Posts Tagged ‘New Orleans Criminal Lawyer’

Federal Crack Amendment

Posted by admin on September 8th, 2010

INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years progress has been made in reducing the harsh sentences for crack cocaine offenses. Most recently, on August 3, 2010 the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was signed into law, reducing to 18 to 1 the sentencing ratio amount of powder cocaine versus crack cocaine that triggers the same sentence. The legislation also eliminates the mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack.

On November 1, 2007, the Sentencing Commission amended the crack guidelines, lowering the penalties for most crack cocaine offenses in USSG §2D1.1 by two levels. On December 11, 2007, the Commission voted to make the amended guidelines retroactive to cases sentenced before November 1, 2007, with an effective date of March 3, 2008. The Commission also significantly modified USSG §1B1.10, which addresses the retroactive application of amendments. Through an amendment effective May 1, 2008 (Amendment 715), the Commission further modified USSG §2D1.1, revising the way in which combined offense levels are determined in cases involving crack and other drugs. The amendment, which was also made retroactive, provides that 1 gram of cocaine base equals 20 kilograms of marijuana and provides for a two-level reduction in the combined offense level for polydrug cases unless certain exceptions apply.

The resources on this page help explain the new law as well as the application of the 2007 crack cocaine guidelines.

COMBATING DISPARITY IN CRACK/POWDER COCAINE SENTENCING
  • Legislative Developments
    • Historic Crack Reform Law Enacted: On August 3, 2010 President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, reducing sentences for crack cocaine offenses. The 100 to 1 sentencing ratio has been reduced to 18 to 1. Twenty-eight grams of crack cocaine will now trigger a five-year prison sentence and 280 grams of crack will trigger a ten-year sentence. The five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine has also been eliminated. The Fair Sentencing Act does not appear to apply retroactively. The Sentencing Commission has issued proposed amendments to implement the directives of the new legislation. The notice and comment period for the proposed amendments is 30 days, to accommodate the Act’s mandate that the Commission promulgate temporary amendments by November 1, 2010. For details on the Act, including the issue of retroactivity, see the FAMM website and the Sentencing Law and Policy Blog. Also, this sample pleading may be helpful in arguing for application of the Act to pending cases with offenses committed before August 3, 2010.
    • Testimony of Assistant United States Attorney General Lanny Breuer Supporting Elimination of Crack/Powder Disparity (April 30, 2009)
      In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs yesterday, Assistant United States Attorney General Lanny Breuer declared that “Congress’s goal should be to completely eliminate the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine.” This is the first time that the Department of Justice has supported equalization of cocaine sentencing. Noting that a complete end to the sentencing disparity cannot occur without Congressional action, Mr. Breuer offered hope for defendants currently facing sentencing for crack cocaine offenses:

      [W]e recognize that federal courts have the authority to sentence outside the guidelines in crack cases or even to create their own quantity ratio. Our prosecutors will inform courts that they should act within their discretion to fashion a sentence that is consistent with the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and our prosecutors will bring the relevant case-specific facts to the courts’ attention.

      Mr. Breuer was one of several witnesses who testified at the April 30th hearing on “Restoring Fairness to Federal Sentencing: Addressing the Crack-Powder Disparity.” On May 21, 2009, Mr. Breuer reiterated the Administration’s position before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security’s Hearing on: Unfairness in Federal Cocaine Sentencing: Is it Time to Crack the 100 to 1 Disparity?

