reached behind the reclined pas- senger seat and pulled a latch on the back seat, giving him access to the vehicle’s trunk. He then retrieved a messenger bag from the trunk and placed it on the back seat, which was obscured by the vehi- cle’s tinted rear windows. After removing his wallet from the bag, Masciandaro, who had remained in the driver’s seat, pro- duced his Virginia driver’s license.

As Masciandaro was retrieving his driv- er’s license, Sergeant Fornshill observed a large knife in plain view protruding from under the vehicle’s driver’s seat. This ob- servation prompted Sergeant Fornshill to direct Masciandaro to step out of the vehi- cle, and to inquire of Masciandaro whether there were other weapons in the vehicle. In response, Masciandaro said that he had a loaded handgun in the messenger bag from which he had obtained his wallet. Sergeant Fornshill then handcuffed both Masciandaro and the female passenger. After a second officer arrived, Sergeant Fornshill searched the vehicle and discov- ered Masciandaro’s Kahr P9 9mm semiau- tomatic handgun in a gun case inside the messenger bag. Sergeant Fornshill con- firmed that the firearm was loaded; six rounds of ammunition were in the weap- on’s magazine and a seventh was in the

2. More specifically, the Toyota was improper- ly parked parallel to the edge of the parking

weapon’s chamber. Sergeant Fornshill then arrested Masciandaro on two charges: (i) unlawful possession of a load- ed firearm in a motor vehicle on NPS land, in violation of § 2.4(b); and (ii) failure to comply with a traffic control device, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.12 (2007). Mas- ciandaro was then taken to the nearby USPP station, where he produced an ex- pired Virginia concealed-carry permit and was processed and released pending trial.

Prior to trial before a United States Magistrate Judge, Masciandaro filed two motions to dismiss the firearm charge, ar- guing (i) that § 2.4 had been amended after his arrest to provide an exception decriminalizing his offense conduct; and (ii) that § 2.4(b), as it existed at the time of the offense conduct, is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facial- ly and as applied to him. On January 14, 2009, Masciandaro appeared, with counsel, before the Magistrate Judge for trial and a hearing on his motions to dismiss. The Magistrate Judge received evidence and heard the live testimony of Masciandaro and Sergeant Fornshill. Following oral argument, the Magistrate Judge took the case under advisement.

Thereafter, on February 3, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order denying Masciandaro’s motions to dismiss and find- ing him guilty of both the traffic violation and firearm charge. In an accompanying Memorandum Opinion setting forth the reasons for denying the motions to dis- miss, the Magistrate Judge ruled (i) that because Masciandaro must be adjudicated under the regulation in force at the time of his offense conduct, and not the subse- quently amended regulation, any exception set forth in a post-offense amendment to § 2.4 is inapplicable; and (ii) that § 2.4(b), both facially and as applied to Mascianda-

lot in an area clearly marked as front-end parking only.

Pet. App. 21a

ro, does not violate the Second Amend- ment right to keep and bear arms as that right was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heller.3 Thereafter, on March 10, 2009, Masciandaro appeared for sen- tencing, and the Magistrate Judge im- posed a $50 fine on the § 4.12 sign viola- tion and a $150 fine and a $10 special assessment on the § 2.4(b) firearm viola- tion. Following imposition of sentence, Masciandaro orally moved for expunge- ment of the firearm conviction, arguing that ‘‘extenuating circumstances, including the fact that the regulation has changed,’’ warranted exercise of the Magistrate Judge’s equitable expungement power. Sentencing Tr. 4. The Magistrate Judge denied the request, noting that:

I understand what you are saying. I don’t think I can get into that business. I think that the rules are clear here, that the law is clear here and that it still applies. And I took that into consider- ation, frankly, I think, in the fine. But I don’t feel that’s appropriate given the case law. So, I am sorry, that is denied.

Id. at 4–5. On March 24, 2009, Masciandaro filed a

timely notice of appeal of the firearm con- viction, pursuant to Rule 58(g)(2)(B), Fed. R.Crim.P. Following an order granting the parties’ joint motion for an extension of time, Masciandaro filed his opening brief on June 19, 2009, arguing (i) that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying Mas- ciandaro’s request to apply the amended version of § 2.4 in force at the time of trial and sentencing; (ii) that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying Masciandaro’s as- applied and facial Second Amendment challenges to § 2.4(b)’s prohibition on load-

3. In the course of the January 14 oral argu- ment, Masciandaro also moved orally to dis- miss the firearm charge on the ground that the government failed to prove, as he con- tends was required, that the firearm was operable at the time of the arrest. The

ed weapons in motor vehicles on National Park land; and (iii) that the Magistrate Judge erred in refusing to exercise juris- diction over Masciandaro’s post-sentencing expungement request. On July 31, 2009, the parties appeared, by counsel, for oral argument. By Order issued that same day, the appeal was taken under advise- ment, and the parties were directed to submit supplemental briefs. The parties complied, and Masciandaro’s appeal is now ripe for disposition.

II.

[1] Jurisdiction over Masciandaro’s ap- peal derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3402, and original jurisdiction below was proper un- der 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a). Importantly, ‘‘[a]n appellate review conducted by a dis- trict court after a bench trial before a magistrate judge is not a trial de novo; rather, the district court utilizes the same standards of review applied by a court of appeals in assessing a district court convic- tion.’’ United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir.2005) (citing Rule 58(g)(2)(D), Fed.R.Crim.P.); see also Unit- ed States v. Steinert, 470 F.Supp.2d 627, 630 (E.D.Va.2007) (same). With respect to Masciandaro’s first two arguments, which were preserved below and raise purely legal issues regarding the denial of his motions to dismiss, review is de novo. See Bursey, 416 F.3d at 306. Review of the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Mascianda- ro’s post-sentencing expungement request is for abuse of discretion. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 166 (4th Cir.1994) (not- ing that ‘‘[e]xpunction TTT is a discretion- ary function of the court, rarely utilized absent extreme circumstances’’).

Magistrate Judge denied this motion in the February 3 Opinion, ruling that neither the regulation, nor the definition of ‘‘weapon’’ set forth in 36 C.F.R. § 1.4 (2007), required such a showing. Masciandaro has not ap- pealed that ruling here.

U.S. v. MASCIANDARO

Cite as 648 F.Supp.2d 779 (E.D.Va. 2009)

783

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648 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

III.

trial and sentencing. That exception pro- vides that

[n]otwithstanding any other provision in this Chapter [providing for NPS regula- tions], a person may possess, carry, and transport concealed, loaded, and opera- ble firearms within a national park area in accordance with the laws of the state in which the national park area, or that portion thereof, is located, except as oth- erwise prohibited by applicable Federal law.

§ 2.4(h). Masciandaro argues that because he was not in violation of the applicable Virginia firearm regulations at the time of his arrest, the exception set forth in § 2.4(h) decriminalizes his conduct.

Masciandaro’s arguments in this regard fail, however, as it is clear that with re- spect to federal criminal regulations pro- mulgated under federal enabling statutes, the regulation in effect at the time of the alleged offense conduct applies absent an express retroactivity statement to the con- trary in the regulation’s amendment or its enabling statute. The Supreme Court es- sentially disposed of this issue more than sixty-five years ago in United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64 S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944). There, the Supreme Court held that ‘‘revocation of [a] regulation d[oes] not prevent indictment and convic- tion for violation of its provisions at a time when it remained in force’’ because ‘‘[r]ev- ocation of [a criminal] regulation does not repeal the [regulation’s enabling] statute.’’ Id. at 536, 64 S.Ct. 359. This follows from the fact that although a ‘‘regulation calls the [enabling statute’s] statutory penalties into play, the statute, not the regulation, creates the offense and imposes punish- ment for its violation.’’ Id. Here, § 2.4(b)’s enabling statute, 16 U.S.C. § 3,

used as shooting platforms.

Masciandaro’s appeal presents three questions. First, it is necessary to deter- mine whether Masciandaro was entitled to the benefit of an exception set forth in an amended regulation in effect at the time of trial and sentencing but not at the time of the offense conduct. Second, assuming the Magistrate Judge correctly held that only the regulation in force at the time of the offense conduct controls, it is next necessary to determine whether that regu- lation, either as applied to Masciandaro’s offense conduct, or on its face is unconsti- tutional under the Second Amendment. And finally, assuming that Masciandaro was constitutionally convicted under the appropriate regulation, it is necessary to determine whether the Magistrate Judge’s rejection of Masciandaro’s post-sentencing expungement request constituted an abuse of discretion.

Each of these questions is separately addressed.

A. Applicable Regulation

[2] Masciandaro’s first argument, dis- tilled to its essence, is that he was entitled to the benefit of an exception to § 2.4(b)’s general prohibition on possession of loaded weapons in motor vehicles on National Park land, which exception was not in force at the time of his offense conduct. In this regard, Masciandaro was convicted of violating § 2.4(b), which prohibits ‘‘[c]ar- rying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation’’ on National Park land.4 The exception Masciandaro contends should have been applied at his trial is set forth in 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h) (2008), which went into effect on January 9, 2009, and was in force at the time of Masciandaro’s

4. Section 2.4(b) includes an exception, not applicable here, for nonmoving vehicles being

Pet. App. 23a

did not change between Masciandaro’s of- fense conduct and the time of his trial. Nor does that enabling statute or § 2.4(b) contain any express retroactivity state- ment excepting the regulation at issue from the rule set forth in Hark. According- ly, Masciandaro was not entitled to the

offense conduct to establish a more strin- gent standard. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)(quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169–70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). In addition, where, as here, a regulation is amended to become more le- nient after a defendant’s alleged offense conduct, the government is free to elect not to prosecute or to prosecute under the new, more lenient standard. Mascianda- ro’s argument that he is entitled to such leniency, however, is precluded by Hark ’s clear holding.6 Accordingly, the Magis- trate Judge’s application of the regulation in effect at the time of Masciandaro’s of- fense conduct must be affirmed.7

between January 9, 2009, and March 19, 2009; (iii) between March 19, 2009, and Feb- ruary 22, 2010; and (iv) after February 22, 2010. Hark and the operation of § 109 sensi- bly avoid this anomaly.

7. Even assuming, arguendo, that Masciandaro had been entitled to § 2.4(h)’s exception, it is not at all clear that his conduct was in com- pliance with the applicable Virginia statute, Va.Code § 18.2–308(A), which prohibits car- rying a concealed firearm ‘‘about [the] per- son’’ without a permit. To the contrary, a brief review of Virginia case law suggests that Masciandaro, whose concealed-carry permit had expired, carried the firearm at issue in this case ‘‘about his person’’ and in a con- cealed manner when he held the messenger bag (in which the firearm was hidden) in the backseat of his vehicle. See, e.g., Schaaf v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 429, 432, 258 S.E.2d 574 (1979) (concealed firearm carried in a handbag is ‘‘about the person’’); Leith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 620, 621–22, 440 S.E.2d 152 (1994) (concealed firearm located in locked console of automobile is ‘‘about the person’’ because it is ‘‘close to the carrier’’ and ‘‘readily accessible’’). The cases relied on by Masciandaro in this regard appear ei- ther to be factually distinguishable or to have been overruled. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Common- wealth, 274 Va. 382, 389, 650 S.E.2d 684 (2007) (firearm placed by defendant between front seats of vehicle as he exited following an accident was not ‘‘about his person’’ because ‘‘once [defendant] exited the vehicle and closed the door, the [firearm] was no longer accessible to him so as to afford ‘prompt and

benefit of § 2.4(b).

§ 2.4(h)’s

amendment to

This result is both sensible and fair, as Masciandaro’s conduct was clearly pro- scribed at the time he engaged in it.5 Of course, it would be neither fair, nor consti- tutional to apply a regulation or statute that changed after a defendant’s alleged

5. In this respect, it is worth noting that the general federal savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, provides that repeal of a federal crimi- nal statute (or partial repeal by amendment) does not preclude prosecution under the prior statute for offense conduct occurring before the statutory change, absent an express retro- activity statement to the contrary. Section 109 reversed the common-law rule, which required application of a statute as it existed at the time of trial, rather than the version existing at the time of the offense conduct. Hark, which issued prior to the enactment of § 109, essentially anticipates § 109’s reversal of the common-law rule and applies § 109’s underlying principle to regulations. See Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 554– 55, 74 S.Ct. 745, 98 L.Ed. 933 (1954). In- deed, there is no reason in principle to treat a statute and a regulation promulgated pursu- ant to a statute disparately in this regard.

6. It is worth noting that application of the amended regulation might be problematic, as nine days after Masciandaro’s sentencing, a D.C. federal district court issued a prelimi- nary injunction against application of § 2.4(h). See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). Just over two months later, Congress passed, and the President signed, a statute codifying the since-enjoined exception. See Pub.L. No. 111–49, Title V, § 512, 123 Stat. 1735, 1764 (May 22, 2009) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a–7b) (effective February 22, 2010). Thus, Masciandaro’s argument, if accepted, would lead to application of different statuto- ry or regulatory provisions based on whether he went to trial (i) before January 9, 2009; (ii)

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Pet. App. 24a

786 B. Second Amendment Challenge

Masciandaro next argues that the Mag- istrate Judge erred in denying his as-ap- plied and facial Second Amendment chal- lenges. More specifically, Masciandaro contends (i) that application of § 2.4(b) to him violates his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, as that right was announced by the Supreme Court in Hel- ler; and (ii) that even assuming his as- applied challenge fails, § 2.4(b) is unconsti- tutionally overbroad on its face. Where, as here, a party brings both as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, it is appro- priate to determine first whether the law is constitutional as applied to the challeng- ing party’s conduct, and then only if the as-applied challenge fails, to determine whether it is necessary to consider the facial challenge. This is so ‘‘for reasons relating both to the proper functioning of courts and to their efficiency,’’ as address- ing facial challenges unnecessarily ‘‘would convert use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary means of vindicating the plaintiff’s own right not to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional into a means of mounting gratuitous wholesale attacks upon state and federal laws.’’ Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502–04, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). In addition, ‘‘the overbreadth question is ordi-

immediate use’ ’’); Sutherland v. Common- wealth, 109 Va. 834, 65 S.E. 15 (1909) (hold- ing that a firearm ‘‘in a scabbard and in a pair of saddlebags’’ is not ‘‘readily accessible for use or surprise if desired’’), overruled in part by Schaaf, 220 Va. at 431, 432, 258 S.E.2d 574 (observing that ‘‘Sutherland was decided seventy years ago, and it is doubtful that this court in 1909 envisioned the modern day handbag’’ and holding application of Sutherland to such situations ‘‘would render [§ 18.2–308(A) ] useless’’). In any event, the Magistrate Judge explicitly declined to ad- dress this issue at trial, holding that § 2.4(h)’s

648 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

Pet. App. 25a

narily more difficult to resolve than the as- applied, since it requires TTT consideration of many more applications than those im- mediately before the court.’’ Fox, 492 U.S. at 485, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (quoting Broad- rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).8 Thus, Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge is ad- dressed first. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to summarize briefly Heller ’s narrow holding and dicta, in which the Supreme Court—for the first time—held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in certain circumstances.

(1) Heller’s Holding

The Second Amendment provides: ‘‘A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.’’ U.S. Const. amend. II. Just over a year ago, the Supreme Court in Heller interpreted this language to ‘‘guarantee [an] individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confronta- tion.’’ 128 S.Ct. at 2797. Of course, Hel- ler ’s holding was much narrower. More specifically, the Supreme Court in Heller addressed three District of Columbia weapons laws, which taken together ‘‘total- ly ban[ned] handgun possession in the home’’ and ‘‘require[d] that any lawful fire- arm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it

exception did not apply. Because that ruling is affirmed here, it is unnecessary to reach or decide whether Masciandaro would qualify for the § 2.4(h) exception.

8. Indeed, in Fox, the Supreme Court remand- ed the case, first for a ‘‘determination, pursu- ant to the standards described above, of the validity of [the] law’s application’’ to the par- ticular plaintiffs ‘‘and, [only] if its application TTT is found to be valid, for determination whether [the law’s] substantial overbreadth nonetheless makes it unenforceable.’’ 492 U.S. at 486, 109 S.Ct. 3028.

inoperable.’’ Id. at 2817.9 Importantly, Heller involved an as-applied challenge to these provisions by a D.C. special police officer who sought an injunction ordering the District of Columbia to issue him a license to carry his handgun, operable and free of a trigger lock, in his home. In finding that the officer was entitled to the relief sought, the Supreme Court summa- rized its holding as follows:

In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home vio- lates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense. As- suming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.

Id. at 2821–22 (emphasis added). Thus, Heller ’s narrow holding is explicitly limit- ed to vindicating the Second Amendment ‘‘right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’’ Id. at 2821 (emphasis added).

Interestingly, Heller does not squarely address or decide the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to statutes and regu- lations subjected to Second Amendment challenges. Justice Scalia’s majority opin-

9. In describing the provisions at issue. Heller observed that ‘‘[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restric- tion of the District’s handgun ban.’’ 128 S.Ct. at 2818.