    • Joint Statement of Thomas W. Hillier, II and Jon Sands at the April 29, 2009 U.S. Senate Hearing on Restoring Fairness to Sentencing: Addressing the Crack-Powder Disparity
      Thomas W. Hillier, II, Federal Public Defender, Western District of Washington, Chair, Federal Defender Legislative Expert Panel; Jon Sands, Federal Public Defender, District of Arizona, Federal Defender Sentencing Guidelines Committee, on behalf of the Federal Public and Community Defenders, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Senate Judiciary Committee
      This testimony urges the following reforms: (1) penalties for offenses involving the same quantity of crack and powder cocaine should be equalized at a level no greater than the current level for powder cocaine; (2) differences among offenses and offenders should be taken into account by the sentencing judge in the individual case, and aggravating circumstances should not be built into every sentence for crack cocaine; (3) the mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine should be repealed; (4) mandatory minimums should be repealed; (5) recidivist sentencing enhancements should be narrowly tailored to minimize their disparate impact on people of color; (6) enhanced penalties for drug distribution near protected zones should be repealed.
    • Statement of A.J. Kramer at the February 12, 2008 U.S. Senate Hearing on Federal Cocaine Sentencing Laws: Reforming the 100- to-1 Crack/Powder Disparity
      A.J. Kramer, Federal Defender, District of the District of Columbia, on behalf of the Federal Public and Community Defenders, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Senate Judiciary Committee
      This testimony urges Congress to make the following reforms: equalize the penalties for crack and powder cocaine at the current powder cocaine quantity levels; direct the USSC to review and, if appropriate, amend the guidelines applicable to all drug types, to account for aggravating and mitigating circumstances that may or may not be present in individual cases; repeal the mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine; repeal the mandatory minimum for all drug offenses; establish a pilot program for federal substance abuse courts; authorize the appropriation of additional funds for the defense of drug trafficking cases in the event Congress authorizes increased salaries and expenses for the prosecution of such cases. In A.J. Kramer’s Supplemental Statement he also addresses DOJ’s arguments against retroactive application of the crack cocaine amendments and refutes DOJ claims regarding the rates of violence and recidivism of crack cocaine offenders.
    • Statement of Michael S. Nachmanoff at the February 26, 2008 U.S. House of Representatives Hearing – Cracked Justice: Addressing the Unfairness in Cocaine Sentencing
      Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Defender, Eastern District of Virginia, on behalf of the Federal Public and Community Defenders, before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security
      This testimony provides additional support and statistics for many of the same arguments made in A.J. Kramer’s Testimony & Supplemental Testimony (described above on this page) before the Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
  • DOJ and USSC Support of Equalization
    • DOJ Memo of May 1, 2009 on Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing for Crack Cocaine Offenses
      This memo from the Deputy Attorney General to all United States Attorneys directs prosecutors to “inform courts that the Administration believes Congress and the Commission should eliminate the crack/powder disparity, but that Congress has not yet determined whether or how to achieve a more appropriate sentencing scheme for crack and powder offenses. Until Congress acts, courts must exercise their discretion under existing case law to fashion a sentence that is consistent with the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Prosecutors should be governed by the facts and circumstances of individual cases and existing law. They may indicate that they will not object to a reasonable variance in an average case.”
    • 2007 USSC Report to Congress on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy
      In this report, the Commission urges reform of the crack cocaine sentencing laws. Facts and arguments contained in the report may be very useful to practitioners defending crack cocaine cases.
ANALYSIS OF THE 2007 CRACK COCAINE GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
  • Mathematical Anomalies Resulting from Drug Equivalency and Quantity Tables
    When the USSC amended the crack cocaine guideline to reduce the base offense levels in November 2007, two separate types of mathematical anomalies resulted: (1) within range-anomalies and differing ratios between crack and powder cocaine in the drug quantity table; and (2) false equivalencies in poly-drug cases resulting from a new crack-to-marijuana equivalency table, resulting in base offense levels no different than pre-amendment levels. The first of these anomalies remains. With Amendment 715, effective May 1, 2008, the Commission remedied the second of these anomalies.

    • Present Anomalies Resulting from Drug Quantity Table: Currently, the lowest ratios incorporated into the amended Drug Quantity Table of §2D1.1 only operate at base offense level 26. This results in within range-anomalies and wildly disparate ratios between crack and powder cocaine. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558, 573 (2007)(“[a]s a result of the 2007 amendment,. . .the Guidelines now advance a crack/powder ratio that varies (at different offense levels) between 25 to 1 and 80 to 1″). When the Commission promulgates a guideline that is based on “unsound judgment,” such as the arbitrary crack/powder ratios animating the drug quantity table, courts may exercise discretion to reject that provision. See Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007); Spears v. United States, _ S.Ct._, 2009 WL 129044 (Jan. 21, 2008) (per curiam) (reaffirming holding in Kimbrough that sentencing judges are entitled to reject and vary from crack cocaine guidelines based on policy disagreements, i.e., that 100:1 crack/powder ratio creates unwarranted disparity); see also U.S. v. Taylor, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069. (E.D.Wis. Oct. 29, 2008) (finding that continued flaws and disparity in crack to powder ratio supports non-guideline sentence where had defendant possessed only powder cocaine, his base offense level would have been 22 rather than 30, and his range 46-57 months rather than 108-135). This analysis should find support in the new legislation that reduces the disparity to 18:1.