10. See, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 609 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1231–35 (D.Utah 2009) (ap- plying strict scrutiny and upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals con- victed of domestic violence crimes from pos- sessing firearms).

11. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1171–72 (W.D.Tenn.2009) (applying intermediate scrutiny and uphold- ing federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United States v. Bledsoe, No.

ion sidesteps this issue, noting that it is preferable to address it in the future on a case-by-case basis. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2821. Heller itself suggests that some elevated level of scrutiny—either strict scrutiny or some intermediate level of scrutiny—is appropriate, and the D.C. laws at issue in Heller failed under any such standard. Id. at 2817–18 and n. 27. Those lower courts to address Second Amendment challenges to statutes and regulations post-Heller have not been uni- form in this respect; some have applied strict scrutiny,10 others have used interme- diate scrutiny,11 and still others have for- mulated an ‘‘undue burden’’-type approach similar to that used in the context of abor- tion regulations.12 In any event, it is rea- sonable to conclude from Heller that some elevated level of scrutiny is required when assessing the Second Amendment constitu- tionality of statutes and regulations.

(2) Heller’s Dicta

Because Heller also ‘‘represents [the Su- preme] Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,’’ Justice Sca- lia’s majority opinion provides some guid- ance, in dicta, for future courts evaluating Second Amendment claims. Id. at 2821. In this regard, Heller ’s dicta is notable for

SA–08–CR–13(2)–XR, 2008 WL 3538717, at *4 (W.D.Tex. Aug. 8, 2008) (unpublished) (ap- plying intermediate scrutiny and upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which places age re- strictions on firearm purchases).

12. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 460 (9th Cir.2009) (ordinance prohibiting fire- arm possession on county property did ‘‘not meaningfully impede the ability of individuals to defend themselves in their homes with usa- ble firearms, the core of the right as Heller analyzed it’’); People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App.4th 568, 577, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 804 (2008) (statute prohibiting carrying of loaded fire- arms in public did ‘‘not burden the core Sec- ond Amendment right announced in Heller ’’).

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787

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648 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

the degree to which it confirms the limited scope of the case’s holding. For example, the majority opinion emphasizes that ‘‘[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited’’ and is ‘‘not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatso- ever and for whatever purpose.’’ Id. at 2816. Thus, Heller recognizes (with ap- proval) that ‘‘the majority of 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weap- ons were lawful under the Second Amend- ment or state analogues.’’ Id. In addition, the majority opinion cautions that

[a]lthough we do not undertake an ex- haustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi- tions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws for- bidding the carrying of firearms in sen- sitive places such as schools and gov- ernment buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

13. To be sure, in rejecting the District of Columbia’s argument that the Second Amend- ment provided only a collective right connect- ed to militia service, Heller relied on at least two 19th-century state supreme court cases interpreting the Second Amendment as pro- tecting an individual right to carry weapons openly (but not concealed) in public. More specifically, Heller cited approvingly to Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846), in which ‘‘the Georgia Supreme Court construed the Second Amendment as protecting the ‘natural right of self-defence’ and therefore struck down a ban on carrying pistols openly.’’ Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2809 (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251). The Heller majority described Nunn as ‘‘perfectly captur[ing] the way in which the operative clause of the Second Amendment furthers’’ the Amendment’s purpose. Id. Similarly, Heller ’s dicta also cited with approval to State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850), in which ‘‘the Louisiana Supreme Court held that citi- zens had a right to carry arms openly’’ under the Second Amendment. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at

Id. at 2816–17 (emphasis added). More- over, Heller ‘‘identif[ied] these presump- tively lawful regulatory measures only as examples’’ that did ‘‘not purport to be ex- haustive.’’ Id. at 2817 n. 26. Accordingly, although Heller does not preclude Second Amendment challenges to laws regulating firearm possession outside the home,13 Heller ’s dicta makes pellucidly clear that the Supreme Court’s holding should not be read by lower courts as an invitation to invalidate the existing universe of public weapons regulations.14 With these as guiding principles, the analysis turns to Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge.

(3) As–Applied Challenge

[3, 4] With respect to Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge, the analysis properly begins with § 2.4(b)’s elements. This is so because where, as here, a defendant is convicted of a ‘‘general’’ charge that is ‘‘framed in the words of the statute,’’ a constitutional challenge to that conviction must focus on the statute’s elements, as ‘‘[c]onviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process.’’

2809 (citing Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490). Of course, like Heller, these 19th-century state supreme court decisions were silent on the constitutionality of the narrower regulation at issue here: a prohibition on carrying or pos- sessing loaded weapons in motor vehicles on National Park land.

14. In this regard, at least one commentator has observed that Heller ’s list of presumptive- ly lawful regulatory measures ‘‘is a crucial cue to lower court judges that is likely to minimize greatly the Heller decision’s im- pact.’’ A. Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control after District of Co- lumbia v. Heller, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 383, 394 (2009). Thus, ‘‘[r]ather than being a win for the ‘pro-gun’ side or a setback for the ‘anti-gun’ forces, [Heller ] may turn out simply to have been a victory for all Americans, having finally driven home to everyone that respecting gun rights and achieving sound gun control are not mutually exclusive en- deavors.’’ Id. at 418.

Pet. App. 27a

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937)).15 Here, 2.4(b) required the government to prove essentially three elements, namely (i) that Masciandaro ‘‘carr[ied] or possess[ed] a loaded weapon’’; (ii) that he did so ‘‘in a motor vehicle’’; and (iii) that he did so on National Park land. § 2.4(b). Thus, the question presented is whether Mascianda- ro’s conviction based on conduct satisfying these elements violates his Second Amend- ment right to keep and bear arms, as that right was elucidated by the Supreme Court in Heller. Put differently, the ques- tion is whether Masciandaro has a Second Amendment right to carry a loaded fire- arm in his vehicle on National Park land.

[5–7] As a threshold matter, it is im- portant to observe that Heller’s narrow holding does not reach or decide this issue. This is so because § 2.4(b), unlike the laws at issue in Heller, does not prohibit pos- session of a loaded firearm in the home; rather, § 2.4(b) prohibits carrying or pos- sessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehi- cle on National Park land.16 Thus, it is necessary to determine whether § 2.4(b)’s application to Masciandaro’s offense con- duct withstands the appropriate level of elevated constitutional scrutiny—either

15. See also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106–107, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979) (‘‘To uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in the indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most basic notions of due process. Few constitu- tional principles are more firmly established than a defendant’s right to be heard on the specific charges of which he is accused.’’)

16. In this respect, Masciandaro argued that because he often slept in his vehicle when traveling long distances, his vehicle is in ef- fect his home. This argument is unpersua- sive. First, occasionally sleeping in one’s ve- hicle on someone else’s property does not convert that vehicle into a home. And more importantly, Masciandaro himself testified at

strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or an ‘‘undue burden’’ analysis. In this re- spect, strict scrutiny requires that a stat- ute or regulation ‘‘be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest in order to survive’’ a constitutional chal- lenge. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997). Intermediate scrutiny requires that the challenged statute or regulation ‘‘be sub- stantially related to an important govern- mental objective.’’ Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988). Finally, a statute or regulation survives an ‘‘undue burden’’ analysis where it does not have the ‘‘ ‘purpose or effect [of] plac[ing] a substantial obstacle in the path’ ’’ of the individual seeking to engage in constitutionally protected con- duct. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) (quoting Planned Parenthood of South- eastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)).

These principles, applied here, compel the conclusion that under any elevated lev- el of constitutional scrutiny, Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge must fail. First, the governmental interest furthered by § 2.4(b)—public safety in National Parks—is both important and compelling. In addition, § 2.4(b) is both narrowly tai-

trial that he often carries numerous personal items in his vehicle precisely because he ‘‘[g]enerally TTT do[es not] know at what point TTT [he] will be home.’’ Trial Tr. 17 (empha- sis added). Thus, even Masciandaro acknowl- edged at trial that he sometimes slept in his vehicle because he was away from home, not because his vehicle was his home. According- ly, Masciandaro’s argument that the regula- tion in question violated his Second Amend- ment right to carry a weapon in his home must be rejected. Neither reached nor decid- ed here is whether a person using a camper or recreational vehicle (RV) on National Park land has a Second Amendment right to carry or possess a loaded, operable firearm in the camper or RV.

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lored and substantially related to further- ing public safety in National Parks. In this respect, § 2.4(b) does not prohibit car- rying or possessing a loaded firearm on National Park land outside motor vehicles, nor does § 2.4(b) prohibit carrying or pos- sessing unloaded firearms in motor vehi- cles on National Park land. Rather, § 2.4(b) is limited to those individuals, like Masciandaro, who elect to carry or possess a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle, and who do so on National Park land. More- over, given these limitations, it is clear that § 2.4(b) does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of Masciandaro’s exercise of his Second Amendment right, as announced in Heller, ‘‘to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’’ Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2821. Accordingly, because § 2.4(b) plainly with- stands any elevated level of scrutiny, Mas- ciandaro’s as-applied challenge must fail.

In addition, Heller’s list of ‘‘presump- tively lawful regulatory measures’’ points persuasively to rejection of Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge. Id. at 2817 n. 26. In this respect, Heller’s dicta explicitly ac- knowledges that ‘‘laws forbidding the car- rying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings’’ do not violate the Second Amendment rights of those prosecuted under such laws. Id. at 2817 (emphasis added). Although Hel- ler does not define ‘‘sensitive places,’’ the examples given—schools and government buildings—plainly suggest that motor vehi- cles on National Park land fall within any sensible definition of a ‘‘sensitive place.’’ Schools and government buildings are sen- sitive places because, unlike homes, they are public properties where large numbers of people, often strangers (and including

17. See, e.g., J.H. Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abor- tions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L. Rev. 253, 303 (2009) (arguing that ‘‘gun control is one area where ‘the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are political

children), congregate for recreational, edu- cational, and expressive activities. Like- wise, National Parks are public properties where large numbers of people, often strangers (and including children), congre- gate for recreational, educational, and ex- pressive activities. Moreover, the loca- tions within National Parks where motor vehicles travel—roads and parking lots— are even more sensitive, as roads and parking lots are extensively regulated thoroughfares frequented by large num- bers of strangers, including children. Thus, unlike a home or other private prop- erty, where the ‘‘need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,’’ the locations in National Parks where vehicles travel, like schools and government build- ings, are sensitive places where the Second Amendment leaves the judgment of wheth- er (and if so, how) to regulate firearms to the legislature, not the judiciary. Id. at 2817. Similarly, Heller ’s approval of con- cealed weapons bans provides further sup- port for rejecting Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge, as carrying a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle—an act which, by defini- tion, is almost always outside the view of those nearby—presents the sort of compel- ling safety risk more adequately resolved by legislation than judicial ipse dixit.17

Finally, the result reached here also finds support in the scant post-Heller case law addressing firearms regulations in ‘‘sensitive places.’’ For example, in Nor- dyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir.2009), a Ninth Circuit panel rejected a Second Amendment Heller challenge to a county ordinance broader than the regulation at issue in this case. More specifically, Nor- dyke held that an ordinance banning all possession of weapons or ammunition on

and not juridical.’ ’’ (quoting Webster v. Re- prod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).

Pet. App. 29a

county property ‘‘fits within the exception from the Second Amendment for ‘sensitive places’ that Heller recognized.’’ Id. at 460. This is so, the Ninth Circuit panel ex- plained, because county property includes many ‘‘gathering places where high num- bers of people might congregate’’ and, like government building and schools, ‘‘possess- ing firearms in such places risks harm to great numbers of defenseless people (e.g., children).’’ Id. at 460, 459. Thus, the ordinance upheld in Nordyke did ‘‘not meaningfully impede the ability of individ- uals to defend themselves in their homes with usable firearms, the core of the right as Heller analyzed it.’’ Id. at 460.

18. It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit has since voted to rehear Nordyke en banc. See 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir.2009) (Order). Of course, it is also worth noting that the bulk of the panel opinion in Nordyke confronted an issue not present in this case, namely whether the Second Amendment applies to state and county ordinances via Fourteenth Amend- ment incorporation. In any event, the panel opinion in Nordyke is persuasive with respect to its ‘‘sensitive places’’ analysis, and no en banc reconsideration of that analysis would affect the result reached here.

In addition, the result reached here also finds support in other post-Heller cases up- holding weapons regulations based on both Heller ’s ‘‘sensitive places’’ exception and Hel- ler ’s recognition that concealed weapons bans are constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 304 Fed.Appx. 473, 474 (9th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (upholding convic- tion for carrying concealed weapon in an airplane and observing that ‘‘nothing in [Hel- ler ] was intended to cast doubt on the prohi- bition of concealed weapons in sensitive places’’); United States v. Dorosan, No. 08cr042, 2009 WL 273300, at *1 (E.D.La. Jan. 28, 2009) (Mem. Op.) (affirming magis- trate judge’s judgment of conviction for viola- tion of 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(1), which prohibits possession of firearms on United States Postal Service property, finding the regulation con- stitutional under Heller’s ‘‘sensitive places’’ exception); United States v. Walters, No. 08cr31, 2008 WL 2740398, at *1 (D.Vi. July 15, 2008) (Order) (upholding conviction for possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a

The same result should obtain here for essentially similar reasons. Significantly, § 2.4(b) is more narrowly framed than the ordinance at issue in Nordyke; § 2.4(b) does not prohibit all possession of firearms and ammunition on National Park land, but rather limits the prohibition at issue to carrying or possessing loaded firearms in motor vehicles. Thus, if the county ordi- nance at issue in Nordyke is constitutional under the Second Amendment, the consti- tutionality of § 2.4(b) follows a fortiori.18 Accordingly, Masciandaro’s § 2.4(b) con- viction, which rested on proof that he pos- sessed a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle and on National Park land, does not vio- late his Second Amendment rights.19

school zone); People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App.4th 303, 314, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674 (2008) (‘‘concealment of a firearm under TTT cloth- ing on a residential driveway that was not closed off from the public and was populated with temporary occupants falls within the ‘historical tradition’ of prohibiting the carry- ing of dangerous weapons in publicly sensi- tive places’’ (quoting Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817)).

19. In this respect, because proof that Mas- ciandaro’s conduct satisfied the elements of § 2.4(b) is sufficient to defeat the as-applied challenge, it is unnecessary to determine whether the Magistrate Judge could have ap- plied a narrowing construction that would have placed the conduct for which Mascian- daro was convicted even further outside the scope of his Second Amendment rights. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125–26, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (reject- ing as-applied constitutional challenge based on state supreme court’s narrowing construc- tion but ‘‘remand[ing] for a new trial TTT to ensure that [defendant’s] conviction stemmed from a finding that the [government] had proved each of the elements’’ of the offense). But see, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874(1997) (observing that courts ‘‘may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction’’ (quoting Virginia v. Am. Book- seller’s Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988))); United States v.

U.S. v. MASCIANDARO

Cite as 648 F.Supp.2d 779 (E.D.Va. 2009)

791

Pet. App. 30a

792

648 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

(4) Facial Challenge

[8, 9] Next, although Masciandaro’s as- applied challenge fails, it is necessary to address his facial challenge. This is so because a facial challenge generally per- mits a ‘‘defendant to attack a statute be- cause of its effect on conduct other than the conduct for which defendant is being punished, thus protecting the right to en- gage in conduct not directly before the court.’’ Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 586, 109 S.Ct. 2633, 105 L.Ed.2d 493 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Brockett, 472 U.S. at 503, 105 S.Ct. 2794). The Supreme Court has recently recog- nized that there are generally two types of facial challenges to a law’s constitutionali- ty. First, a party ordinarily ‘‘can only succeed in a facial challenge by ‘estab- lish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’’ Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1190, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). In addition, the Su- preme Court’s ‘‘cases recognize a second type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may be overturned as impermissibly over- broad because a ‘substantial number’ of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legiti- mate sweep.’ ’’ Id. at 1190 n. 6 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)).20

Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875) (‘‘It would certainly be dangerous if the legis- lature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.’’) Similarly, because the judgment of conviction here did not rest upon any factual findings (nor did the charging document at issue set forth any allegations) concerning the nature of Daingerfield Island, it is unneces- sary to determine whether such findings may

Thus, the analysis turns to whether Ma- ciandaro’s Second Amendment facial chal- lenge to § 2.4(b) succeeds under either type of facial challenge.

[10] First, it is pellucidly clear that Masciandaro has not ‘‘establish[ed] that no set of circumstances exists under which’’ § 2.4(b) would be valid. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. In this respect, it is important to observe as a threshold matter that because, as discussed supra, the Second Amendment does not grant Masciandaro an absolute right to carry a loaded weapon in his vehicle on National Park land in all circumstances, it necessar- ily follows that § 2.4(b) has at least some constitutional applications. And where, as here, a law has at least some constitutional applications, a facial challenge to that law ordinarily succeeds only where the chal- lenging party demonstrates that any un- constitutional applications of the law are not ‘‘severable’’ as a matter of statutory construction. This ‘‘severability’’ inquiry ‘‘is largely a question of legislative intent, but the presumption is in favor of sever- ability.’’ Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984). Thus, absent a clear showing that the law’s enacting body ‘‘would not have enacted those provisions [or applications] which are within its power, independently of [those] which [are] not, the invalid part[s] may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.’’ Id. (internal quotations omitted).21 Masciandaro has made no such showing. Notably, the only applications of § 2.4(b) raised by Mascian-

have provided further support for rejecting Masciandaro’s as-applied challenge.

20. See also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 314, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (‘‘Ab- sent an exception such as First Amendment overbreadth, we will facially invalidate a stat- ute only if the plaintiff establishes that the statute is invalid in all its applications.’’).

21. See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 323, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (‘‘We pre-

Pet. App. 31a

daro that are even arguably unconstitu- tional under Heller are (i) application of § 2.4(b) to a person legitimately using a motor vehicle as a home, or (ii) application of § 2.4(b) to a person who loads a firearm in a vehicle on National Park land for immediate and articulable self-defense purposes. Yet, even assuming, arguendo, that such applications might infringe on some hypothetical individual’s Second Amendment right, narrowing constructions of § 2.4(b) could easily remedy any uncon- stitutionality.22 Accordingly, Masciandaro has not ‘‘establish[ed] that no set of cir- cumstances exists under which’’ § 2.4(b)

sume that the unconstitutional application is severable. This presumption is a manifesta- tion of Salerno ’s general rule that we should not strike a statute on its face unless it is invalid in all its applications. Unless the Leg- islative clearly would not have enacted the constitutional applications independently of the unconstitutional application, the Court leaves the constitutional applications stand- ing.’’ (citing Regan, 468 U.S. at 653, 104 S.Ct. 3262)).

22. For example, where, unlike here, a person prosecuted under § 2.4(b) lawfully resides in a ‘‘vehicle’’ (like a motor home), a construing court could simply narrow the meaning of ‘‘motor vehicle’’ in § 2.4(b) to exclude vehi- cles actually used as homes. Similarly, in the unlikely event that a person were prosecuted for loading a weapon in circumstances pre- senting an imminent danger, a construing court could read a common-law ‘‘justifica- tion’’ defense into § 2.4(b). Although these observations do not purport to determine whether (and under what facts) such con- structions would be appropriate or necessary, these observations illustrate that any uncon- stitutional applications of § 2.4(b) are resolva- ble on a case-by-case basis.

Of course, Heller did not read a common- law ‘‘justification’’ or ‘‘self-defense’’ exception into the D.C. law at issue in that case, instead finding that such statutory construction was foreclosed by a prior opinion of the D.C. Court of Appeals, the statute’s plain text, and ‘‘the presence of certain other enumerated exceptions.’’ Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2818–19 (citing McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 755–56 (D.C.1978)). In this regard, it is im-

would be constitutionally valid and hence has failed to satisfy the first type of facial challenge. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095.

Similarly, Masciandaro has not demon- strated that § 2.4(b) must be struck down on its face as unconstitutionally overbroad. First, it is debatable whether the facial ‘‘overbreadth’’ doctrine ever extends be- yond the First Amendment context and, if it does, whether it is applicable to Second Amendment challenges.23 And even as- suming, arguendo, that facial overbreadth challenges are permissible in the Second Amendment context,24 it appears more

portant to note that the Supreme Court typi- cally ‘‘defer[s] to the decisions of the courts of the District of Columbia on matters of exclu- sively local concern.’’ Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). But see Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2853–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (‘‘[B]e- cause I see nothing in the District law that would preclude the existence of a background common-law self-defense exception, I would avoid the constitutional question by interpret- ing the statute to include it.’’). By contrast, neither § 2.4(b)’s plain text, nor any enumer- ated exceptions, foreclose a common-law self- defense exception. Nor is it necessary here to consider deference to the construction of a state court, as the regulation at issue is feder- al, and not local, in nature.

23. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 194–97 (5th ed.2003) (describing de- bate in Supreme Court and among scholars as to scope of overbreadth doctrine).

24. To be sure, Heller likens the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in at least some respects to the First Amendment right to free speech, most notably in observ- ing that ‘‘rational basis’’ scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of scrutiny for the D.C. regulations at issue in that case. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817 n. 27 (‘‘Obviously, [a ration- al basis] test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeop- ardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.’’).

U.S. v. MASCIANDARO

Cite as 648 F.Supp.2d 779 (E.D.Va. 2009)

793

Pet. App. 32a

794

648 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

doubtful still that such challenges are ap- propriate with respect to firearms laws not affecting the home.25 In any event, it is unnecessary here to decide whether (and under what circumstances) a facial over- breadth challenge may succeed on Second Amendment grounds, as Masciandaro has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrat- ing ‘‘from actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist in which’’ § 2.4(b) cannot be applied constitutionally. N.Y. State Club Ass’n Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (emphasis added).26 In- deed, Masciandaro’s allegations of § 2.4(b)’s overbreadth are purely hypo- thetical and are unsupported by any show- ing that the alleged overbreadth is real, let alone substantial. Accordingly, Mascian- daro’s facial challenges must be rejected and the Magistrate Judge’s ruling in that regard affirmed.

725 F.2d 674 (4th Cir.1984)). Thus, a court’s equitable expungement power ‘‘is to be reserved only for extreme and com- pelling circumstances, such as when neces- sary to remedy the denial of an individual’s constitutional rights, or when the govern- ment concedes the defendant’s innocence.’’ Id. at 284 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[13] This case presents no such cir- cumstances. Indeed, where, as here, a conviction is constitutionally valid and up- held, it is difficult to imagine circum- stances warranting expungement. Thus, even assuming the Magistrate Judge had discretion to grant Masciandaro’s expunge- ment request, the record does not support Masciandaro’s contention that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant the re- quest. Rather, the Magistrate Judge found that expungement was not ‘‘appro- priate given the case law’’ and that any extenuating circumstances were taken into account by the modest fine imposed. Sen- tencing Tr. 4, 5. Accordingly, Masciandaro has failed to demonstrate that the Magis- trate Judge’s denial of his expungement request was an abuse of discretion.

IV.

In sum, the Magistrate Judge correctly held that Masciandaro must be adjudicated under the regulations in effect at the time of the alleged offense conduct. In addi- tion, the Magistrate Judge correctly held

arms for self-defense is ‘‘most acute,’’ it ap- pears doubtful that overbreadth challenges are appropriate where, as here, a firearm limitation does not even arguably affect fire- arms in the home. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817.

26. See also Wash. State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1190 n. 6 (‘‘We generally do not apply the ‘strong medicine’ of overbreadth analysis where the parties fail to describe the instanc- es of arguable overbreadth of the contested law.’’).

C. Expungement [11, 12] Masciandaro’s

final ment—that the Magistrate Judge commit- ted an abuse of discretion in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over or grant his ex- pungement request—is patently meritless. To be sure, ‘‘courts TTT have inherent equi- table power to order the expungement of criminal records[,] TTT [but] such power is of ‘exceedingly narrow scope.’ ’’ United States v. Salleh, 863 F.Supp. 283, 283–84 (E.D.Va.1994) (quoting Coles v. Levine, 561 F.Supp. 146, 153 (D.Md.1983), aff’d,

argu-

25. In this respect, it is worth noting that even in the First Amendment context, overbreadth challenges are inappropriate to challenges only involving regulation of ‘‘commercial speech.’’ See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (‘‘[O]verbreadth doctrine does not ap- ply to commercial speech.’’); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380–81, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (same). Thus, given Heller ’s focus on the home, where the Second Amendment right to keep and bear

Pet. App. 33a

IN RE DIGITEK PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION

Cite as 648 F.Supp.2d 795 (S.D.W.Va. 2009)

795

that Masciandaro’s as-applied and facial Second Amendment challenges are not supported by Heller and hence must fail. Finally, the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Masciandaro’s post-sentencing expunge- ment request was not an abuse of discre- tion. Accordingly, Masciandaro’s appeal must be dismissed and his judgment of conviction affirmed.

An appropriate Order will issue.

In re DIGITEKb PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION.

This Document Relates to all Cases.

MDL No. 1968.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston.

July 23, 2009.

Background: Consumers brought product liability action against corporation. Follow- ing transfer to multidistrict litigation (MDL) court, consumers moved for order permitting ex parte contact with corpora- tion’s former employees.

Holding: The District Court, Mary E. Stanley, United States Magistrate Judge, held that counsel for consumers would be permitted to conduct ex parte interviews of former employees.

Ordered accordingly.

1. Federal Courts O157 Transfer of a case to a multidistrict

litigation court requires the application of the law of the circuit of the transferee court considering motions with respect to discovery disputes and other pretrial is- sues.

2. Attorney and Client O32(12) Counsel for consumers in multidistrict products liability action would be permit- ted to conduct ex parte interviews of de- fendant corporation’s former employees to the extent allowed by American Bar Asso- ciation (ABA) Model Rules and comment, without giving advance notice of intention to contact employees or to send such em- ployees a form letter approved by the court. U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules S.D.W.Va., Rule

83.7.

PRETRIAL ORDER # 31 (Ex Parte Contact with Former Actavis Employees)

MARY E. STANLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for an order permitting ex parte contact with former Actavis employees (docket # 153). The Actavis defendants have responded in opposition (# 156), and Plaintiffs have filed a reply (# 158).

Positions of the parties

Plaintiffs contend that the court should apply the West Virginia Rules of Profes- sional Conduct with respect to counsel’s ex parte contact with the former employees of the Actavis defendants. (# 153, at 1.) They assert that in multidistrict litigation, the transferee court applies the law of the circuit in which it is sitting when ruling on discovery disputes. Id., at 4. Plaintiffs argue that the West Virginia Rules permit ex parte contact with former employees of an adverse corporate party. Id., at 1.

The Actavis defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ motion does not comport with either New Jersey or West Virginia law. (# 156, at 2.) They urge the court to adopt reasonable restrictions and protections for ex parte interviews of their former em- ployees, including identification and notice of each former employee to be contacted,

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Posted by admin on September 6th, 2011

News From THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS (FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA):

ADMISSION OF INTERNET-BASED DOCUMENTS AT TRIAL

Panel attorney George Chaney is steering evidence from the Information Superhighway directly into the courtroom. Recently, in his defense of Sidney Joseph before Judge Clement, Chaney successfully introduced into evidence hard copies of several documents generated from electronic Internet images which contained photographs of prop firearms used in theatrical settings. Overcoming an initial government objection regarding a lack of proper foundation, Judge Clement admitted the Internet-based documents for use in cross-examination of the government’s firearms expert. Only after the expert erroneously identified these items as photographs of genuine firearms, did Chaney reveal that they were photos of prop guns. Chaney was thus able to argue in closing that if a firearms expert could be so easily mistaken, the government’s photographs of the perpetrator depicting what appeared to be the defendant holding a .38 Smith & Wesson was all the more suspect.

Key evidentiary rules potentially pertinent to this issue are Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) regarding hearsay exception for business records, Fed. R. Evid. 901regarding authentication of documents and Fed. R. Evid. 1001 and 1003, regarding admission of electronically re-recorded versions of original documents. For further background on introducing Internet-generated documents, see Dieseth, Paul, The Use of Document Depositories and the Internet in Large Scale and Multi- jurisdictional Products Liability Litigation, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 615, 625 (2000).

Kudos to George Chaney for using the Net to blaze the trail into the 21st century courtroom.

Tags: Attorney New Orleans, Criminal Attorney New Orleans, Criminal Defense Attorney New Orleans, Criminal Defense Lawyer New Orleans, Criminal Lawyer New Orleans, Federal Case Law Update, Federal Criminal Attorney New Orleans, Federal Detention Hearings, Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Federal Firearms, Federal Public Defender Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Crime News, New Orleans Criminal Lawyer, New Orleans Federal Criminal Attorney, New Orleans Federal Criminal Defense Lawyer, New Orleans Federal Criminal Lawyer, The Defense Never Rests, United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
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Posted by admin on September 6th, 2011

FEDERAL DETENTION HEARINGS

The purpose of a detention hearing is to determine whether conditions exist that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial and the safety of any other persons and the community. Defense counsel should be vigilant about motions for pre-trial detention hearings and insure that the motion is being properly brought. There are too many clients ordered detained. Nationally, only 2% of people released on bond fail to appear for trial. With such a reduced chance of nonappearance, risk of flight is historically unlikely. At least one of the threshold requirements of 18 U.S.C. §3142(f) must be present in order for the government to move for detention. Under the Bail Reform Act, if none of these requirements are met, there is no basis for the detention hearing. A nexus must exist between the charge and the request for detention. If a nexus does not exist, the felon may not be detained unless the defendant is a risk of flight or will obstruct justice. Otherwise, danger to the community is not a viable reason to request detention.

The government can only move for a detention hearing when the case involves:

(1) a crime of violence; (2) an offense for which the maximum

sentence is life imprisonment or death; (3) a drug offense carrying a maximum term

of imprisonment of ten years or more; (4) any felony committed after the person has been convicted of two or more of the

above offenses (state or federal); (5) a serious risk of flight; or (6) a serious risk that the person will obstruct

or attempt to obstruct justice or threaten, injure or intimidate or attempt to do so to a prospective witness or juror.

The burden is on the government to prove that one of the six factors exist. If the case does not involve a crime or circumstance set out above, the defendant may not be detained even if the judge finds him to be a danger to the community. In United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit held that “a detention hearing can only be held in a case that involves a crime or circumstance set out in section 3142(f) of the Act. … [t]herefore, the fact that [a felon] may pose a threat to the community is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis to detain him before conviction, his detention is not authorized by the Act.” The Fifth Circuit is in agreement with the First and Third Circuits. See United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1988) and United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3rd Cir. 1986).

Under 18 U.S.C. §3142(e), if the judge orders pre- trial detention, a rebuttable presumption arises that no conditions will reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community. Any evidence favorable to the defendant may rebut the presumption, including evidence of family and employment ties. Proof that the charge is not listed under §3142(f) can also serve to overturn detention.

A challenge to the presumption that a 18 U.S.C. §922(g) (felon in possession of a firearm) violation is a crime of violence has important ramifications for motions brought by the government for pre-trial detention hearings. Defense lawyers may challenge motions brought under §3142(f)(1)(A) when a crime of violence has not been charged and the remaining factors have not been met. Under Byrd, a ruling that a defendant be detained based solely on a determination that he is a danger to the community is improper unless the defendant is charged with a crime of violence or one of the other 5 crimes or circumstances listed in §3142(f)(1).

Tags: Attorney New Orleans, Criminal Attorney New Orleans, Criminal Defense Attorney New Orleans, Criminal Defense Lawyer New Orleans, Criminal Lawyer New Orleans, Federal Case Law Update, Federal Criminal Attorney New Orleans, Federal Detention Hearings, Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Federal Firearms, New Orleans Crime News, New Orleans Criminal Lawyer, New Orleans Federal Criminal Attorney, New Orleans Federal Criminal Defense Lawyer, New Orleans Federal Criminal Lawyer, United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
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Posted by admin on September 6th, 2011

FELON-IN-POSSESSION OF A FIREARM: A CRIME OF NON- VIOLENCE

The Fifth Circuit has never decided whether a felon-in-possession of a firearm is a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act. Only three circuits have addressed the issue. The D.C. and Sixth Circuits held that mere possession of a firearm by a felon is not a crime of violence. See United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) and United States v. Hardon, 149 F.3d 1185, No. 98-1625, 1998 WL 320945 (6th Cir. June 4, 1998) (unpublished opinion). The Second Circuit has held that it is. See United States v. Dillard, 214 F. 3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Courts are concerned that since felons are barred from possessing firearms, their disregard for this bar creates a constant, on-going threat that they will use the firearms.

Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet spoken on the issue, Judge Clement in the Eastern District of Louisiana held that for purposes of the Bail Reform Act, a felon-in-possession of a firearm charged under §922(g) is a crime of violence. See United States v. Kirkland, No. Crim. A. 99-143, 1999 WL 329702 (E.D.La. May 21, 1999). The issue is most often battled out in the district court. The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a Second Circuit challenge to that circuit’s own ruling in Dillard. Because the defendant will usually moot the issue by pleading to the felon-in-possession of a firearm charge, the issue does not routinely reach appellate review.

The Bail Reform Act defines a “crime of violence” as:

(A) an offense that has an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another;

(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense; or

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Tapia v. United States

Posted by admin on June 30th, 2011

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TAPIA v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–5400. Argued April 18, 2011—Decided June 16, 2011

Petitioner Tapia was convicted of, inter alia, smuggling unauthorized aliens into the United States. The District Court imposed a 51month prison term, reasoning that Tapia should serve that long in order to qualify for and complete the Bureau of Prisons’ ResidentialDrug Abuse Program (RDAP). On appeal, Tapia argued that lengthening her prison term to make her eligible for RDAP violated 18

U. S. C. §3582(a), which instructs sentencing courts to “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Relying onCircuit precedent, it held that a sentencing court cannot impose a prison term to assist a defendant’s rehabilitation, but once imprisonment is chosen, the court may consider the defendant’s rehabilitation needs in setting the sentence’s length.