      For a more thorough discussion of present anomalies and suggestions on how to argue against unwarranted disparity still existing between the guidelines treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses see Good Math to Fight the Bad Math: Avoiding Unwarranted Disparity by Applying the Commission’s Lowest Accepted Ratios to All Offense Levels.

    • Remedy to False Equivalencies in Poly-Drug Cases: Through amendment 715, the Commission modified the Drug Equivalency Tables in Application Note 10(E) of §2D1.1, to provide that 1 gram of cocaine base equals 20 kilograms of marijuana. It also amended Application Note 10(D) to provide for a two level reduction to the combined offense level for a case involving crack and one or more other drugs, subject to some exclusions. A corresponding amendment to §1B1.10 renders the change to §2D1.1 retroactive. Attorneys who are challenging §2D1.1 on its face may wish to study the history of the prior mathematical problems with the equivalency table.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2007 CRACK COCAINE GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
  • Guidance to CJA Panel Attorneys
  • Sample Motions, Briefs, Petitions and Orders
  • Chart Comparing Amended Version of USSG §1B1.10 with Previous Version
    by National Federal Defender Sentencing Resource Counsel
    This chart compares the November 1, 2007 amended version of USSG §1B1.10 against the previous version, pointing out new potential limitations on eligibility for relief. For additional comparisons of the previous and amended versions of USSG §1B1.10 see Redline Version of §1B1.10, Old Version of §1B1.10 and Amended Version of §1B1.10.
  • Supreme Court Holds That Booker Does Not Apply to Resentencings Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582
    In Dillon v. United States (No. 09-6338), issued on June 17, 2010, the Court held that Booker does not apply to sentencing modifications under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Percy Dillon had moved for a sentence reduction after the crack cocaine guidelines were amended, arguing both for the two-level reduction set forth in the amended guidelines as well as a sentence below the amended guideline range based on application of the 3553(a) factors. The Third Circuit held that Booker did not apply to section 3582 sentencing modifications; instead, the court treated the amended guideline range as mandatory and held that the defendant was only eligible for the two-level reduction. In affirming the Third Circuit’s judgment, the Supreme Court first determined that “Section 3582(c)(2)’s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Based on this determination, “we conclude that proceedings under that section do not implicate the interests identified in Booker.” For further analysis of Dillon see this SCOTUSblog post. For briefs filed in the case see SCOTUSwiki. For orders cited within petitioner’s reply brief see fact-finding orders and appointment of counsel orders.
  • Commission Clarifies Meaning of USSG §1B1.10(b)(2)(B): Clients Who Received Non-Guideline Sentence Under Booker Still Eligible for Crack Retroactivity Sentence Reduction
    The amended guideline retroactivity policy statement, USSG §1B1.10, states at §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) that “if the original term of imprisonment constituted a non-guideline sentence determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, a further reduction generally would not be appropriate.” This appears to suggest that clients are not entitled to relief under the amendment if they received a non-guideline sentence under Booker. However, Sentencing Resource Counsel, as well as many Federal Defenders, report that at the Crack Summits in Charlotte and St. Louis, and at the Defender conference in Seattle, the Commission explained that §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) applies only if the original sentencing judge did not consider the guidelines at all. This acknowledgment is good news because there should be no instances in which judges ignored the guidelines. A sentencing judge must consider the guidelines, even if she then rejects them as unsound policy, and to do otherwise is reversible error under Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558, 564, 570 (2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 2468 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). For comments relevant to this issue made at the St. Louis Crack Summit, view the Transcript of Portions of the Crack Amendment Retroactivity Summit.
  • Crack Retroactivity: Questions, Answers, Caselaw, Argument Outlines (February 18, 2008)
    by Federal Public & Community Defenders
    This memorandum addresses a variety of procedural and substantive issues arising in crack retroactivity cases including: the right to counsel; the right to a hearing and for the defendant to be present; whether a court must order a new presentence report upon motion; whether a court may amend a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) where the original sentence was imposed pursuant to a binding plea agreement; application of §3582(c)(2) to defendants who originally received a non-guideline sentence; application of safety valve or the substantial assistance statute in §3582(c)(2) proceedings; application of §3582(c)(2) relief to career offenders; relief where the defendant was incarcerated beyond the expiration of his sentence under the amended guideline range; and whether a court may impose a sentence below the minimum of the amended guideline range. For a more recent update on several issues raised in this article, see Crack Retroactivity Caselaw (May 11, 2009).