Held: Section 3582(a) does not permit a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation. Pp. 3–15.

(a) For nearly a century, the Federal Government used an indeterminate sentencing system premised on faith in rehabilitation. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363. Because that systemproduced “serious disparities in [the] sentences” imposed on similarlysituated defendants, id., at 365, and failed to “achieve rehabilitation,” id., at 366, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984(SRA), replacing the system with one in which Sentencing Guidelines would provide courts with “a range of determinate sentences,” id., at

368. Under the SRA, a sentencing judge must impose at least imprisonment, probation, or a fine. See §3551(b). In determining the appropriate sentence, judges must consider retribution, deterrence,incapacitation, and rehabilitation, §3553(a)(2), but a particular pur2 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

pose may apply differently, or not at all, depending on the kind ofsentence under consideration. As relevant here, a court ordering imprisonment must “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” §3582(a). A similar provision instructs the Sentencing Commission, as the Sentencing Guidelines’ author, to “insure that the guidelines reflect theinappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant.” 28 U. S. C. §994(k). Pp. 3–6.

(b) Consideration of Tapia’s claim starts with §3582(a)’s clear text.Putting together the most natural definitions of “recognize”—“to acknowledge or treat as valid”—and not “appropriate”—not “suitable orfitting for a particular purpose”—§3582(a) tells courts to acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation. It also instructs courts to make that acknowledgment when “determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and. . . [when] determining the length of the term.” Amicus, appointed todefend the judgment below, argues that the “recognizing” clause is merely a caution for judges not to put too much faith in the capacityof prisons to rehabilitate. But his alternative interpretation is unpersuasive, as Congress expressed itself clearly in §3582(a). Amicus also errs in echoing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that §3582’s term“imprisonment” relates to the decision whether to incarcerate, not thedetermination of the sentence’s length. Because “imprisonment”most naturally means “the state of being confined” or “a period of confinement,” it does not distinguish between the defendant’s initialplacement behind bars and his continued stay there.

Section 3582(a)’s context supports this textual conclusion. By restating §3582(a)’s message to the Sentencing Commission, Congressensured that all sentencing officials would work in tandem to implement the statutory determination to “reject imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 367. Equally illuminating is the absence of any provision authorizing courts to ensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation programs. When Congress wanted sentencing courts to take account of rehabilitative needs, it gave them authority to do so. See, e.g., §3563(b)(9).In fact, although a sentencing court can recommend that an offender be placed in a particular facility or program, see §3582(a), the authority to make the placement rests with the Bureau of Prisons, see, e.g., §3621(e). The point is well illustrated here, where the District Court’s strong recommendations that Tapia participate in RDAP and be placed in a particular facility went unfulfilled. Finally, for those who consider legislative history useful, the key Senate Report on the SRA provides corroborating evidence. Pp. 6–12.

3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Syllabus

(d) Here, the sentencing transcript suggests that Tapia’s sentencemay have been lengthened in light of her rehabilitative needs. A court does not err by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitationwithin prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs. But the record indicates that the District Court may have increased the length of Tapia’s sentence to ensure her completion ofRDAP, something a court may not do. The Ninth Circuit is left to consider on remand the effect of Tapia’s failure to object to the sentence when imposed. Pp. 14–15.

376 Fed. Appx. 707, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 10–5400

ALEJANDRA TAPIA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 16, 2011]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider here whether the Sentencing Reform Act precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening aprison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’srehabilitation. We hold that it does.

I Petitioner Alejandra Tapia was convicted of, inter alia, smuggling unauthorized aliens into the United States, inviolation of 8 U. S. C. §§1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). At sentencing, the District Court determined that the United States Sentencing Guidelines recommended a prison termof between 41 and 51 months for Tapia’s offenses. The court decided to impose a 51-month term, followed bythree years of supervised release. In explaining its reasons, the court referred several times to Tapia’s need for drug treatment, citing in particular the Bureau of Prison’sResidential Drug Abuse Program (known as RDAP or the500 Hour Drug Program). The court indicated that Tapiashould serve a prison term long enough to qualify for andcomplete that program:

“The sentence has to be sufficient to provide needed correctional treatment, and here I think the needed 2 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program. . . . . .

“Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am going to impose a 51-month sentence, . . . and one ofthe factors that affects this is the need to provide treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough toget the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.” App.

27.

(“Number two” was “to deter her from committing other criminal offenses.” Ibid.) The court “strongly recommend[ed]” to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that Tapia “participate in [RDAP] and that she serve her sentence at”the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California (FCI Dublin), where “they have the appropriate tools . . . to help her, to start to make a recovery.” Id., at 29. Tapiadid not object to the sentence at that time. Id., at 31.

On appeal, however, Tapia argued that the DistrictCourt had erred in lengthening her prison term to make her eligible for RDAP. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2. In Tapia’sview, this action violated 18 U. S. C. §3582(a), which instructs sentencing courts to “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correctionand rehabilitation.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 376 Fed. Appx. 707 (2010),relying on its prior decision in United States v. Duran, 37

F. 3d 557 (1994). The Ninth Circuit had held there that §3582(a) distinguishes between deciding to impose a termof imprisonment and determining its length. See id., at

561. According to Duran, a sentencing court cannot impose a prison term to assist a defendant’s rehabilitation.But “[o]nce imprisonment is chosen as a punishment,” thecourt may consider the defendant’s need for rehabilitation in setting the length of the sentence. Ibid.

We granted certiorari to consider whether §3582(a) 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

permits a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation. 562

U. S. ___ (2010). That question has divided the Courts of Appeals.¹Because the United States agrees with Tapia’s interpretation of the statute, we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.²We now reverse.

II We begin with statutory background—how the relevant sentencing provisions came about and what they say.Aficionados of our sentencing decisions will recognize much of the story line.“For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363 (1989). Within “customarily wide” outer boundaries set byCongress, trial judges exercised “almost unfettered discretion” to select prison sentences for federal offenders. Id., at 364. In the usual case, a judge also could reject prisontime altogether, by imposing a “suspended” sentence. If the judge decided to impose a prison term, discretionaryauthority shifted to parole officials: Once the defendanthad spent a third of his term behind bars, they could orderhis release. See K. Stith & J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging:Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 18–20 (1998). This system was premised on a faith in rehabilitation.

—————— ¹Three Circuits have held that §3582(a) allows a court to lengthen, although not to impose, a prison term based on the need for rehabilitation. See United States v. Duran, 37 F. 3d 557 (CA9 1994); United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F. 3d 622 (CA8 2006); United States v. Jimenez, 605 F. 3d 415 (CA6 2010). Two Courts of Appeals have ruledthat §3582(a) bars a court from either imposing or increasing a periodof confinement for rehabilitative reasons. See United States v. Manzella, 475 F. 3d 152 (CA3 2007); In re Sealed Case, 573 F. 3d 844 (CADC 2009).²We appointed Stephanos Bibas to brief and argue the case, 562 U. S.___ (2011), and he has ably discharged his responsibilities. 4 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Discretion allowed “the judge and the parole officer to [base] their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 363. A convict, the theory went, should generally remain in prison onlyuntil he was able to reenter society safely. His release therefore often coincided with “the successful completion of certain vocational, educational, and counseling programs within the prisons.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 40 (1983) (hereinafter S. Rep.). At that point, parole officials could “determin[e] that [the] prisoner had become rehabilitated and should be released from confinement.” Stith & Cabranes, supra, at 18.³

But this model of indeterminate sentencing eventuallyfell into disfavor. One concern was that it produced “[s]erious disparities in [the] sentences” imposed on simi- larly situated defendants. Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 365. Another was that the system’s attempt to “achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed.” Id., at 366. Lawmakers and others increasingly doubted that prison programscould “rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis”—or that parole officers could “determine accurately whether orwhen a particular prisoner ha[d] been rehabilitated.”

S. Rep., at 40.

—————— ³The statutes governing punishment of drug-addicted offenders (likeTapia) provide an example of this system at work. If a court concluded that such an offender was “likely to be rehabilitated through treatment,” it could order confinement “for treatment . . . for an indeterminate period of time” not to exceed the lesser of 10 years or the statutorymaximum for the offender’s crime. 18 U. S. C. §4253(a) (1982 ed.); see also §4251(c) (“ ‘Treatment’ includes confinement and treatment in an institution . . . and includes, but is not limited to, medical, educational, social, psychological, and vocational services, corrective and preventive guidance and training, and other rehabilitative services”). Once the offender had undergone treatment for six months, the Attorney Generalcould recommend that the Board of Parole release him from custody, and the Board could then order release “in its discretion.” §4254. 5 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court

Congress accordingly enacted the Sentencing ReformAct of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987 (SRA or Act), to overhaul federal sentencing practices. The Act abandoned indeterminate sentencing and parole in favor of a system in whichSentencing Guidelines, promulgated by a new SentencingCommission, would provide courts with “a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 368. And the Act further channeled judges’ discretion by establishing a frameworkto govern their consideration and imposition of sentences.

Under the SRA, a judge sentencing a federal offender must impose at least one of the following sanctions: imprisonment (often followed by supervised release), probation, or a fine. See §3551(b). In determining the appropriate sentence from among these options, §3553(a)(2) requires the judge to consider specified factors, including:

“the need for the sentence imposed—“(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; “(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; “(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and “(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medicalcare, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”

These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes ofsentencing generally, and a court must fashion a sentence“to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the extent that they are applicable” in a given case. §3551(a).

The SRA then provides additional guidance about how the considerations listed in §3553(a)(2) pertain to each of 6 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court

the Act’s main sentencing options—imprisonment, supervised release, probation, and fines. See §3582(a); §3583;§3562(a); §3572(a). These provisions make clear that a particular purpose may apply differently, or even not at all, depending on the kind of sentence under consideration. For example, a court may not take account of retribution (the first purpose listed in §3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised release. See §3583(c).

Section 3582(a), the provision at issue here, specifies the “factors to be considered” when a court orders imprisonment. That section provides:

“The court, in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment isto be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means ofpromoting correction and rehabilitation.”

A similar provision addresses the Sentencing Commissionin its capacity as author of the Sentencing Guidelines. The SRA instructs the Commission to:

“insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 28 U. S. C. §994(k).

With this statutory background established, we turn to the matter of interpretation.

III

A Our consideration of Tapia’s claim starts with the text of18 U. S. C. §3582(a)—and given the clarity of that provi- 7 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

sion’s language, could end there as well. As just noted, that section instructs courts to “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” A common—and in context the most natural—definition of the word “recognize” is “to acknowledge or treat as valid.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1611 (2d ed. 1987). And a thingthat is not “appropriate” is not “suitable or fitting for aparticular purpose.” Id., at 103. Putting these two definitions together, §3582(a) tells courts that they should acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation. And when should courts acknowledge this? Section §3582(a) answers: when “determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, [when] determining the length of the term.” So a court making these decisions should consider the specified rationales of punishment except for rehabilitation, which it should acknowledge as an unsuitable justification for a prison term.

As against this understanding, amicus argues that§3582(a)’s “recognizing” clause is not a flat prohibitionbut only a “reminder” or a “guide [for] sentencing judges’ cognitive processes.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 23–24 (hereinafter Amicus Brief) (emphasis deleted). Amicus supports thisview by offering a string of other definitions of the word “recognize”: “‘recall to mind,’ ‘realize,’ or ‘perceiveclearly.’” Id., at 24 (quoting dictionary definitions). Once these are plugged in, amicus suggests, §3582(a) reveals itself as a kind of loosey-goosey caution not to put too much faith in the capacity of prisons to rehabilitate.

But we do not see how these alternative meanings of“recognize” help amicus’s cause. A judge who “perceivesclearly” that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation would hardly incarcerate someone for that purpose. Ditto for a judge who “realizes” or 8 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

“recalls” that imprisonment is not a way to rehabilitate an offender. To be sure, the drafters of the “recognizing”clause could have used still more commanding language:Congress could have inserted a “thou shalt not” or equivalent phrase to convey that a sentencing judge may never,ever, under any circumstances consider rehabilitation in imposing a prison term. But when we interpret a statute,we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the merely excellent. Congress expressed itself clearly in §3582(a),even if armchair legislators might come up with something even better. And what Congress said was that when sentencing an offender to prison, the court shall consider all the purposes of punishment except rehabilitation—because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of pursuing that goal.

Amicus also claims, echoing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Duran, that §3582(a)’s “recognizing” clause bars courts from considering rehabilitation only when imposing a prison term, and not when deciding on its length. The argument goes as follows. Section 3582(a) refers to twodecisions: “The court, [1] in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, [2] in determining the length of theterm” must consider the purposes of punishment listed in §3553(a)(2), subject to the caveat of the “recognizing” clause. But that clause says only that “imprisonment” isnot an appropriate means of rehabilitation. Because the “primary meaning of ‘imprisonment’ is ‘the act of confining a person,’” amicus argues, the clause relates only to

[1] the decision to incarcerate, and not to [2] the separate determination of the sentence’s length. Amicus Brief 52.

We again disagree. Under standard rules of grammar,§3582(a) says: A sentencing judge shall recognize that imprisonment is not appropriate to promote rehabilitation when the court considers the applicable factors of§3553(a)(2); and a court considers these factors when 9 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court

determining both whether to imprison an offender and what length of term to give him. The use of the word “imprisonment” in the “recognizing” clause does notdestroy—but instead fits neatly into—this construction.“Imprisonment” as used in the clause most naturallymeans “[t]he state of being confined” or “a period of confinement.” Black’s Law Dictionary 825 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1137(1993) (the “state of being imprisoned”). So the word does not distinguish between the defendant’s initial placementbehind bars and his continued stay there. As the D. C. Circuit noted in rejecting an identical argument, “[a]sentencing court deciding to keep a defendant locked up for an additional month is, as to that month, in fact choosing imprisonment over release.” In re Sealed Case, 573

F. 3d 844, 850 (2009).⁴Accordingly, the word “imprisonment” does not change the function of the “recognizing”clause—to constrain a sentencing court’s decision both to impose and to lengthen a prison term.⁵

The context of §3582(a) puts an exclamation point onthis textual conclusion. As noted earlier, supra, at 6, another provision of the SRA restates §3582(a)’s message,

—————— ⁴Indeed, we can scarcely imagine a reason why Congress would have wanted to draw the distinction that amicus urges on us. That distinction would prevent a court from considering rehabilitative needs in imposing a 1-month sentence rather than probation, but not in choosing a 60-month sentence over a 1-month term. The only policy argument amicus can offer in favor of this result is that “[t]he effects of imprisonment plateau a short while after the incarceration” and “ ‘[t]he difference in harm between longer and shorter prison terms is smaller than typically assumed.’ ” Amicus Brief 56. But nothing in the SRAindicates that Congress is so indifferent to the length of prison terms. ⁵The Government argues that “Congress did not intend to prohibit courts from imposing less imprisonment in order to promote a defendant’s rehabilitation.” Brief for United States 40 (emphasis added). This case does not require us to address that question, and nothing inour decision expresses any views on it. 10 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court

but to a different audience. That provision, 28 U. S. C. §994(k), directs the Sentencing Commission to ensure that the Guidelines “reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose ofrehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” In this way, Congress ensured that all sentencing officials would work in tandem to implement the statutory determination to“rejec[t] imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 367 (citing 28 U. S. C. §994(k)). Section 994(k) bars the Commission from recommending a “term of imprisonment”—a phrase that again refers both to the fact and to the length of incarceration—based on a defendant’s rehabilitative needs. And §3582(a) prohibits a court from considering those needs to impose or lengthen a period of confinement when selecting a sentence from within, or choosing to depart from, the Guidelines range. Each actor at each stage in the sentencing process receives the same message: Do not think aboutprison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.

Equally illuminating here is a statutory silence—the absence of any provision granting courts the power toensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation programs. For when Congress wanted sentencing courts to take account of rehabilitative needs, it gave courtsthe authority to direct appropriate treatment for offenders. Thus, the SRA instructs courts, in deciding whetherto impose probation or supervised release, to considerwhether an offender could benefit from training and treatment programs. See 18 U. S. C. §3562(a); §3583(c). And so the SRA also authorizes courts, when imposing those sentences, to order an offender’s participation in certain programs and facilities. §3563(b)(9); §3563(b)(11); §3563(a)(4); §3583(d). As a condition of probation, for example, the court may require the offender to “undergo 11 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment,including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, asspecified by the court, and [to] remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose.” §3563(b)(9).