    For prior articles raising similar issues, see Sentence Reductions Under the Retroactive Crack Amendment , Selected Retroactivity Caselaw, Retroactive Crack Amendment: Practice Tips and Other Lessons Learned in Charlotte and Crack Summit II: Practice Tips and Lessons Learned in St. Louis.

  • Appointment of Counsel in Crack Retroactivity Cases (June 25, 2008)
    by the Training Branch of the Office of Defender Services
    This memo to the participants of the National Sentencing Policy Institute presents ten reasons why counsel should be appointed to handle § 3582(c)(2) motions. For a prior memorandum addressing this issue, see Providing Counsel to All Potentially Eligible Beneficiaries of the Retroactive Crack Guideline Amendment Makes Sense and Is Constitutionally Required (by National Federal Defender Sentencing Resource Counsel) and Effective, Efficient, and Fair Implementation of the Retroactive Amendment.
  • BOP Communications Affecting Inmates Eligible for Sentence Reductions Under the Amended Crack Cocaine Guidelines
  • Letter from Defenders to the United States Sentencing Commission (November 21, 2007)
    This letter outlines the Defender community’s opposition to the Commission’s decision to amend USSG §1B1.10 (concerning retroactive application of amendments). Practitioners may find this letter useful in arguing, for example, that courts are not bound by the limitations set forth in the amendments to USSG §1B1.10.
  • Supplemental Statement of A.J. Kramer for the February 12, 2008 U.S. Senate Hearing on Federal Cocaine Sentencing Laws: Reforming the 100- to-1 Crack/Powder Disparity
    A.J. Kramer, Federal Defender, District of the District of Columbia, on behalf of the Federal Public and Community Defenders, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Senate Judiciary Committee
    This supplemental testimony responds to several DOJ assertions about retroactive application of the crack cocaine amendments, and corrects DOJ inaccuracies concerning alleged “dangerousness” of defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses. It includes statistics showing lack of violence and recidivism in crack cocaine cases, urges judicial discretion, and directly contradicts DOJ testimony. Practitioners can use this supplemental statement, as well as A.J. Kramer’s original testimony, and the testimony of Michael Nachmanoff before the House, when disputing prosecutorial allegations that crack cocaine offenses, and those who are convicted of them, are “dangerous.”
HELPFUL LINKS
  • Families Against Mandatory Minimums
    Check FAMM’s web site for updated information on legislative developments regarding punishment for cocaine related offenses.
  • FJC Crack Cocaine Retroactivity Guideline Information Exchange
    The Federal Judicial Center hosts this intranet web page to provide a forum for sharing information and ideas on policy and practice with regard to crack cocaine sentencing guideline retroactivity. Those with access to the site include all federal court judges and employees, federal defenders, personnel from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (such as Probation), the Sentencing Commission and the Federal Judicial Center.

Office of Defender Services/Training Branch, Administrative Office of the United States Courts * One Columbus Circle, N.E. * Suite G-430 * Washington, DC 20544 Phone (202) 502-2900 * Hotline (800) 788-9908 * Fax (202) 502-2911

Tags: , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Case Law Update | No Comments »

Posted by admin on September 8th, 2010

I. INTRODUCTION

This outline summarizes United States Supreme Court decisions published between

September 29, 2009 and March 31, 2010, and those cases pending review. For up-to-date

summaries of all decided cases and cases pending review, see the

Review-Preview-Overview

Division, Office of the Federal Public Defender, S.D. Fla., and available at

United States Supreme Court, updated weekly by Paul M. Rashkind, Chief of the Appellatehttp://www.rashkind.com

direct any email questions about this outline or the websites listed above to

II. SPECIFIC OFFENSES

A. Cases Granted Review

, or the U.S. Supreme Court Blog at http://ussc.blogspot.com/. Pleaselaura_wasco@fd.org.

Skilling v. United States

F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009); Honest Services Fraud; 18 U.S.C. § 1346.