If Congress had similarly meant to allow courts to baseprison terms on offenders’ rehabilitative needs, it would have given courts the capacity to ensure that offendersparticipate in prison correctional programs. But in fact, courts do not have this authority. When a court sentences a federal offender, the BOP has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over “the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment,” §3621(b), and the treatment programs (ifany) in which he may participate, §§3621(e), (f); §3624(f). See also 28 CFR pt. 544 (2010) (BOP regulations for administering inmate educational, recreational, and vocational programs); 28 CFR pt. 550, subpart F (drug abuse treatment programs). A sentencing court can recommend that the BOP place an offender in a particular facility or program. See §3582(a). But decisionmaking authorityrests with the BOP.

This case well illustrates the point. As noted earlier, the District Court “strongly recommend[ed]” that Tapia participate in RDAP, App. 29, and serve her sentence at FCI Dublin, “where they have the facilities to really help her,” id., at 28. But the court’s recommendations were only recommendations—and in the end they had no effect. See Amicus Brief 42 (“[Tapia] was not admitted to RDAP,nor even placed in the prison recommended by the districtcourt”); Reply Brief for United States 8, n. 1 (“According toBOP records, [Tapia] was encouraged to enroll [in RDAP] during her psychology intake screening at [the federal prison], but she stated that she was not interested, and she has not volunteered for the program”). The sentencingcourt may have had plans for Tapia’s rehabilitation, but itlacked the power to implement them. That incapacity speaks volumes. It indicates that Congress did not intend 12 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court

that courts consider offenders’ rehabilitative needs when imposing prison sentences.

Finally, for those who consider legislative history useful, the key Senate Report concerning the SRA provides onelast piece of corroborating evidence. According to thatReport, decades of experience with indeterminate sentencing, resulting in the release of many inmates after theycompleted correctional programs, had left Congress skeptical that “rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting.” S. Rep., at 38. Although some critics argued that “rehabilitation should be eliminated completely as a purpose of sentencing,” Congress declined toadopt that categorical position. Id., at 76. Instead, the Report explains, Congress barred courts from consideringrehabilitation in imposing prison terms, ibid., and n. 165, but not in ordering other kinds of sentences, ibid., and

n. 164. “[T]he purpose of rehabilitation,” the Report stated, “is still important in determining whether a sanction other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in aparticular case.” See id., at 76–77 (emphasis added).

And so this is a case in which text, context, and historypoint to the same bottom line: Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.

B With all these sources of statutory meaning stacked against him, amicus understandably tries to put the SRA’sview of rehabilitation in a wholly different frame. Amicus begins by conceding that Congress, in enacting the SRA, rejected the old “[r]ehabilitation [m]odel.” Amicus Brief 1. But according to amicus, that model had a very limited focus: It was the belief that “isolation and prison routine” could alone produce “penitence and spiritual renewal.” Id., at 1, 11. What the rehabilitation model did not include—and the SRA therefore did not reject—was prison 13 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court

treatment programs (including for drug addiction) targeted to offenders’ particular needs. See id., at 21, 25, 27–

28. So even after the passage of §3582(a), amicus argues, a court may impose or lengthen a prison sentence to promote an offender’s participation in a targeted treatment program. The only thing the court may not do is to impose a prison term on the ground that confinement itself—itsinherent solitude and routine—will lead to rehabilitation.

We think this reading of the SRA is too narrow. For one thing, the relevant history shows that at the time ofthe SRA’s enactment, prison rehabilitation efforts focused on treatment, counseling, and training programs, not onseclusion and regimentation. See Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865–1965, in Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society 169, 189–190 (N. Morris & D. Rothman eds. 1995) (describing the pre-SRA “therapeutic model of rehabilitation”as characterized by “individualized treatment” and “vocational training and group counseling programs”); see also

n. 3, supra (noting pre-SRA statutes linking the confinement of drug addicts to the completion of treatment programs). Indeed, Congress had in mind precisely theseprograms when it prohibited consideration of rehabilitation in imposing a prison term. See 28 U. S. C. §994(k) (instructing the Sentencing Commission to prevent theuse of imprisonment to “provid[e] the defendant withneeded educational or vocational training . . . or other correctional treatment”); S. Rep., at 40 (rejecting the“model of ‘coercive’ rehabilitation—the theory of correction that ties prison release dates to the successful completion of certain vocational, educational, and counseling programs within the prisons”). Far from falling outside the“rehabilitation model,” these programs practically defined it.

It is hardly surprising, then, that amicus’s argument finds little support in the statutory text. Read most natu14 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court

rally, 18 U. S. C. §3582(a)’s prohibition on “promotingcorrection and rehabilitation” covers efforts to place offenders in rehabilitation programs. Indeed, §3582(a)’s language recalls the SRA’s description of the rehabilitative purpose of sentencing—“provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, orother correctional treatment.” §3553(a)(2)(D). That description makes clear that, under the SRA, treatment, training, and like programs are rehabilitation’s sum andsubstance. So amicus’s efforts to exclude rehabilitation programs from the “recognizing” clause’s reach do not succeed. That section prevents a sentencing court fromimposing or lengthening a prison term because the court thinks an offender will benefit from a prison treatment program.

IV In this case, the sentencing transcript suggests thepossibility that Tapia’s sentence was based on her rehabilitative needs. We note first what we do not disapprove about Tapia’s sentencing. A court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs. To the contrary, a court properly may address a person who is about to begin a prison term about these important matters. And as noted earlier, a court may urge the BOP toplace an offender in a prison treatment program. See supra, at 11. Section 3582(a) itself provides, just after the clause at issue here, that a court may “make a recommendation concerning the type of prison facility appropriate for the defendant”; and in this calculus, the presence of arehabilitation program may make one facility more appropriate than another. So the sentencing court here didnothing wrong—and probably something very right—intrying to get Tapia into an effective drug treatment 15 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court

program.

But the record indicates that the court may have done more—that it may have selected the length of the sentence to ensure that Tapia could complete the 500 Hour DrugProgram. “The sentence has to be sufficient,” the court explained, “to provide needed correctional treatment, and here I think the needed correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program.” App. 27; see supra, at 1–2. Or again: The “number one” thing “is the need to provide treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program.” App. 27; see supra, at 2. These statements suggest that the court may have calculated the length of Tapia’s sentence to ensure that shereceive certain rehabilitative services. And that a sentencing court may not do. As we have held, a court may notimpose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offenderto complete a treatment program or otherwise to promoterehabilitation.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Consistent with our practice, see, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 8), we leave it to the Court of Appeals to consider the effect of Tapia’s failure to object tothe sentence when imposed. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731 (1993).

It is so ordered. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 10–5400

ALEJANDRA TAPIA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 16, 2011]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins,concurring.

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that 18 U. S. C.§3582(a) “precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s rehabilitation.” Ante, at 1. I write separatelyto note my skepticism that the District Judge violated this proscription in this case.

At the sentencing hearing, the District Judge carefullyreviewed the sentencing factors set forth in §3553(a). First, he considered “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense” committed by petitioner Alejandra Tapia—in this case, alien smuggling. App. 25–26; see §3553(a)(1). He emphasized that Tapia’s criminal conduct “created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury” to the smuggled aliens. App. 26; see also id., at 20 (noting thatthe aliens were secreted in the vehicle’s gas tank compartment). Second, he reviewed Tapia’s “history andcharacteristics,” §3553(a)(1), including her history of beingabused and her associations “with the wrong people,” id., at 26. He noted his particular concern about Tapia’scriminal conduct while released on bail, when she failed to appear and was found in an apartment with methamphetamine, a sawed-off shotgun, and stolen mail. Id., at 25–26. Third, he noted that the offense was “serious,” warranting a “sufficient” sentence. Id., at 26; see 2 TAPIA v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

§3553(a)(2)(A). Fourth, he considered the need “to deter criminal conduct” and “to protect the public from furthercrimes of the defendant,” which he characterized as a “bigfactor here, given [Tapia’s] failure to appear and what she did out on bail.” App. 26; see §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C). Fifth, he took account of the need “to provide needed correctional treatment,” in this case, the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) “500Hour Drug Program,” more officially called the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP). App. 27; see§3553(a)(2)(D). And, finally, he noted the need “to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities” and the need for thesentence “to be sufficient to effect the purposes of 3553(a) but not greater.” App. 27; see §§3553(a), (a)(6).

Tapia faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 36months’ incarceration, App. 18, but her Guidelines range was 41 to 51 months, id., at 13. After reviewing the §3553(a) factors, the judge imposed a sentence of 51months, the top of the Guidelines range. He offered two reasons for choosing this sentence: “number one,” the needfor drug treatment; and “[n]umber two,” deterrence. Id., at 27. With respect to the latter reason, the judge highlighted Tapia’s criminal history and her criminal conductwhile released on bail—which, he said, was “something that motivates imposing a sentence that in total is at the high end of the guideline range.” Id., at 27–28. He concluded, “I think that a sentence less than what I am imposing would not deter her and provide for sufficient time so she could begin to address these problems.” Id., at 28.

The District Judge’s comments at sentencing suggestthat he believed the need to deter Tapia from engaging infurther criminal conduct warranted a sentence of 51 months’ incarceration. Granted, the judge also mentioned the need to provide drug treatment through the RDAP. The 51-month sentence he selected, however, appears to have had no connection to eligibility for the RDAP. See BOP Program Statement No. P5330.11, §2.5.1(b) (Mar. 16, 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

2009) (providing that, to participate in the RDAP, aninmate must ordinarily have at least 24 months remaining on her sentence). Even the 36-month mandatory minimum would have qualified Tapia for participation in the RDAP. I thus find it questionable that the judge lengthened her term of imprisonment beyond that necessary for deterrence in the belief that a 51-month sentence was necessary for rehabilitation. Cf. S. Rep. No. 98–225,

p. 176 (1983) (“A term imposed for another purpose of sentencing may . . . have a rehabilitative focus if rehabilitation in such a case is an appropriate secondary purpose of the sentence”).

Although I am skeptical that the thoughtful DistrictJudge imposed or lengthened Tapia’s sentence to promote rehabilitation, I acknowledge that his comments at sentencing were not perfectly clear. Given that Ninth Circuit precedent incorrectly permitted sentencing courts to consider rehabilitation in setting the length of a sentence, see ante, at 2, and that the judge stated that the sentenceneeded to be “long enough to get the 500 Hour DrugProgram,” App. 27, I cannot be certain that he did not lengthen Tapia’s sentence to promote rehabilitation inviolation of §3582(a). I therefore agree with the Court’sdisposition of this case and join the Court’s opinion in full.

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Freeman v. United States

Posted by admin on June 30th, 2011

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010

Syllabus

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–10245. Argued February 23, 2011—Decided June 23, 2011

In order to reduce unwarranted federal sentencing disparities, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorizes the United States SentencingCommission to create, and to retroactively amend, Sentencing Guidelines to inform judicial discretion. Title 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2) permits a defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment“based on” a Guidelines sentencing range that has subsequently beenlowered by retroactive amendment to move for a sentence reduction.This case concerns §3582(c)(2)’s application to cases in which the defendant and the Government have entered into a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which permits the parties to “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case,” and “binds the court [to theagreed-upon sentence] once [it] accepts the plea agreement.” Petitioner Freeman was indicted for various crimes, including possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. 21 U. S. C. §841(a)(1).He entered into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement to plead guilty to allcharges; in return the Government agreed to a 106-month sentence.The agreement states that the parties independently reviewed theapplicable Guidelines, noted that Freeman agreed to have his sentence determined under the Guidelines, and reflected the parties’ understanding that the agreed-to sentence corresponded with the minimum sentence suggested by the applicable Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, along with a consecutive mandatory minimum of 60months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-traffickingcrime under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A). Three years after the District Court accepted the plea agreement, the Commission issued a retroactive Guidelines amendment to remedy the significant disparity between the penalties for cocaine base and powder cocaine offenses. 2 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES Syllabus

Because the amendment’s effect was to reduce Freeman’s applicablesentencing range to 37 to 46 months plus the consecutive 60-monthmandatory minimum, he moved for a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2). However, the District Court denied the motion, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed because its precedent rendered defendants sentenced pursuant to 11(c)(1)(C) agreements ineligible for §3582(c)(2) relief, barring a miscarriage of justice or mutual mistake.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 355 Fed. Appx. 1, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded that defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that specify a particular sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2). Pp.5–10.

(a) The text and purpose of the statute, Rule 11(c)(1)(C), and the governing Guidelines policy statements compel the conclusion thatthe district court has authority to entertain §3582(c)(2) motions whensentences are imposed in light of the Guidelines, even if the defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. The district judge must,in every case, impose “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the purposes of federal sentencing, in light of the Guidelines and other relevant factors. §3553(a). The Guidelines provide a framework or starting point—a basis, in the term’s commonsense meaning—for the judge’s exercise of discretion. Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant and the prosecutor to agree on a specific sentence, but that agreement does not discharge the district court’s independent obligation to exercise its discretion. In the usual sentencing, whether following trial or plea, the judge’s reliance on the Guidelines will be apparent when the judge uses the Guidelines range as the starting point in the analysis and imposes a sentencewithin the range. Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49. Even where the judge varies from the recommended range, id., at 50, if the judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the deviation, then the Guidelines are in a real sense a basis for the sentence. The parties’ recommended sentence binds the court “once the court accepts the plea agreement,” Rule 11(c)(1)(C), but the relevant policy statement forbids the judge to accept an agreement without first giving due consideration to the applicable Guidelines sentencing range, even if the parties recommend a specific sentence as a condition of the guilty plea, see U. S. Sentencing Commission, GuidelinesManual §6B1.2. This approach finds further support in the policystatement applicable to §3582(c)(2) motions, which instructs the district court in modifying a sentence to substitute the retroactive amendment, but to leave all original Guidelines determinations in 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Syllabus

place, §1B1.10(b)(1). Pp. 5–7.

(b) Petitioner’s sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the District Court expressed its independent judgment that the sentencewas appropriate in light of the applicable Guidelines range. Its decision was therefore “based on” that range within §3582(c)(2)’s meaning. P. 7.

(c) The Government’s argument that sentences that follow an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement are based only on the agreement itself and not the Guidelines, and are therefore ineligible for §3582(c)(2) reduction, must be rejected. Even when a defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C)agreement, the judge’s decision to accept the plea and impose therecommended sentence is likely to be based on the Guidelines; andwhen it is, the defendant should be eligible to seek §3582(c)(2) relief.Pp. 7–10.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR concluded that if an agreement under FederalRule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) agreement) expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment, and that range is subsequentlylowered by the Sentencing Commission, the prison term is “based on” the range employed and the defendant is eligible for sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). Pp. 1–11.

(a) The term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuantto a (C) agreement is “based on” the agreement itself, not on the judge’s calculation of the Guidelines sentencing range. To hold otherwise would be to contravene the very purpose of (C) agreements—tobind the district court and allow the Government and the defendant to determine what sentence he will receive. Pp. 1–5.

(b) This does not mean, however, that a term of imprisonment imposed under a (C) agreement can never be reduced under §3582(c)(2).Because the very purpose of a (C) agreement is to allow the parties todetermine the defendant’s sentence, when the agreement itself employs a particular Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offenses in establishing the term of imprisonment imposedby the district court, the defendant is eligible to have his sentence reduced under §3582(c)(2). Pp. 5–9.

(c) Freeman is eligible. The offense level and criminal history category set forth in his (C) agreement produce a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months; it is evident that the parties combined the 46-monthfigure at the low end of the range with the 60-month mandatory minimum sentence under §924(c)(1)(A) to establish the 106-monthsentence called for in the agreement. Under the amended Guidelines, however, the applicable sentencing range is now 37 to 46 months. Therefore, Freeman’s prison term is “based on” a sentencing range that “has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Com

4 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

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mission,” rendering him eligible for sentence reduction. Pp. 9–11.

KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered anopinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SO-TOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS,

C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 09–10245

WILLIAM FREEMAN, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2011]

JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE GINSBURG,JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAGAN join.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. §3551 et seq., calls for the creation of Sentencing Guidelines to inform judicial discretion in order to reduce unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing. The Act allows retroactive amendments to the Guidelines for cases where the Guidelines become a cause of inequality, not a bulwark against it. When a retroactive Guideline amendment is adopted, §3582(c)(2) permits defendants sentenced based on a sentencing range that has been modified to move for a reduced sentence.

The question here is whether defendants who enter intoplea agreements that recommend a particular sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2). See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1)(C) (authorizing such plea agreements). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, barring a miscarriage ofjustice or mutual mistake, defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements cannot benefit from retroactiveGuideline amendments.

Five Members of the Court agree that this judgmentmust be reversed. The Justices who join this pluralityopinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the 2 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Court of Appeals finds no support in §3582(c)(2), Rule11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements. In every case the judge must exercise discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. This discretion, in turn, is framed by the Guidelines. And the Guidelines must be consulted, in the regular course, whether the case is one inwhich the conviction was after a trial or after a plea,including a plea pursuant to an agreement that recommends a particular sentence. The district judge’s decision to impose a sentence may therefore be based on the Guidelines even if the defendant agrees to plead guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Where the decision to impose a sentenceis based on a range later subject to retroactive amendment, §3582(c)(2) permits a sentence reduction.

Section 3582(c)(2) empowers district judges to correct sentences that depend on frameworks that later prove unjustified. There is no reason to deny §3582(c)(2) relief todefendants who linger in prison pursuant to sentences that would not have been imposed but for a since-rejected, excessive range.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would reverse the judgment on adifferent ground set out in the opinion concurring in the judgment. That opinion, like the dissent, would hold that sentences following 11(c)(1)(C) agreement are based on the agreement rather than the Guidelines, and therefore that§3582(c)(2) relief is not available in the typical case. But unlike the dissent she would permit the petitioner here toseek a sentence reduction because his plea agreement in express terms ties the recommended sentence to theGuidelines sentencing range.

The reasons that lead those Members of the Court who join this plurality opinion may be set forth as follows.

I A Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

“modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” 18 U. S. C. §3582(c); but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions. Here, the exception is contained in a statutory provision enacted to permit defendants whose Guidelines sentencing range has been lowered by retroactive amendment to move for a sentence reduction if the terms of the statute are met. The statute provides:

“In the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 994(o) . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reductionis consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” §3582(c)(2).

This case concerns the application of the statute to casesin which defendants enter into plea agreements underRule 11(c)(1)(C). That Rule permits the parties to “agreethat a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, . . . [a request which] binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” The question is whether defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that specify a particular sentence may be saidto have been sentenced “based on” a Guidelines sentencingrange, making them eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2).

B Petitioner William Freeman was indicted in 2005 for various crimes, including possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C). He entered into an agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in whichhe agreed to plead guilty to all charges. In return the Government “agree[d] that a sentence of 106 months’ incarceration is the appropriate disposition of this case.” 4 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

App. 26a. The agreement states that “[b]oth parties have independently reviewed the Sentencing Guidelines applicable in this case,” and that “[Freeman] agrees to have his sentence determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines.” The agreement reflects the parties’ expectationthat Freeman would face a Guidelines range of 46 to 57months, id., at 27a–28a (Offense Level 19, Criminal History Category IV), along with a consecutive mandatoryminimum of 60 months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U. S. C.§924(c)(1)(A). The recommended sentence of 106 months thus corresponded with the minimum sentence suggested by the Guidelines, in addition to the 60-month §924(c) (1)(A) sentence.

The District Court accepted the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, the court “adopt[ed] the findings ofthe probation officer disclosed in the probation report andapplication of the guidelines as set out therein.” App. 47a.“[H]aving considered the advisory guidelines and 18 USC 3553(a),” the court imposed the recommended 106-monthsentence, which was “within the guideline ranges”—the 46- to 57-month range the parties had anticipated plus the mandatory 60 months under §924(c)(1)(A)—and “sufficient to meet the objectives of the law.” Id. at 48a–49a.

Three years later, the Commission issued a retroactiveamendment to the Guidelines to remedy the significant disparity between the penalties for cocaine base and powder cocaine offenses. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Supp. App. C, Amdt. 706(Nov. 2010) (USSG) (effective Nov. 1, 2007) (adjusting Guidelines); id., Amdt. 713 (effective Mar. 3, 2008) (making Amendment 706 retroactive). Its effect was to reduce Freeman’s applicable sentencing range to 37 to 46 months,again with the consecutive 60-month mandatory minimum. App. 142a–144a (Sealed).

Freeman moved for a sentence reduction under 5 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

§3582(c)(2). The District Court, however, denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuitaffirmed. United States v. Goins, 355 Fed. Appx. 1 (2009). Adhering to its decision in United States v. Peveler, 359

F. 3d 369 (2004), the Court of Appeals held that defendants sentenced following 11(c)(1)(C) agreements thatspecify a particular sentence are ineligible for §3582(c)(2) relief, barring a miscarriage of justice or mutual mistake.

This Court granted certiorari. 561 U. S. __ (2010).

II Federal sentencing law requires the district judge inevery case to impose “a sentence sufficient, but not greaterthan necessary, to comply with” the purposes of federal sentencing, in light of the Guidelines and other §3553(a) factors. 18 U. S. C. §3553(a). The Guidelines provide aframework or starting point—a basis, in the commonsensemeaning of the term—for the judge’s exercise of discretion. E.g., 1 Oxford English Dictionary 977 (2d ed. 1989). Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant and the prosecutor to agree that a specific sentence is appropriate, but that agreement does not discharge the district court’s independent obligation to exercise its discretion. In the usual sentencing, whether following trial or plea, the judge’sreliance on the Guidelines will be apparent, for the judgewill use the Guidelines range as the starting point in the analysis and impose a sentence within the range. Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007). Even where the judge varies from the recommended range, id., at 50, if the judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point toexplain the decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense a basis for the sentence. Rule 11(c)(1)(C) makes the parties’ recommended sentence binding on the court “once the court accepts the pleaagreement,” but the governing policy statement confirmsthat the court’s acceptance is itself based on the Guide6 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

lines. See USSG §6B1.2. That policy statement forbidsthe district judge to accept an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s applicable sentencing range. The commentary to §6B1.2 advises that a court may accept an11(c)(1)(C) agreement “only if the court is satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate sentence within the applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiablereasons.” Cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36 (1993)(Guidelines commentary is authoritative). Any bargainbetween the parties is contingent until the court accepts the agreement. The Guidelines require the district judgeto give due consideration to the relevant sentencing range, even if the defendant and prosecutor recommend a specificsentence as a condition of the guilty plea.

This approach finds further support in the policy statement that applies to §3582(c)(2) motions. See USSG §1B1.10. It instructs the district court in modifying a sentence to substitute only the retroactive amendment and then leave all original Guidelines determinations inplace. §1B1.10(b)(1). In other words, the policy statementseeks to isolate whatever marginal effect the sincerejected Guideline had on the defendant’s sentence. Working backwards from this purpose, §3582(c)(2) modification proceedings should be available to permit the districtcourt to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent thesentencing range in question was a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement. This is the only ruleconsistent with the governing policy statement, a statement that rests on the premise that a Guideline rangemay be one of many factors that determine the sentence imposed.

Thus, the text and purpose of the three relevantsources—the statute, the Rule, and the governing policy 7 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

statements—require the conclusion that the district courthas authority to entertain §3582(c)(2) motions when sentences are imposed in light of the Guidelines, even if thedefendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement.

III The transcript of petitioner’s sentencing hearing revealsthat his original sentence was based on the Guidelines. The District Court first calculated the sentencing range,as both §3553(a)(4) and §6B1.2(c) require. App. 47a, 49a. It explained that it “considered the advisory guidelinesand 18 USC 3553(a),” and that “the sentence imposed . . . fall[s] within the guideline rang[e] and [is] sufficient tomeet the objectives of the law.” Id., at 48a–49a. Apart from the defense attorney’s initial statement that the caseinvolved a “(C) plea,” id., at 47a, the hearing proceeded asif the agreement did not exist. The court expressed itsindependent judgment that the sentence was appropriatein light of the applicable Guidelines range, and its decisionwas therefore “based on” that range.

IV The Government asks this Court to hold that sentences like petitioner’s, which follow an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement,are based only on the agreement and not the Guidelines, and therefore that defendants so sentenced are ineligiblefor §3582(c)(2) relief. The Government’s position rests inpart on the concern that the conclusion reached here will upset the bargain struck between prosecutor and defendant. See Brief for United States 42–43. That, however, has nothing to do with whether a sentence is “based on” the Guidelines under §3582(c)(2). And in any event, theconcern is overstated. Retroactive reductions to sentencing ranges are infrequent, so the problem will not arise often. Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of 8 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Criminal Sentencing, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 519, 535 (2009).More important, the district court’s authority under §3582(c)(2) is subject to significant constraints, constraintsthat can be enforced by appellate review.

The binding policy statement governing §3582(c)(2) motions places considerable limits on district court discretion. All Guidelines decisions from the original sentencing remain in place, save the sentencing range that was altered by retroactive amendment. USSG §1B1.10(b)(1). In an initial sentencing hearing, a district court can vary below the Guidelines; but, by contrast, below-Guidelinesmodifications in §3582(c)(2) proceedings are forbidden,USSG §1B1.10(b)(2)(A), except where the original sentence was itself a downward departure. §1B1.10(b)(2)(B).And the court must always “consider the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment.” §1B1.10, comment., n. 1(B)(ii). The district court’s authority is limited; and the Courts of Appeals, and ultimately this Court, can ensure that districtcourts do not overhaul plea agreements, thereby abusing their authority under §3582(c)(2). See Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. ___ (2010) (reviewing and affirming a §3582(c)(2) sentence reduction); Gall, 552 U. S., at 49 (all sentences are reviewable for abuse of discretion).

The Government would enact a categorical bar on§3582(c)(2) relief. But such a bar would prevent district courts from making an inquiry that is within their own special knowledge and expertise. What is at stake in thiscase is a defendant’s eligibility for relief, not the extent of that relief. Indeed, even where a defendant is permitted to seek a reduction, the district judge may conclude that areduction would be inappropriate. District judges have a continuing professional commitment, based on scholarshipand accumulated experience, to a consistent sentencingpolicy. They can rely on the frameworks they have de9 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

vised to determine whether and to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted in any particular case. They may,when considering a §3582(c)(2) motion, take into account a defendant’s decision to enter into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. If the district court, based on its experience andinformed judgment, concludes the agreement led to a morelenient sentence than would otherwise have been imposed,it can deny the motion, for the statute permits but does not require the court to reduce a sentence. This discretion ensures that §3582(c)(2) does not produce a windfall.

As noted, the opinion concurring in the judgment suggests an intermediate position. That opinion argues thatin general defendants sentenced following 11(c)(1)(C)agreements are ineligible for §3582(c)(2) relief, but relief may be sought where the plea agreement itself contemplates sentence reduction. The statute, however, calls for an inquiry into the reasons for a judge’s sentence, not the reasons that motivated or informed the parties. If, as the Government suggests, the judge’s decision to impose a sentence is based on the agreement, then §3582(c)(2)does not apply. The parties cannot by contract upset anotherwise-final sentence. And the consequences of this erroneous rule would be significant. By allowing modification only when the terms of the agreement contemplate it,the proposed rule would permit the very disparities theSentencing Reform Act seeks to eliminate.

The Act aims to create a comprehensive sentencingscheme in which those who commit crimes of similar severity under similar conditions receive similar sentences. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(6); K. Stith & J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging 104–105 (1998). Section 3582(c)(2) contributes to that goal by ensuring that district courts may adjust sentences imposed pursuant to a range that the Commission concludes are too severe, out of stepwith the seriousness of the crime and the sentencingranges of analogous offenses, and inconsistent with the 10 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Act’s purposes.

The crack-cocaine range here is a prime example of anunwarranted disparity that §3582(c)(2) is designed to cure. The Commission amended the crack-cocaine Guidelines to effect a “partial remedy” for the “urgent and compelling” problem of crack-cocaine sentences, which, the Commission concluded, “significantly undermines the variouscongressional objectives set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act.” United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy,pp. 8–10 (May 2007); see also USSG Supp. App. C, Amdt. 706; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 99–100 (2007). The Commission determined that those Guidelines were flawed, and therefore that sentences that relied on them ought to be reexamined. There is no good reasonto extend the benefit of the Commission’s judgment only to an arbitrary subset of defendants whose agreed sentenceswere accepted in light of a since-rejected Guidelines range based on whether their plea agreements refer to theGuidelines. Congress enacted §3582(c)(2) to remedy systemic injustice, and the approach outlined in the opinion concurring in the judgment would undercut a systemic solution.

Even when a defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, the judge’s decision to accept the plea and impose the recommended sentence is likely to be based on the Guidelines; and when it is, the defendant should be eligible to seek §3582(c)(2) relief. This straightforward analysis would avoid making arbitrary distinctions betweensimilar defendants based on the terms of their plea agreements. And it would also reduce unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing, consistent with the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.

* * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 11 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

this case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 09–10245

WILLIAM FREEMAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2011]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the plurality that petitioner William Freeman is eligible for sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2), but I differ as to the reason why. In my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) agreement) is “based on” the agreement itself, not on the judge’s calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines. However, I believe that if a (C) agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment, and that range is subsequently lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission, the term of imprisonment is “based on” the range employed and the defendant is eligible for sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2).

To ask whether a particular term of imprisonment is “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range is to ask whether that range serves as the basis or foundation for the term of imprisonment. No term of imprisonment— 2 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

whether derived from a (C) agreement or otherwise—has legal effect until the court enters judgment imposing it. As a result, in applying §3582(c)(2) a court must discern the foundation for the term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge. As the plurality explains, in the normal course the district judge’s calculation of the Guidelines range applicable to the charged offenses will serve as the basis for the term of imprisonment imposed. See ante, at 5; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007).

Sentencing under (C) agreements, however, is different.At the time of sentencing, the term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement does not involve the court’s independent calculation of the Guidelines or consideration of the other 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) factors. The court may only accept or reject the agreement, and if it chooses to accept it, at sentencing the court may onlyimpose the term of imprisonment the agreement calls for;the court may not change its terms. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(A) (“To the extent the plea agreement is ofthe type specified in [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)], the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report”); AdvisoryCommittee’s Notes on 1979 Amendments to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App., pp. 583–584 (1982 ed.)(“[C]ritical to a . . . (C) agreement is that the defendant receive the . . . agreed-to sentence”); accord, United States

v. Rivera-Martínez, 607 F. 3d 283, 286 (CA1 2010); United States v. Green, 595 F. 3d 432, 438 (CA2 2010).

In the (C) agreement context, therefore, it is the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced. At the moment of sentencing, the court simply implements theterms of the agreement it has already accepted. Contrary to the plurality’s view, see ante, at 5–6, the fact that USSG §6B1.2(c) (Nov. 2010) instructs a district court to use the Guidelines as a yardstick in deciding whether to accept a 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

(C) agreement does not mean that the term of imprisonment imposed by the court is “based on” a particular Guidelines sentencing range. The term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge is dictated by the termsof the agreement entered into by the parties, not the judge’s Guidelines calculation. In short, the term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement is, for purposes of §3582(c)(2), “based on” the agreement itself.

To hold otherwise would be to contravene the very purpose of (C) agreements—to bind the district court andallow the Government and the defendant to determine what sentence he will receive. Although district courts ordinarily have significant discretion in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a particular defendant, see Gall, 552 U. S., at 46, under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) it is the parties’ agreement that determines the sentence to be imposed, see Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1999Amendments to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App.,

p. 1570 (2000 ed.) (noting that, under a (C) agreement, “the government and defense have actually agreed on what amounts to an appropriate sentence . . . . [T]his agreement is binding on the court once the court acceptsit”). To be sure, the court “retains absolute discretion whether to accept a plea agreement,” ibid., but once it does it is bound at sentencing to give effect to the parties’ agreement as to the appropriate term of imprisonment.

Allowing district courts later to reduce a term of imprisonment simply because the court itself consideredthe Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement would transform §3582(c)(2) into a mechanism bywhich courts could rewrite the terms of (C) agreements inways not contemplated by the parties. At the time that §3582(c)(2) was enacted in 1984, it was already well understood that, under Rule 11, the term of imprisonment stipulated in a (C) agreement bound the district court onceit accepted the agreement. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

11(e)(1) (1982) (specifying that the parties to a (C) agreement may “agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case”); United States v. French, 719

F. 2d 387, 389, n. 2 (CA11 1983) (per curiam) (noting that a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement was a “‘binding’ plea bargain”).¹

In the absence of any indication from the statutory text or legislative history that §3582(c)(2) was meant to fundamentally alter the way in which Rule 11(c)(1)(C) operates, I cannot endorse the plurality’s suggestion that §3582(c)(2) should be understood “to permit the district court to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent thesentencing range in question was a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement.” Ante, at 6; cf. Dillon

v. United States, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at (“Congress intended [§3582(c)(2)] to authorize only alimited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence”).

By the same token, the mere fact that the parties to a

(C) agreement may have considered the Guidelines in thecourse of their negotiations does not empower the courtunder §3582(c)(2) to reduce the term of imprisonment they ultimately agreed upon, as Freeman argues. Undoubtedly, he is correct that in most cases the Government andthe defendant will negotiate the term of imprisonment in a

(C) agreement by reference to the applicable Guidelinesprovisions. See Brief for Petitioner 30–31 (“[T]he Guidelines are . . . the starting point and initial benchmark for plea negotiations”); Brief for United States 33 (noting the“concededly strong likelihood that the parties will . . . calculat[e] and conside[r] potential Guidelines ranges in

—————— ¹Prior to 2002, Rule 11’s provisions governing binding plea agreements were located in Rule 11(e)(1)(C). In substance they were largely identical to the current rules in 11(c)(1)(C). See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e)(1)(C) (2000). 5 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

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the course of negotiating a plea agreement and selecting aspecific sentence”). This only makes sense; plea bargaining necessarily occurs in the shadow of the sentencing scheme to which the defendant would otherwise be subject. See United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 255 (2005) (“[P]lea bargaining takes place in the shadow of . . . a potential trial” (emphasis deleted)).