, 130 S.Ct. 393 (cert. granted Oct. 13, 2009); decision below at 554

Issues: (1) Whether the federal “honest services” fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, requires

the government to prove that the defendant’s conduct was intended to achieve

“private gain” rather than to advance the employer’s interests, and, if not, whether

§ 1346 is unconstitutionally vague. (2) When a presumption of jury prejudice

arises because of the widespread community impact of the defendant’s alleged

conduct and massive, inflammatory pretrial publicity, whether the government

may rebut the presumption of prejudice, and, if so, whether the government must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror was actually prejudiced.

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project

below at 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2007); Material Assistance to Terrorist Organization; 18

U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).

, 130 S.Ct. 48 (cert. granted Sep. 30, 2009); decision

Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the knowing provision of “any

*** service, *** training, [or] expert advice or assistance,” 18 U.S.C. §

2339A(b)(1), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally

vague.

Carr v. United States

578 (7th Cir. 2009); Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”); 18 U.S.C.

, 130 S. Ct. 47 (cert. granted Sept. 30, 2009); decision below at 551 F.3d

§

2250(a).Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), which imposes criminal penalties on certain sex

offenders who travel in interstate commerce and knowingly fail to register or

update a registration as required by SORNA, 42 U.S.C. § 16901, et seq., applies

to petitioner, whose interstate travel occurred after his conviction for a sex offense

Page 4 of 8

that triggers a registration requirement, but before SORNA’s enactment. (2)

Whether the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes prosecution under § 2250(a) of a

person whose underlying offense and interstate travel predated SORNA’s

enactment, but whose failure to register occurred well after SORNA’s

requirements became applicable to him.

Robertson v. United States, ex Rel. Watson

decision below at 940 A.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Criminal Contempt; D.C. Code 1981,

, 130 S.Ct. 1011 (cert. granted Dec. 14, 2009);§

16-1005(f).

Issue: Whether, consistent with this Court’s cases and the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an action for criminal

contempt in a congressionally created court may be brought in the name and

pursuant to the power of a private person, rather than in the name and pursuant to

the power of the United States.

III. SECOND AMENDMENT

A. Case Granted Review

McDonald v. City of Chicago

2008 WL 5111112 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Second Amendment.

, 130 S.Ct. 48 (cert. granted Sep. 30, 2009); decision below at

Issue: Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as

against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or

Due Process Clauses.

IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT

A. Case Granted Review

City of Ontario v. Quon

F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2009); Fourth Amendment and Expectation of Privacy.

, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (cert. granted Dec. 14, 2009); decision below at 529

Issues: (1) Whether a SWAT team member has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text

messages transmitted on his SWAT pager, where the police department has an official

no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking lieutenant announced an informal policy of

allowing some personal use of the pagers. (2) Whether the Ninth Circuit contravened this

Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents and created a circuit conflict by analyzing whether

the police department could have used “less intrusive methods” of reviewing text

messages transmitted by a SWAT team member on his SWAT pager. (3) Whether

individuals who send text messages to a SWAT team member’s SWAT pager have a

Page 5 of 8

reasonable expectation that their messages will be free from review by the recipient’s

government employer.

V. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS

A. Decided Cases

Maryland v. Shatzer

Counsel.

, 559 U.S. ___ (2010); Questioning Following Invocation of Right to

Issue: Can an extended passage of time (here two and a half years) between a person’s

invocation of the right to counsel and officer’s subsequent attempts to question that

person nullify the proscription against further police-initiated questioning.

Held: Yes, the rule enunciated in

person’s invocation of right to counsel only applies to a period of 14 days after such

invocation.

Edwards v. Arizona which precludes interrogation following aFlorida v. Powell

of Counsel.

, 559 U.S. __ (2010); Sufficiency of

Miranda’s Advice of Right to PresenceIssue: Whether prior to questioning a person, the interrogating officer must expressly advise

him/her of the rights to consult with counsel prior to questioning and at any time during

questioning.

Held: No, so long as the

custodial interrogation, the warnings need not expressly state that a person has the right to

consult with an attorney prior to answering questions and has a related right to consult

with counsel in the middle of interrogation. Here, the warning of a “right to talk to a

lawyer before answering any questions” along with the right to use this right at any time,

sufficed.

Miranda warning reasonably conveys rights which attach during aPadilla v. Kentucky

, 559 U.S. __ (2010); Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel.

Issue: Whether failure to correctly inform client of guilty plea’s immigration consequences

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Held: As a matter of federal law, counsel must inform a client when his or her plea carries a risk

of deportation.