The term of imprisonment imposed by the district court,however, is not “based on” those background negotia- tions; instead, as explained above, it is based on the binding agreement produced by those negotiations. I therefore cannot agree with Freeman that §3582(c)(2) calls upondistrict courts to engage in a free-ranging search through the parties’ negotiating history in search of a Guidelinessentencing range that might have been relevant to the agreement or the court’s acceptance of it. Nor can I agreewith the plurality that the district judge’s calculation ofthe Guidelines provides the basis for the term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement.

II These conclusions, however, do not mean that a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement can never be reduced under §3582(c)(2), as the Government contends. For example, Rule 11(c)(1)(C) allows the parties to “agree that a specific . . . sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case.” In delineating the agreedupon term of imprisonment, some (C) agreements maycall for the defendant to be sentenced within a particularGuidelines sentencing range. In such cases, the district court’s acceptance of the agreement obligates the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, and there can be nodoubt that the term of imprisonment the court imposes is“based on” the agreed-upon sentencing range within the meaning of §3582(c)(2). If that Guidelines range is subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission, the de6 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

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fendant is eligible for sentence reduction.

Similarly, a plea agreement might provide for a specificterm of imprisonment—such as a number of months—but also make clear that the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the offenseto which the defendant pleaded guilty. As long as that sentencing range is evident from the agreement itself, for purposes of §3582(c)(2) the term of imprisonment imposedby the court in accordance with that agreement is “basedon” that range. Therefore, when a (C) agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range to establishthe term of imprisonment, and that range is subsequently lowered by the Commission, the defendant is eligible for sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2).²

In so holding, I necessarily reject the categorical ruleadvanced by the Government and endorsed by the dissent,which artificially divorces a (C) agreement from its express terms.³Because the very purpose of a (C) agreement ——————

²The dissent suggests that this rule results from a “mistaken shift inanalysis” in this opinion from the actions of the judge to the intent of the parties. See post, at 4 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). The purpose of a

(C) agreement, however, is to bind the sentencing court to the terms agreed upon by the parties. See supra, at 3–4. Therefore, to determine whether a sentence imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement was “basedon” a Guidelines sentencing range, the reviewing court must necessarily look to the agreement itself.

³The majority of the Courts of Appeals to have addressed this question have taken approaches consistent with the one I take today. See United States v. Rivera-Martínez, 607 F. 3d 283, 286–287 (CA1 2010); United States v. Ray, 598 F. 3d 407, 409–410 (CA7 2010); United States

v. Main, 579 F. 3d 200, 203 (CA2 2009); United States v. Scurlark, 560

F. 3d 839, 842–843 (CA8 2009). It appears that only the Third Circuithas applied the absolute rule advanced by the Government. See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F. 3d 275, 282, and n. 8 (2009). As noted by the plurality, see ante, at 1, even the Sixth Circuit allows for sentence reduction “to avoid a miscarriage of justice or to correct a mutual mistake,” United States v. Peveler, 359 F. 3d 369, 378, n. 4 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). And only two Courts of Appeals have adopted a wide-ranging approach similar to the one suggested by

7 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

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is to allow the parties to determine the defendant’s sentence, when the agreement itself employs the particular Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offenses in establishing the term of imprisonment, thedefendant is eligible to have his sentence reduced under §3582(c)(2).⁴In such cases, the district court’s reduction of the sentence does not rewrite the plea agreement; instead, it enforces the agreement’s terms.

Like the plurality, I am not persuaded by the Government’s argument that allowing a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement to be reduced under§3582(c)(2) deprives the Government of the benefit of thebargain it struck with the defendant. When a (C) agreement explicitly employs a particular Guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment, theagreement itself demonstrates the parties’ intent thatthe imposed term of imprisonment will be based on that range, as required for sentence reduction under the statute.⁵The Government’s concern that application of

—————— Freeman. See United States v. Garcia, 606 F. 3d 209, 214 (CA5 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Cobb, 584 F. 3d 979, 985 (CA10 2009). ⁴The dissent contends that, even when a (C) agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment, the district court imposing a sentence pursuant to that agreement does not “appl[y]” that range within the meaning of the applicable Guidelines policy statement. See post, at 4–5 (citing USSG §1B1.10(b)(1) (Nov. 2010)). But in so arguing, the dissent—like theGovernment—would have courts ignore the agreement’s express terms,which the court “applie[s]” when imposing the term of imprisonment. ⁵The plurality asserts that “[t]here is no good reason to extend the benefit [of sentence reduction] only to an arbitrary subset of defendants. . . based on whether their plea agreements refer to the Guidelines.” Ante, at 10. But the “good reason” is evident: Rule 11(c)(1)(C)’s entire purpose is to allow the parties’ intent to determine sentencing outcomes. See supra, at 3–4. If a (C) agreement does not indicate the parties’ intent to base the term of imprisonment on a particular Guidelines range subsequently lowered by the Commission, then §3582(c)(2)simply does not apply. 8 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

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§3582(c)(2) to (C) agreements will result in certain defendants receiving an “unjustified windfall” is therefore misplaced. See Brief for United States 40, 43.

Furthermore, in cases where the Government believes that even the limited sentence reduction authorized by §3582(c)(2) and USSG §1B1.10 improperly benefits thedefendant, it can argue to the district court that the courtshould not exercise its discretion under the statute to reduce the sentence.⁶See Dillon, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (noting that, in applying §3582(c)(2), the courtmust “consider whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the factorsset forth in [18 U. S. C.] §3553(a)”).

Finally, if the Government wants to ensure ex ante that a particular defendant’s term of imprisonment will not be reduced later, the solution is simple enough: Nothingprevents the Government from negotiating with a defendant to secure a waiver of his statutory right to seek sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2), just as it often doeswith respect to a defendant’s rights to appeal and collaterally attack the conviction and sentence.⁷See 18 U. S. C. §3742; 28 U. S. C. §2255 (2006 ed., Supp. III); see alsoApp. 28a–29a (provision in Freeman’s agreement expressly waiving both rights). In short, application of

—————— ⁶For example, the district court might decline to reduce the term of imprisonment of an eligible defendant in light of the Government’sargument that it made significant concessions in the agreement—such as dropping a charge or forgoing a future charge—and therefore itwould not have agreed to a lower sentence at the time the agreement was made. ⁷The opposite would not necessarily be true, however, under thereading of §3582(c)(2) proposed by the Government and the dissent. If a district court has no statutory authority to reduce a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement—because such a term isnever “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range within the meaning of §3582(c)(2)—it is not clear how the parties could effectively confer thatauthority upon the court by the terms of their agreement. 9 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

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§3582(c)(2) to an eligible defendant does not—and will not—deprive the Government of the benefit of its bargain.

III In order to conclude that Freeman is eligible for sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2), the plea agreementbetween Freeman and the Government must use a Guidelines sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission to establish the termof imprisonment imposed by the District Court. Freeman’s agreement does.The agreement states that Freeman “agrees to have hissentence determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines,” App. 28a, and that 106 months is the total term ofimprisonment to be imposed, id., at 26a. The agreement also makes clear that the §924(c)(1)(A) count to whichFreeman agrees to plead guilty carries a minimum sentence of 60 months, “which must be served consecutivelyto” any other sentence imposed. Id., at 27a. This leaves 46 months unaccounted for. The agreement sets Freeman’s offense level at 19, as determined by the quantity of drugs and his acceptance of responsibility, and states that the parties anticipate a criminal history category of IV. Id., at 27a–28a. Looking to the Sentencing Guidelines, an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category ofIV produce a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months.⁸See USSG ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). Therefore, contraryto the dissent’s curious suggestion that “there is no wayof knowing what th[e] sentence was ‘based on,’” post, at 6, it is evident that Freeman’s agreement employed the

—————— ⁸Because it is the parties’ agreement that controls in the (C) agreement context, see supra, at 3–4, even if the District Court had calculated the range differently than the parties, see post, at 8 (ROBERTS,

C. J., dissenting), Freeman would still be eligible for resentencing, aslong as the parties’ chosen range was one that was “subsequently . . .lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” §3582(c)(2). 10 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

46-month figure at the bottom end of this sentencing range,in combination with the 60-month mandatory minimumsentence under §924(c)(1)(A), to establish his 106-month sentence.⁹Thus the first of §3582(c)(2)’s conditions issatisfied—Freeman’s term of imprisonment is “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range.

In 2007 the Commission amended the Guidelines provisions applicable to cocaine base offenses, such that the offense level applicable to the quantity of drugs for whichFreeman was charged was lowered from 22 to 20. See App. 142a–143a (Sealed); USSG Supp. App. C, Amdt. 706.Taking into account the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Freeman’s recalculated offense level is 17, resulting in an amended sentencing range of 37to 46 months. Thus there can be no doubt that the Guidelines sentencing range originally used to establish Freeman’s term of imprisonment “has subsequently been

—————— ⁹The dissent asks whether Freeman would be eligible for sentence reduction if the agreement had called for a 53-month term of imprisonment. See post, at 7. Though that question is not presented by thefacts of this case, the answer is evident from the foregoing discussion: Ifthe agreement itself made clear that the parties arrived at the 53month term of imprisonment by determining the sentencing range applicable to Freeman’s offenses and then halving the 106-month figureat its low end, he would have been eligible under §3582(c)(2). See United States v. Franklin, 600 F. 3d 893, 897 (CA7 2010) (noting that a

(C) agreement would not foreclose relief under §3582(c)(2) if it providedthat the term of imprisonment was to be 40 percent below the low endof the applicable sentencing range).

Of course, if a (C) agreement “does not contain any references to the Guidelines,” post, at 8 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting), there is no way of knowing whether the agreement “use[d] a Guidelines sentencing rangeto establish the term of imprisonment,” supra, at 6, and a prisonersentenced under such an agreement would not be eligible. It is therefore unclear why the dissent believes that the straightforward inquirycalled for by the rule I apply today will “foster confusion” among the lower courts. Post, at 7. This approach is consistent with the onealready taken by most Courts of Appeals, see n. 3, supra, and there is no indication that they have found it unpalatable, cf. post, at 9. 11 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” §3582(c)(2), suchthat the amendment “ha[s] the effect of lowering [Freeman’s] applicable guideline range,” §1B1.10(a)(2)(B). As a result, Freeman’s term of imprisonment satisfies thesecond of §3582(c)(2)’s conditions. I therefore concur in the plurality’s judgment that he is eligible for sentencereduction. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 09–10245

WILLIAM FREEMAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2011]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.

The plurality and the opinion concurring in the judgment agree on very little except the judgment. I on the other hand agree with much of each opinion, but disagreeon the judgment. I agree with the concurrence that thesentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines. I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whetherthe agreement could be said to “use” or “employ” a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specifiedin the agreement. Ante, at 1 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).In that respect I agree with the plurality that the approach of the concurrence to determining when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence may be reduced is arbitrary and unworkable. Ante, at 9–10.

Section 3582(c)(2) provides that “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently beenlowered by the Sentencing Commission,” a district court“may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). The lone issue here is whether petitioner William Freeman meets the initial prerequisite of having been sen2 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tenced to a term of imprisonment “based on” a subsequently reduced sentencing range.

I agree with JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR that “the term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement is, for purposes of §3582(c)(2), ‘based on’ the agreement itself.” Ante, at 3. In this case, Freeman executed a written pleaagreement in which the parties “agree[d] that a sentenceof 106 months’ incarceration [was] the appropriate disposition.” App. 26a. Because the plea agreement was entered pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), that proposed sentence became binding on the District Court once it accepted the agreement. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1)(C) (the parties’ “request” for “a specific sentence” “binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement”). As a result, when determining the sentence to impose on Freeman, the District Court needed to consult one thing and one thingonly—the plea agreement. See ante, at 2 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (“At the moment of sentencing, the court simply implements the terms of the agreement it has already accepted”).

I also agree with JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR that the “term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge is dictatedby the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties, not the judge’s Guidelines calculation,” and that “[a]l-lowing district courts later to reduce a term of imprisonment simply because the court itself considered the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement would transform §3582(c)(2) into a mechanism by which courts could rewrite the terms of (C) agreements in ways not contemplated by the parties.” Ante, at 3.

But then comes the O. Henry twist: After cogently explaining why a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence is based on the plea agreement, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR diverges from that straightforward conclusion and holds that Freeman nevertheless satisfies the threshold requirement in §3582(c)(2).According to her opinion, if a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) “agreement 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment”—or if such use is “evident from the agreement”—then the defendant’s “term of imprisonment is ‘based on’ the range employed and the defendant is eligible for sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2).” Ante, at 1, 6. This exception is in my view as mistaken as the position of the plurality—and basically for the same reasons.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR begins the departure from her own rule innocently enough. As she explains, “some (C)agreements may call for the defendant to be sentencedwithin a particular Guidelines sentencing range.” Ante, at

5. In such a case, according to JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, there can be “no doubt” that the prison term the court imposes is“based on” the agreed-upon sentencing range, and therefore the defendant is eligible for sentence reduction. Ibid.

Whether or not that is true, it provides no support for the next step:

“Similarly, a plea agreement might provide for aspecific term of imprisonment—such as a number ofmonths—but also make clear that the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty. As long as that sentencing range is evident from the agreement itself . . . the term of imprisonment imposed by the court in accordance with thatagreement is ‘based on’ that range.” Ante, at 6.

This category of cases is not “similar” to the first at all.It is one thing to say that a sentence imposed pursuant to an agreement expressly providing that the court willsentence the defendant within an applicable Guidelinesrange is “based on” that range. It is quite another toconclude that an agreement providing for a specific term is “similarly” based on a Guidelines range, simply because the specified term can be said to reflect that range. 4 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

According to the concurrence, if the parties simply “consider[ ] the Guidelines” or “negotiate . . . by reference”to them, the defendant is not eligible for a sentence reduction. Ante, at 4. If, however, the agreement sets forth a specific term but it is somehow “clear that the basis for thespecified term is a Guidelines sentencing range,” then thedefendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. Ante, at 6. This head-scratching distinction between negotiating byreference to the Guidelines and using them as a basis for the specified term makes for an unworkable test that canyield only arbitrary results.

The confusion is compounded by the varying standardsin the concurrence. Sometimes the test is whether an agreement “expressly uses” a Guidelines sentencing range, ante, at 1, 6; see ante, at 7 (“explicitly employs”). Other times the test is whether such use is “evident,” ante, at 6, 9; see ante, at 10, n. 9 (“clear”). A third option is whether the agreement “indicate[s] the parties’ intent to base theterm of imprisonment on a particular Guideline range.” Ante, at 7, n. 5 (emphasis added).

The error in the concurring opinion is largely attributable to a mistaken shift in analysis. In the first half of the opinion, the inquiry properly looks to what the judge does: He is, after all, the one who imposes the sentence. After approving the agreement, the judge considers only the fixed term in the agreement, so the sentence he actuallyimposes is not “based on” the Guidelines.

In the second half of the opinion, however, the analysis suddenly shifts, and focuses on the parties: Did they “use” or “employ” the Guidelines in arriving at the term in theiragreement? But §3582(c)(2) is concerned only withwhether a defendant “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range.” Only a courtcan sentence a defendant, so there is no basis for examining why the parties settled on a particular prison term.

This conclusion dovetails with USSG §1B1.10(b)(1)— 5 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement governing whether a defendant is eligible for a reduction under§3582(c)(2). As we explained last Term, §3582(c)(2) requires a district court “to follow the Commission’s instructions in §1B1.10 to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 9). According to §1B1.10(b)(1), the court must first determine “the amended guideline range that would have been applicableto the defendant” if the retroactively amended provisionhad been in effect at the time of his sentencing. “In making such determination, the court shall substitute onlythe amendments . . . for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced.” USSG §1B1.10(b)(1), p. s. (emphasis added).

As noted, the District Court sentenced Freeman pursuant to the term specified by his plea agreement; it never “applied” a Guidelines provision in imposing his term of imprisonment. The fact that the court may have “use[d]the Guidelines as a yardstick in deciding whether to accept a (C) agreement does not mean that the term of imprisonment imposed by the court is ‘based on’ a particularGuidelines sentencing range.” Ante, at 2–3 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Even if the Guidelines were “used” or “employed” by the parties in arriving at the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentencing term, they were not “applied whenthe defendant was sentenced.” Once the District Court accepted the agreement, all that was later “applied” was the sentence set forth in that agreement.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR is wrong to assert that her standard “does not rewrite the plea agreement” but rather“enforces the agreement’s terms.” Ante, at 7. According tothe concurrence, “[w]hen a (C) agreement explicitly employs a particular Guidelines sentencing range to establishthe term of imprisonment, the agreement itself demonstrates the parties’ intent that the imposed term of im6 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

prisonment will be based on that range,” and therefore subject to reduction if the Commission subsequently lowers that range. Ibid. In this case, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR concludes that Freeman’s agreement contemplated such areduction, even though the parties had “agree[d] that asentence of 106 months’ incarceration is the appropriatedisposition of this case.” App. 26a.

There is, however, no indication whatever that the parties to the agreement contemplated the prospect of lowered sentencing ranges. And it is fanciful to suppose that the parties would have said “106 months” if what theyreally meant was “a sentence at the lowest end of the applicable Guidelines range.” Cf. App. 25a (parties in this case recommending “a fine at the lowest end of the applicable Guideline Range”). In concluding otherwise, the concurrence “ignore[s] the agreement’s express terms.” Ante, at 7, n. 4.

The reality is that whenever the parties choose a fixed term, there is no way of knowing what that sentence was“based on.” The prosecutor and the defendant could well have had quite different reasons for concluding that 106months was a good deal. Perhaps the prosecutor wanted to devote the limited resources of his office to a different area of criminal activity, rather than try this case. Perhaps the defendant had reason to question the credibilityof one of his key witnesses, and feared a longer sentence if the case went to trial.

Indeed, the fact that there may be uncertainty abouthow to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range could be the basis for agreement on a fixed term in a plea under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Here the agreement made clear thatthere was some doubt about the Guidelines calculations. See App. 28a (“Both parties reserve the right to object tothe USSG §4A1.1 calculation of defendant’s criminal history”); ibid. (the parties acknowledge that their Guidelines calculations “are not binding upon the Court” and 7 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

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that the “defendant understands the Court will independently calculate the Guidelines at sentencing and defendant may not withdraw the plea of guilty solely because theCourt does not agree with . . . [the] Sentencing Guideline application”).

In addition, parties frequently enter plea agreementsthat reflect prosecutorial decisions not to pursue particular counts. If a defendant faces three counts, and agreesto plead to one if the prosecutor does not pursue the other two, is the sentence reflected in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C)agreement in any sense “based on” the Guidelines sentencing range for the one count to which the defendant pleaded? Surely not. The concurrence tacitly concedes as much when it suggests that an agreement to “drop[ ] acharge or forgo[ ] a future charge” could ultimately begrounds for not reducing the defendant’s sentence. Ante, at 8, n. 6. But what this really shows is a basic flaw in the“based on” test adopted by that opinion.

Finally, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s approach will foster confusion in an area in need of clarity. As noted, courts will be hard pressed to apply the distinction between referring to and relying on a Guidelines range. Other questions abound:

What if the agreement contains a particular Guidelines calculation but the agreement’s stipulated sentence is outside the parties’ predicted Guidelines range? The test in the concurring opinion is whether the agreement “uses”or “employs” a Guidelines sentencing range to establishthe term of imprisonment, ante, at 1, not whether that term falls within the range. In this case, what if the term was 53 months—exactly half the low end of the sentencing range anticipated by the parties? Is it “evident” in that case that the Guidelines were used or employed to establish the agreed-upon sentence?*

——————

* JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR responds that “[i]f the agreement itself made 8 FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

What if the plea agreement does not contain any references to the Guidelines—not even the partial and tentative Guidelines calculations in Freeman’s agreement—butthe binding sentence selected by the parties corresponds exactly to the low end of the applicable Guidelines range?Is it “evident” in that case that the agreement is based ona sentencing range?

What if the District Court calculates the applicableGuidelines range differently than the parties? This is no academic hypothetical. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 600 F. 3d 893, 896–897 (CA7 2010) (noting that “thedistrict court settled on a higher guidelines range than that contemplated in the [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] plea agreement”). Is a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence still subject to reduction if the parties relied on the wrong sentencingrange? JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s surprising answer is “yes,” see ante, at 9, n. 8, even though the governing Guidelines provision specifies that a defendant is only eligiblefor sentence reduction if the amended Guideline has “the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range”—presumably the correct applicable guideline range. See USSG §1B1.10(a)(2), p. s. Relying on error isjust one unforeseen consequence of looking not to thespecified term in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, but insteadtrying to reconstruct what led the parties to agree to thatterm in the first place.

This confusion will invite the very thing JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR claims to disavow: a “free-ranging search” bydistrict courts “through the parties’ negotiating history in search of a Guidelines sentencing range that might havebeen relevant to the agreement.” Ante, at 5. This is par—————— clear” that the parties arrived at the 53-month figure by determiningthe sentencing range and then halving the range’s low end—106 months—then the sentence could be reduced. Ante, at 10, n. 9. Does the 53-month figure itself make that clear? What if the figure is 26½ months? 9 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

ticularly unfortunate given that the whole point of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements is to provide the parties with certainty about sentencing.

* * * As with any negotiation, parties entering a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement must take the bitter with the sweet. Because of today’s decision, however, Freeman gets more sweet and the Government more bitter than either side bargained for. But those who will really be left with asour taste after today’s decision are the lower courtscharged with making sense of it going forward. I respectfully dissent.

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Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown Syllabus

Posted by admin on June 30th, 2011

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010

Syllabus

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A., ET AL. v. BROWN ET UX., CO-ADMINISTRATORS OFTHE ESTATE OF BROWN, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 10–76. Argued January 11, 2011 —Decided June 27, 2011

Respondents, North Carolina residents whose sons died in a bus accident outside Paris, France, filed a suit for wrongful-death damages inNorth Carolina state court. Alleging that the accident was caused bytire failure, they named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation, and petitioners, three Goodyear USA subsidiaries, organizedand operating, respectively, in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France. Petitioners’ tires are manufactured primarily for European and Asianmarkets and differ in size and construction from tires ordinarily sold in the United States. Petitioners are not registered to do business inNorth Carolina; have no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in the State; do not design, manufacture, or advertise theirproducts in the State; and do not solicit business in the State or sellor ship tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage of their tires were distributed in North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion todismiss the claims against them for want of personal jurisdiction. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the North Carolina courts had general jurisdiction over petitioners, whose tires had reached the State through “the stream of commerce.”

Held: Petitioners were not amenable to suit in North Carolina on claims unrelated to any activity of petitioners in the forum State.Pp. 6–14.

(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to proceed against adefendant. The pathmarking decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, provides that state courts may exercise 2

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personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has “certainminimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of thesuit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice.’ ” Id., at 316. Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fairplay and substantial justice” concept, the Court in International Shoe classified cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants. First, the Court recognized that jurisdiction could be asserted where thecorporation’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and gave rise to the episode-in-suit. Id., at 317. It also observed that the commission of “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficientto render a corporation answerable in that State with respect to thoseacts, though not with respect to matters unrelated to the forum connections. Id., at 318. These two categories compose what is nowknown as “specific jurisdiction.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414, n. 8. International Shoe distinguished from cases that fit within the “specific jurisdiction” categories, “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suitagainst it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinctfrom those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. Adjudicatory authority so grounded is now called “general jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9. Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. In only two decisions postdating International Shoe has this Court considered whether an out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342

U. S. 437; and Helicopteros, 466 U. S. 408. Pp. 6–9.

(b) Petitioners lack “the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts” necessary to allow North Carolina to entertain asuit against them unrelated to anything that connects them to theState. Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 416. The stream-of-commerce cases on which the North Carolina court relied relate to exercises of specific jurisdiction in products liability actions, in which a nonresident defendant, acting outside the forum, places in the stream of commerce aproduct that ultimately causes harm inside the forum. Many statelong-arm statutes authorize courts to exercise specific jurisdictionover manufacturers when the events in suit, or some of them, occurred within the forum State. The North Carolina court’s stream-ofcommerce analysis elided the essential difference between casespecific and general jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s productsinto the forum may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction, see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Syllabus

286, 297; but ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant. A corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts within a state,” International Shoe instructed, “is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U. S., at 318.

Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners togeneral jurisdiction. In the 1952 Perkins case, general jurisdictionwas appropriately exercised over a Philippine corporation sued inOhio, where the company’s affairs were overseen during World War

II. In Helicopteros, however, the survivors of U. S. citizens killed when a helicopter owned by a Colombian corporation crashed in Peru could not maintain wrongful-death actions against that corporationin Texas, where the company’s contacts “consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a Texas enterprise]; and sending personnel to [Texas] for training.”466 U. S., at 416. These links to Texas did not “constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts . . . found to exist in Perkins,” and were insufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim that neither “ ‘ar[o]se out of’ . . . no[r] related to” the defendant’s activities in Texas. Id., at 415–416. This Court sees no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners’ tires sporadically made in North Carolina through intermediaries. Pp. 9–13.

(c) Neither below nor in their brief in opposition to the petition forcertiorari did respondents urge disregard of petitioners’ discretestatus as subsidiaries and treatment of all Goodyear entities as a “unitary business,” so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in the subsidiaries as well. Respondents have therefore forfeited this contention. Pp. 13–14.

199 N. C. App. 50, 681 S. E. 2d 382, reversed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 10–76

GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EDGAR D. BROWN,ET UX., CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATEOF JULIAN DAVID BROWN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

[June 27, 2011]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the jurisdiction of state courts overcorporations organized and operating abroad. We address, in particular, this question: Are foreign subsidiaries of aUnited States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?

A bus accident outside Paris that took the lives of two 13-year-old boys from North Carolina gave rise to the litigation we here consider. Attributing the accident to adefective tire manufactured in Turkey at the plant of aforeign subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear USA), the boys’ parents commenced an action for damages in a North Carolina state court; theynamed as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation,and three of its subsidiaries, organized and operating, respectively, in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina and regularly engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest 2

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the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction over it; GoodyearUSA’s foreign subsidiaries, however, maintained thatNorth Carolina lacked adjudicatory authority over them.

A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for compatibility with the FourteenthAmendment’s Due Process Clause. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945) (assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state corporation must comply with“‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940))).Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision have differentiated between general or allpurpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414, nn. 8, 9 (1984).

A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations withthe State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. See International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 317. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the forumand the underlying controversy,” principally, activity or anoccurrence that takes place in the forum State and istherefore subject to the State’s regulation. von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966) (hereinafter vonMehren & Trautman); see Brilmayer et al., A GeneralLook at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 782 (1988) (hereinafter Brilmayer). In contrast to general, allpurpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined toadjudication of “issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” von Mehren & Trautman 1136.

Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred 3 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

in France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.The North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged. Brown v. Meter, 199 N. C. App. 50, 57–58, 681 S. E. 2d 382, 388 (2009). Were the foreign subsidiaries nonetheless amenable to general jurisdiction in North Carolina courts? Confusing or blending general and specific jurisdictionalinquiries, the North Carolina courts answered yes. Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had reached North Carolina through “the stream of commerce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals believed,gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign corporations. Id., at 67–68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394–395.

A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for theexercise of general jurisdiction. Such a connection does not establish the “continuous and systematic” affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation’s contacts withthe State.

I On April 18, 2004, a bus destined for Charles de Gaulle Airport overturned on a road outside Paris, France. Passengers on the bus were young soccer players from NorthCarolina beginning their journey home. Two 13-year-olds, Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, sustained fatal injuries. The boys’ parents, respondents in this Court, filed asuit for wrongful-death damages in the Superior Court ofOnslow County, North Carolina, in their capacity as administrators of the boys’ estates. Attributing the accidentto a tire that failed when its plies separated, the parents alleged negligence in the “design, construction, testing, 4

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and inspection” of the tire. 199 N. C. App., at 51, 681 S. E.2d, at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA (Goodyear Luxembourg), Goodyear Lastikleri T. A. S. (Goodyear Turkey),and Goodyear Dunlop Tires France, SA (GoodyearFrance), petitioners here, were named as defendants. Incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France, respectively, petitioners are indirect subsidiaries of GoodyearUSA, an Ohio corporation also named as a defendant in the suit. Petitioners manufacture tires primarily for sale in European and Asian markets. Their tires differ in size and construction from tires ordinarily sold in the United States. They are designed to carry significantly heavier loads, and to serve under road conditions and speed limits in the manufacturers’ primary markets.¹

In contrast to the parent company, Goodyear USA,which does not contest the North Carolina courts’ personaljurisdiction over it, petitioners are not registered to dobusiness in North Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage of petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millionsmanufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. These tires were typically custom ordered to equip specialized vehicles such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse trailers. Petitioners state, and respondents

—————— ¹Respondents portray Goodyear USA’s structure as a reprehensible effort to “outsource” all manufacturing, and correspondingly, tort litigation, to foreign jurisdictions. See Brief for Respondents 51–53.Yet Turkey, where the tire alleged to have caused the accident-in-suit was made, is hardly a strange location for a facility that primarilysupplies markets in Europe and Asia. 5 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

do not here deny, that the type of tire involved in the accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufacturedby Goodyear Turkey, was never distributed in NorthCarolina.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims against them for want of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. Acknowledging that the claims neither “related to, nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] contacts with NorthCarolina,” the Court of Appeals confined its analysis to “general rather than specific jurisdiction,” which the court recognized required a “higher threshold” showing: A defendant must have “continuous and systematic contacts” with the forum. Id., at 58, 681 S. E. 2d, at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted). That threshold was crossed, the court determined, when petitioners placed their tires“in the stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina.” Id., at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394.

Nothing in the record, the court observed, indicatedthat petitioners “took any affirmative action to cause tires which they had manufactured to be shipped into North Carolina.” Id., at 64, 681 S. E. 2d, at 392. The court found, however, that tires made by petitioners reached North Carolina as a consequence of a “highly-organized distribution process” involving other Goodyear USA subsidiaries. Id., at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. Petitioners, the court noted, made “no attempt to keep these tires from reaching the North Carolina market.” Id., at 66, 681 S. E. 2d, at 393. Indeed, the very tire involved in the accident,the court observed, conformed to tire standards established by the U. S. Department of Transportation and boremarkings required for sale in the United States. Ibid.²As

—————— ²Such markings do not necessarily show that any of the tires weredestined for sale in the United States. To facilitate trade, the Solicitor 6

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further support, the court invoked North Carolina’s “interest in providing a forum in which its citizens are able toseek redress for [their] injuries,” and noted the hardshipNorth Carolina plaintiffs would experience “[were they]required to litigate their claims in France,” a country towhich they have no ties. Id., at 68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionaryreview. Brown v. Meter, 364 N. C. 128, 695 S. E. 2d 756 (2010).

We granted certiorari to decide whether the general jurisdiction the North Carolina courts asserted over petitioners is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 561 U. S. ___ (2010).

II A

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority toproceed against a defendant. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 207 (1977). The canonical opinion in this area remains International Shoe, 326 U. S. 310, in which we held that a State may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendanthas “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., at 316 (quoting Meyer, 311 U. S., at 463).

Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fair play andsubstantial justice” concept, the Court in International Shoe classified cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants. First, as in International Shoe itself, jurisdiction unquestionably could be asserted where the corpora

—————— General explained, the United States encourages other countries to“treat compliance with [Department of Transportation] standards, including through use of DOT markings, as evidence that the products are safely manufactured.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32. 7 Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)

Opinion of the Court

tion’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit. 326 U. S., at

317. Further, the Court observed, the commission of certain “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficient to render a corporation answerable in that Statewith respect to those acts, though not with respect tomatters unrelated to the forum connections. Id., at 318. The heading courts today use to encompass these two International Shoe categories is “specific jurisdiction.” See von Mehren & Trautman 1144–1163. Adjudicatory authority is “specific” when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 8.

International Shoe distinguished from cases that fit within the “specific jurisdiction” categories, “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. Adjudicatory authority so grounded is today called “general jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9. For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for acorporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which thecorporation is fairly regarded as at home. See Brilmayer728 (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, andprincipal place of business as “paradig[m]” bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction).

Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving “single or occasional acts” occurring or having their impact within the forum State. As a rule in these cases, this Court has inquired whether there was “some act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself ofthe privilege of conducting activities within the forum 8

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State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958). See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 287, 297 (1980) (Oklahoma court may not exercise personal jurisdiction “over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products-liabilityaction, when the defendants’ only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 474–475 (1985) (franchisor headquartered in Florida may maintain breach-of-contract action in Florida against Michigan franchisees, where agreement contemplated ongoing interactions between franchisees and franchisor’sheadquarters); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 105 (1987) (Taiwanese tire manufacturer settled product liability action broughtin California and sought indemnification there from Japanese valve assembly manufacturer; Japanese company’s“mere awareness . . . that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would reach the forum State in the stream of commerce” held insufficient to permit California court’s adjudication ofTaiwanese company’s cross-complaint); id., at 109 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); id., at 116–117 (Brennan, J., concurringin part and concurring in judgment). See also Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610,628 (1988) (in the wake of International Shoe, “specificjurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reducedrole”).

In only two decisions postdating International Shoe, discussed infra, at 11–13, has this Court considered whether an out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims 9 Ci