B. Cases Granted Review

Page 6 of 8

Michigan v. Bryant

Mich. 132 (2009); Confrontation Clause and

, 130 S. Ct. __ (cert. granted March 1, 2010); decision below at 483

Crawford.Issue: Whether preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and

circumstances of the shooting are nontestimonial because they were “made under

circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to

enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” including not only aid to a

wounded victim, but also the prompt identification and apprehension of an apparently

violent and dangerous individual.

VI. SENTENCING

A. Decided Case

Johnson v. United States

Predicates.

, 559 U. S. __ (2010); Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)

Issues: (1) Whether a simple battery conviction involving merely de minimis physical contact

categorically meets ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. (2) Whether a state’s highest

court holding that predicate state conviction does not have as an element the use or

threatened use of physical force against another is binding on federal court applying

ACCA.

Held: Because the Florida offense of battery by offensive touching does not require the use of

physical force, it does not qualify as an ACCA predicate under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

B. Cases Granted Review

United States v. O’Brien

F.3d 921 (1st Cir. 2009); Mandatory Minimums.

, 130 S. Ct. 49 (cert. granted Sept. 30, 2009); decision below at 542

Issue: Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides for a series of escalating

mandatory minimum sentences depending on the manner in which the basic crime (viz.

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to an underlying offense, or possessing

that firearm in furtherance of that offense) is carried out. The question is whether the

sentence enhancement to a 30-year minimum when the firearm is a machine gun is an

element of the offense that must be charged and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt, or instead a sentencing factor that may be found by a judge by the preponderance

of the evidence.

Barber v. Thomas

800 (9th Cir. 2008); Good Time Credit.

, 130 S. Ct. 737 (cert. granted Nov. 30, 2009); decision below at 533 F.3d

Page 7 of 8

Issues: (1) Does “term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act,

enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time

credits on the basis of the sentence imposed. (2) If “term of imprisonment” in the federal

good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference

appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be

awarded based on the sentence imposed.

Abbott v. United States

States

Cir. 2009) and 329 Fed. Appx. 569 (5th Cir. 2009), respectively; Consecutive Mandatory

Minimums with § 924(c).

, 130 S. Ct. 1284 (cert. granted Jan. 25, 2010) and

Gould v. United, 130 S. Ct. 1283 (cert. granted Jan. 25, 2010); decisions below at 574 F.3d 203 (3rdIssue: The cases have been consolidated to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)’s

prefatory phrase “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise

provided by this section or by any other provision of law” encompasses the underlying

drug trafficking offense or crime of violence, and if not, whether it includes another

offense for possessing the firearm in the same transaction.

United States v. Dolan

F.3d 10 (10th Cir. 2009); Timeliness of Order of Restitution.

, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (cert. granted Jan. 8, 2010); decision below at 571

Issue: Whether a district court may enter a restitution order beyond the time limit prescribed in

18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).

Dillon v. United States

572 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. Jun 10, 2009); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

, 130 S.Ct. 797 (cert. granted December 7, 2009); decision below at

Issues: (1) Whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are binding when a district court imposes

a new sentence pursuant to a revised guideline range under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. (2)

Whether during a § 3582(c)(2) sentencing, a district court is required to impose sentence

based on an admittedly incorrectly calculated guideline range.

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder

below at 570 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2009); Federal Misdemeanor as an Aggravated Felony.

, 130 S.Ct. 1012 (cert. granted December 14, 2009); decision

Issue: Whether a person convicted under state law for simple drug possession (a federal

misdemeanor) has been “convicted” of an “aggravated felony” on the theory that he could

have been prosecuted for recidivist simple possession (a federal felony), even though

there was no charge or finding of a prior conviction in his prosecution for possession.

VII. APPEALS

A. Case Granted Review

Page 8 of 8

United States v. Marcus

538 F.3d 97 (2 Cir. 2008); Ex Post Facto Prohibitions

, 130 S.Ct. 393 (cert. granted October 13, 2009); decision below atnd and Standard of Review.

Issue: Whether the Second Circuit departed from the Court’s interpretation of Rule 52(b) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by adopting as the appropriate standard for

plain-error review of an alleged ex post facto violation whether there is any possibility

that the defendant could have been convicted based exclusively on conduct that took

place before the enactment of the statutes in question.

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Case Law Update | No Comments »